The EPR problem is studied both from an instrumentalistic and from a realistic point of view. Bohr's reply to the EPR paper is analyzed and demonstrated to be not completely representative of Bohr's general views on the possibility of defining properties of a microscopic object. A more faithful Bohrian answer would not have led Einstein to the conclusion that Bohr's completeness claim of quantum mechanics implies nonlocality. The projection postulate, already denounced in 1936 by Margenau as the source of the (...) EPR paradox, is found to be also at the origin of the nonlocality conundrum. Its unobservability in EPR-like experiments is demonstrated, thus showing the redundancy of the idea of nonlocality in the instrumentalist interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is argued that also from a realist point of view there is no reason to assume nonlocality. The relevance of Bohm's quantum potential and of Bell's inequalities with respect to the (non)locality problem is discussed. (shrink)

The known facts of quantum physics and biology strongly suggest the following hypotheses: atoms and the fundamental particles have a rudimentary degree of consciousness, volition, or self-activity; the basic features of quantum mechanics are a result of this fact; the quantum mechanical wave properties of matter are actually the conscious properties of matter; and living organisms are a direct result of these properties of matter. These hypotheses are tested by using them to make detailed predictions of new facts, and then (...) by showing that the predictions can be verified. The hypotheses are used to predict successfully that the quantum wave properties of matter are strongly predominant in proteins, to explain the presence and relative abundance of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur in proteins, and to explain diffraction phenomena, the behavior of helium II, the exclusion principle, and causality and determinism in modern science, thus closely relating physics and biology. (shrink)

Introductory Abstract Philosophers of science, in the course of making a sharp distinction between the tasks of the philosopher and those of the scientist, have pointed to the possibility of an empirical science of induction. A comparative psychology of knowledge processes is offered as one aspect of this potential enterprise. From fragments of such a psychology, methodological suggestions are drawn relevant to several chronic problems in the social sciences, including the publication of negative results from novel explorations, the operational diagnosis (...) of dispositions, the status of aggregates of persons as social entities, and the validation of psychological tests. (shrink)

This paper's purpose is to set forth the conditions of explanation in the domain of formal modelling of social action. Explanation is defined as an adequate account of the underlying factors bringing about a phenomenon. The modelling of a social phenomenon can claim explanatory value in this sense if the following two conditions are fulfilled. (1) The generative mechanisms involved translate the effects of real factors abstracted from their phenomenal context, not those of purely ideal ones. (2) The explanatory hypotheses, (...) which account for the effects of explanatory factors, and the purely descriptive hypotheses, which introduce conceptual simplifications and summarise complex secondary mechanisms, are relatively independent from each other with regard to the phenomenon represented. This condition subjects the model to testing by alternatives through the development of purely descriptive hypotheses in the sense of explanatory or analytical realism. (shrink)

There exists a fundamental convergence between some major trends of modern epistemology—as outlined, for instance, by Filmer Northrop and Henry Margenau—and the theories actually developed within sciences of the human mind where two types of thought—one implicit and, the other, explicit—tend to refer to two different lines of development. Moreover, these theories can find in the psychology of Lev Vygotsky some seminal hypotheses of a major importance. In order to highlight this convergence, we parallel the role played by structured conceptual (...) systems in Vygotsky’s conception of intellectual development and Northrop’s epistemology. We show how these conceptual systems account for the notion of causality and can explain the success of scientific thought, i.e. its possible match with the real world, while this match falsely justified an overall biological model of intellectual development in Jean Piaget’s work. We conclude that dual process theorists should no longer neglect cognitive tools, and especially conceptual systems, which underpin the awareness and mastery of thought that are characteristic of type 2 processes. This whole analysis leads us to maintain that human psychology is not characterized in the first instance by a need to act, but a quest for meaning. (shrink)

The explanatory power of structures in analytical sociologists’ agent-based models brings into question methodological individualism. We defend that from an explanatory point of view, the syntactic properties of models require semantic conditions of interpretation drawn from a conceptual research framework; in such a framework, social/relational structures have only partial, explanatory power ; and taking the explanation further through generative mechanism modeling necessitates calling upon methodological individualism’s generic framework of interpretation that relies on social actors’ rational capacity. According to this interpretive (...) framework, forces in action in society are governed by the subjective meaning of/the reasons for individual actions. (shrink)

This second installment from the author's book-length study of Ralph Wendell Burhoe's life and thought details the background of the establishing of the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science in 1955 and its intellectual rationale. A group of clergy from the Coming Great Church Conference and scientists who were members of the Committee on Science and Values of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences came together to form the new Institute on Star Island, off the coast of (...) Portsmouth, New Hampshire. From the beginning, with the guidance of Burhoe, the chief concern of these scientists and clergy was the need to regenerate a contemporary civilization that was on the brink of danger due to its inability to discipline its own burgeoning scientific and technological prowess. Revitalizing religion was deemed essential to this regeneration of society. Since religion is largely destabilized by science, the major task is to emphasize how contemporary scientific understandings support religious wisdom and accentuate its importance. This task is to be accomplished through a science-based theology which reformulates religious wisdom for a culture that accepts science as the most reliable form of knowledge. This rationale for IRAS also articulates the program to which Burhoe committed himself. (shrink)

When the state of a physical system is not fully determined by available data, it should be possible nevertheless to make a systematic guess concerning the unknown state by applying the principles of information theory. The resulting theoretical blend of informational and mechanical constructs should then constitute a modern structure for statistical physics. Such a program has been attempted by a number of authors, most notably Jaynes, with seeming success. However, we demonstrated in a recent publication that the standard list (...) of so-called “mutually exclusive and exhaustive” quantum states that is commonly employed by these authors is in fact not exhaustive. It follows that the information-theoretic foundations of quantum statistics must be reformulated. The present paper discusses the fundamental problems involved and establishes a format for the correct application of information theory to quantum mechanical situations. (shrink)

EXPANDED EDITION (eBook): -/- Infinity Is Not What It Seems...Infinity is commonly assumed to be a logical concept, reliable for conducting mathematics, describing the Universe, and understanding the divine. Most of us are educated to take for granted that there exist infinite sets of numbers, that lines contain an infinite number of points, that space is infinite in expanse, that time has an infinite succession of events, that possibilities are infinite in quantity, and over half of the world’s population believes (...) in a divine Creator infinite in knowledge, power, and benevolence. -/- According to this treatise, such assumptions are mistaken. In reality, to be is to be finite. The implications of this assessment are profound: the Universe and even God must necessarily be finite. -/- The author makes a compelling case against infinity, refuting its most prominent advocates. Any defense of the infinite will find it challenging to answer the arguments laid out in this book. But regardless of the reader’s position, FOREVER FINITE offers plenty of thought-provoking material for anyone interested in the subject of infinity from the perspectives of philosophy, mathematics, science, and theology. -/- This electronic edition of FOREVER FINITE is offered free online for all and is expanded with content that does not appear in the published edition due to print production page limitations. From the Introduction to the Conclusion, Chapters 1–27 are identical to the published print edition, including the page numbering for the chapters. This electronic edition adds an appendix and associated content—specifically, updates to the book’s back matter (68 new endnotes, 17 new bibliographic references, 3 new figure credits, 14 new glossary terms) and front matter (an updated table of contents and this preface note). (shrink)

The only observational quantity which quantum mechanics needs to address islocation. The typical primitive observation on a microsystem (e.g., photon) isdetection at alocation (e.g., by a photomultiplier “looking at” a grating). To analyze an experiment, (a) form a conceptual ensemble of replicas of it, (b) assign a wave function (in “position representation”) to its initial condition, (c) evolve the wave function by the Schrödinger equation (known, once and for all, as a function of the system's composition), (d) compute the probability (...) for particle detection at various times and places. The initial wave function is chosen on the basis of experience with such treatments. Key experiments are thus treated: (i) time-of-flight, (ii) Stern-Gerlach, (iii) Franck-Hertz, (iv) photon recoil, (v) photoionization. Quantum states, dynamical variables, and measurements, and the usual postulates about them, are superfluous. The explicit treatments are nonrelativistic; the existence of relativistic generalizations is left open. (shrink)

It is proposed to consider present-day physics as dealing with a special situation, the situation in which the phenomena of life and consciousness play no role. It is pointed out that physical theory has often dealt, in the past, with similarly special situations. Planetary theory neglects all but gravitational forces, macroscopic physics neglects fluctuations due to the atomic structure of matter, nuclear physics disregards weak and gravitational interactions. In some of these cases, physicists were well aware of dealing with special (...) situations, or limiting cases as they are called in the article; in other cases, they were not. It is pointed out that, even if it were true that present-day physics accurately describes the motion of the physical constituents of living bodies, it would not give the whole story. Arguments are adduced, however, to show that the laws of physics, applicable for inanimate matter, will have to be modified when dealing with the more general situation in which life and consciousness play significant roles. (shrink)

Many have found attractive views according to which the veracity of specific causal judgements is underwritten by general causal laws. This paper describes various variants of that view and explores complications that appear when one looks at a certain simple type of example from physics. To capture certain causal dependencies, physics is driven to look at equations which, I argue, are not causal laws. One place where physics is forced to look at such equations (and not the only place) is (...) in its handling of Green's functions which reveal point-wise causal dependencies. Thus, I claim that there is no simple relationship between causal dependence and causal laws of the sort often pictured. Rather, this paper explores the complexity of the relationship in a certain well-understood case. (shrink)

A reproducibility principle is formulated and adopted as the guiding criterion for the acceptance of an experimental procedure as a simultaneous measurement of several observables. It is pointed out that this criterion can be applied to classical as well as quantum physics, and that it incorporates compatible as well as incompatible observables. The concept of fuzzy probability measure is presented as a possible mathematical tool for the description of statistical processes involving measurements of incompatible observables.

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Vol. 2, number 1, Autumn 1987, pp. 84-104. R.M. Nugayev. The genesis and structure of models in the modern theory of gravity. Abstract. The analysis of theory-choice problem in modern theory of gravity necessitates consideration of the genesis and the structure of the systems of gravitational abstract objects. My approach to physical theory structure uses and develops the ideas of V.S.Stepin. The basic equations of general relativity - Einstein’s equations – are shown to (...) describe the relations between the abstract objects of the basic model only. The whole theory of gravity chain consists of general relativity, nonmetric theories of gravitation, Newton’s theory of gravitation and special theory of relativity. All these theories describe the relations between the abstract objects of partial ideal models subordinated to the basic one. (shrink)

. The confrontation between Hellenism and Judaism goes back to the invasion of the Middle East by the armies of Alexander the Great. The differing ideologies, first rationalized by Philo of Alexandria, have emerged repeatedly for the past 2,000 years. The inability to resolve the differences can be traced to the differing epistemologies of religious fundamentalists and scientists with views that can be traced to Karl Popper, Immanuel Kant, and, ultimately, Aristotle.

Almost all commentators acknowledge that among the grounds on which scientists perform theory-choices are criteria of simplicity. In general, simplicity is regarded either as only a logico-empirical quality of a theory, diagnostic of the theory's future predictive success, or as a purely aesthetic or otherwise extra-empirical property of it. This paper attempts to demonstrate that the simplicity-criteria applied in scientific practice include both a logico-empirical and a quasi-aesthetic criterion: to conflate these in an account of scientists' theory-choice is to court (...) confusion. (shrink)

Van Bendegem has recently offered an argument to the effect that, if time is discrete, then there should exist a correspondence between the motions of massive bodies and a discrete geometry. On this basis, he concludes that, even if space is continuous, it should nonetheless appear discrete. This paper examines the two possible ways of making sense of that correspondence, and shows that in neither case van Bendegem’s conclusion logically follows.

This paper investigates the possibiity of developing a fully micro realistic version of elementary quantum mechanics. I argue that it is highly desirable to develop such a version of quantum mechanics, and that the failure of all current versions and interpretations of quantum mechanics to constitute micro realistic theories is at the root of many of the interpretative problems associated with quantum mechanics, in particular the problem of measurement. I put forward a propensity micro realistic version of quantum mechanics, and (...) suggest how it might be possible to discriminate, on expermental grounds, between this theory and other versions of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

A fully micro realistic, propensity version of quantum theory is proposed, according to which fundamental physical entities - neither particles nor fields - have physical characteristics which determine probabilistically how they interact with one another . The version of quantum "smearon" theory proposed here does not modify the equations of orthodox quantum theory: rather, it gives a radically new interpretation to these equations. It is argued that there are strong general reasons for preferring quantum "smearon" theory to orthodox quantum theory; (...) the proposed change in physical interpretation leads quantum "smearon" theory to make experimental predictions subtly different from those of orthodox quantum theory. Some possible crucial experiments are considered. (shrink)

The paper puts forward the proposal to do relativistic quantum theory without a position operator and without a position probability amplitude. The proposed scheme employs space and time in a fundamental manner and treats them equitably as in special relativity by defining the state vectors as functions of configuration spacetime. From a discussion of the conceptual structure and of the problem of measurement of quantum theory, there emerges an understanding which shows that the absence of a satisfactory position probability density (...) in important cases like that of the photon, in the usual scheme of quantum theory, poses a fundamental difficulty, but that the scheme proposed here is free from the same difficulty and promises, instead, to lead in a natural manner to a fundamentally more satisfactory description of the observations. (shrink)

There is broad consensus as to what a rigid body is in classical mechanics. The idea is that a rigid body is an undeformable body. In this paper I show that, if this identification is accepted, there are therefore rigid bodies which are unstable. Instability here means that the evolution of certain rigid bodies, even when isolated from all external influence, may be such that their identity is not preserved over time. The result is followed by analyzing supertasks that are (...) possible in infinite systems of rigid bodies. I propose that, if we wish to preserve our original intuitions regarding the necessary stability of rigid bodies, then the concept of rigid body must be clearly distinguished from that of undeformable body. I therefore put forward a new definition of rigid body. Only the concept of undeformable body is holistic and every connected part of a rigid body in this new sense is always a rigid body in this new sense. Finally, I briefly discuss the connection between this conceptual distinction and the dimensionality of space, thereby enabling it to be supported from a new and interesting perspective. (shrink)

I defend the projection postulate against two of Margenau's criticisms. One involves two types of nonideal measurements, measurements that disturb and measurements that annihilate. Such measurements cannot be characterized using the original version of the projection postulate. This is one of the most interesting and powerful objections to the projection postulate since most realistic measurements are nonideal, in Margenau's sense. I show that a straightforward generalization of the projection postulate is capable of handling the more realistic kinds of measurements considered (...) by Margenau. His other objection involves the EPR (Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen) situation. He suggests that there is a significant potential for violations of the no-superluminalsignals requirement of the special theory of relativity, if projections occur in this situation and others like it. He also suggests that what is paradoxical about this situation disappears if the projection postulate is rejected. I show that it is not possible to use measurements on pairs of spatially-separated systems whose states are entangled to transmit information superluminally, and generalize this result to include nonideal measurements. I also show that EPR's dilemma does not really depend on the projection postulate. (shrink)

The present study attempts to provide a consistent and coherent account of what the world could be like, given the conceptual framework and results of contemporary quantum theory. It is suggested that standard quantum mechanics can, and indeed should, be understood as a realist theory within its domain of application. It is pointed out, however, that a viable realist interpretation of quantum theory requires the abandonment or radical revision of the classical conception of physical reality and its traditional philosophical presuppositions. (...) It is argued, in this direction, that the conceptualization of the nature of reality, as arising out of our most basic physical theory, calls for a kind of contextual realism. Within the domain of quantum mechanics, knowledge of 'reality in itself', 'the real such as it truly is' independent of the way it is contextualized, is impossible in principle. In this connection, the meaning of objectivity in quantum mechanics is analyzed, whilst the important question concerning the nature of quantum objects is explored. (shrink)

Standard quantum mechanics undeniably violates the notion of separability that classical physics accustomed us to consider as valid. By relating the phenomenon of quantum nonseparability to the all-important concept of potentiality, we effectively provide a coherent picture of the puzzling entangled correlations among spatially separated systems. We further argue that the generalized phenomenon of quantum nonseparability implies contextuality for the production of well-defined events in the quantum domain, whereas contextuality entails in turn a structural-relational conception of quantal objects, viewed as (...) carriers of dispositional properties. It is finally suggested that contextuality, if considered as a conditionalization preparation procedure of the object to be measured, naturally leads to a separable concept of reality whose elements are experienced as distinct, well-localized objects having determinate properties. In this connection, we find it necessary to distinguish the meaning of the term reality from the criterion of reality for us. The implications of the latter considerations for the notion of objectivity in quantum mechanics are also discussed. (shrink)

It is shown that Lewis’ ontological doctrine of Humean supervenience incorporates at its foundation the so-called separability principle of classical physics. In view of the systematic violation of the latter within quantum mechanics, the claim that contemporary physical science may posit non-supervenient relations beyond the spatiotemporal ones is reinforced on a foundational basis concerning constraints on the state representation of physical systems. Depending on the mode of assignment of states to quantum systems — unit state vectors versus statistical density operators (...) — we distinguish between strongly and weakly non-Humean, non-supervenient relations. It is demonstrated that in either case, the relations of quantum entanglement constitute prototypical examples of irreducible physical relations that do not supervene upon a spatiotemporal arrangement of Humean qualities, weakening, thereby, the thesis of Humean supervenience. In this respect, the status of Lewis’ recombination principle is examined, whereas his conception of lawhood is critically investigated. It is concluded that the assumption of ontological reductionism, as expressed in Lewis’ Humean doctrine, cannot be regarded as a reliable code of the nature of the physical world and its contents. It is proposed instead that due to the undeniable existence of non-supervenient relations, a metaphysic of relations of a moderate kind ought to be acknowledged as an indispensable part of our understanding of the natural world at a fundamental level. (shrink)

Standard quantum mechanics unquestionably violates the separability principle that classical physics (be it point-like analytic, statistical, or field-theoretic) accustomed us to consider as valid. In this paper, quantum nonseparability is viewed as a consequence of the Hilbert-space quantum mechanical formalism, avoiding thus any direct recourse to the ramifications of Kochen-Specker’s argument or Bell’s inequality. Depending on the mode of assignment of states to physical systems – unit state vectors versus non-idempotent density operators – we distinguish between strong/relational and weak/deconstructional forms (...) of quantum nonseparability. The origin of the latter is traced down and discussed at length, whereas its relation to the all important concept of potentiality in forming a coherent picture of the puzzling entangled interconnections among spatially separated systems is also considered. Finally, certain philosophical consequences of quantum non-separability concerning the nature of quantum objects, the question of realism in quantum mechanics, and possible limitations in revealing the actual character of physical reality in its entirety are explored. (shrink)

We examine some of Connes’ criticisms of Robinson’s infinitesimals starting in 1995. Connes sought to exploit the Solovay model S as ammunition against non-standard analysis, but the model tends to boomerang, undercutting Connes’ own earlier work in functional analysis. Connes described the hyperreals as both a “virtual theory” and a “chimera”, yet acknowledged that his argument relies on the transfer principle. We analyze Connes’ “dart-throwing” thought experiment, but reach an opposite conclusion. In S , all definable sets of reals are (...) Lebesgue measurable, suggesting that Connes views a theory as being “virtual” if it is not definable in a suitable model of ZFC. If so, Connes’ claim that a theory of the hyperreals is “virtual” is refuted by the existence of a definable model of the hyperreal field due to Kanovei and Shelah. Free ultrafilters aren’t definable, yet Connes exploited such ultrafilters both in his own earlier work on the classification of factors in the 1970s and 80s, and in Noncommutative Geometry, raising the question whether the latter may not be vulnerable to Connes’ criticism of virtuality. We analyze the philosophical underpinnings of Connes’ argument based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, and detect an apparent circularity in Connes’ logic. We document the reliance on non-constructive foundational material, and specifically on the Dixmier trace −∫ (featured on the front cover of Connes’ magnum opus) and the Hahn–Banach theorem, in Connes’ own framework. We also note an inaccuracy in Machover’s critique of infinitesimal-based pedagogy. (shrink)

A new interpretation of the time-reversal invariance principle is given. As a result, it is shown that microscopic dynamic reversibility has no basis in physics. The existing contradiction between one-way time and two-way time is reconciled. It is also pointed out that the common notion that clocks run backwards when time is reversed is wrong.

An explicit philosophy and meta-philosophy of positivism, empiricism and popperianism is provided. Early popperianism is argued to be essentially a form of empiricism, the deviations from empiricism are traced. In contrast, the meta-philosophy and philosophy of an evolutionary naturalistic realism is developed and it is shown how the maximal conflict of this doctrine with all forms of empiricism at the meta-philosophical level both accounts for the form of its development at the philosophical level and its defense against attack from nonrealist (...) quarters. Following an earlier article on realism of similar theme (Synthese 26 (1974), 409) this paper then further explores the ramifications of a thoroughgoing realist position. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the problem of experimental error. The prevalent view that experimental errors can be dismissed as a tiresome but trivial blemish on the method of experimentation is criticized. It is stressed that the occurrence of errors in experiments constitutes a permanent feature of the attempt to test theories in the physical world, and this feature deserves proper attention. It is suggested that a classification of types of experimental error may be useful as a heuristic device in (...) studying the nature of these errors. However, the standard classification of systematic and random errors is mathematically based does not focus on the causes of the errors, their origins, or the contexts in which they arise. A new typology of experimental errors is therefore proposed whose criterion is epistemological. This typology reflects the various stages that can be discerned in the execution of an experiment, each stage constituting a category of a certain type of experimental error. The proposed classification consists of four categories which are illustrated by historical cases. (shrink)

Abstract One cannot discount experimental errors and turn the attention to the logicomathematical structure of a physical theory without distorting the nature of the scientific method. The occurrence of errors in experiments constitutes an inherent feature of the attempt to test theories in the physical world. This feature deserves proper attention which has been neglected. An attempt is made to address this problem.

The principle of causality has traditionally been formulated in terms of the dynamic equations of classical physics. It has been believed that only stable (conservative) systems can be meaningfully studied in this way. The evolutionary systems studied by social scientists and biologists are non-conservative, and so are excluded from the traditional formulation of causality. The author argues that causal laws for non-conservative systems can be meaningfully formulated. An example based on Malthus'' population theory is given.

This part of the paper concludes the presentation of the unified theory. It is shown that the theory requires the existence of, and applies only to, irreducible quantal dispersions associated with pure or mixed states. Two experimental procedures are given for the operational verification of such dispersions. Because the existence of irreducible dispersions associated with mixed states is required by Postulate 4 of the theory, and because Postulate 4 expresses the basic implications of the second law of classical thermodynamics, it (...) is concluded that the second law is a manifestation of phenomena characteristic of irreducible quantal dispersions associated with the elementary constituents of matter. (shrink)

Faced with strong arguments to the effect that Leibniz''sPrinciple of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is not a necessary truth, many supporters of the Principle have staged a strategic retreat to the claim that it is contingently true in this, the actual, world. The purpose of this paper is to examine the status of the various forms of PII in both classical and quantum physics, and it is concluded that this latter view is at best doubtful, at worst, simply wrong.

Some recent work in the philosophy of quantum mechanics has suggested that quantum systems can be thought of as non-separable and therefore non-individual, in some sense, in Bell and E.P.R. type situations. This suggestion is set in the context of previous work regarding the individuality of quantal particles and it is argued that such entities can be considered as individuals if their non-classical statistical correlations are understood in terms of non-supervenient relations holding between them. We conclude that such relations are (...) strongly non-supervenient in Cleland's sense and note a possible connection between this idea and the realist quantum logic programme. (shrink)

Arthur Pap’s work played an important role in the development of the analytic tradition. This role goes beyond the merely historical fact that Pap’s views of dispositional and modal concepts were influential. As a sympathetic critic of logical empiricism, Pap, like Quine, saw a deep tension in logical empiricism at its very best in the work of Carnap. But Pap’s critique of Carnap is quite different from Quine’s, and represents the discovery of limits beyond which empiricism cannot go, where there (...) lies nothing other than intuitive knowledge of logic itself. Pap’s arguments for this intuitive knowledge anticipate Etchemendy’s recent critique of the model-theoretic account of logical consequence. Pap’s work also anticipates prominent developments in the contemporary neo-Fregean philosophy of mathematics championed by Wright and Hale. Finally, Pap’s major philosophical preoccupation, the concepts of necessity and possibility, provides distinctive solutions and perspectives on issues of contemporary concern in the metaphysics of modality. In particular, Pap’s account of modality allows us to see the significance of Kripke’s well-known arguments on necessity and apriority in a new light. (shrink)