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9. The Ring: On Religious Pluralism

In David Heyd (ed.), Toleration: An Elusive Virtue. Princeton University Press. pp. 147-157 (1996)

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  1. Problems of Religious Luck, Chapter 6: The Pattern Stops Here?Guy Axtell - 2018 - In Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement. Lanham, MD, USA & London, UK: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.
    This book has argued that problems of religious luck, especially when operationalized into concerns about doxastic risk and responsibility, can be of shared interest to theologians, philosophers, and psychologists. We have pointed out counter-inductive thinking as a key feature of fideistic models of faith, and examined the implications of this point both for the social scientific study of fundamentalism, and for philosophers’ and theologians’ normative concerns with the reasonableness of a) exclusivist attitudes to religious multiplicity, and b) theologically-cast but bias-mirroring (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.Guy Axtell - 2018 - Lanham, MD, USA & London, UK: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.
    To speak of being religious lucky certainly sounds odd. But then, so does “My faith holds value in God’s plan, while yours does not.” This book argues that these two concerns — with the concept of religious luck and with asymmetric or sharply differential ascriptions of religious value — are inextricably connected. It argues that religious luck attributions can profitably be studied from a number of directions, not just theological, but also social scientific and philosophical. There is a strong tendency (...)
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  • Religion in the public sphere.Andrew F. Smith - 2014 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 40 (6):535-554.
    Commonplace among deliberative theorists is the view that, when defending preferred laws and policies, citizens should appeal only to reasons they expect others reasonably to accept. This view has been challenged on the grounds that it places an undue burden on religious citizens who feel duty-bound to appeal to religious reasons to justify preferred positions. In response, I develop a conception of democratic deliberation that provides unlimited latitude regarding the sorts of reasons that can be introduced, so long as one (...)
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  • Second-Order Arguments, or Do We Still Need Tolerance in the Public Sphere?Aleksei Loginov - 2019 - Changing Societies and Personalities 3 (4):319-332.
    A number of widely discussed court decisions on cases of insults against religious feelings in Russia, such as the relatively recent “Pokemon Go” case of blogger Ruslan Sokolovsky or the lawsuit filed against an Orthodox priest by Nikolai Ryabchevsky in Yekaterinburg for comparing Lenin with Hitler, make pertinent the question of why toleration becomes so difficult in matters concerning religion. In this paper, I revise the classical liberal concept of toleration (David Heyd, Peter Nicholson, and John Horton), arguing that it (...)
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  • Religious diversity and religious toleration.Philip L. Quinn - 2001 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 50 (1/3):57-80.
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  • Duelo divino. Libertad de conciencia y tolerancia religiosa.Leonardo González Valderrama - 2016 - Ideas Y Valores 65 (S2):107-120.
    Para defender la tolerancia religiosa, se muestra que no hay razones para considerar que unas religiones son más verdaderas que otras, del mismo modo que no es posible establecer que una religión es verdadera, ya que la creencia religiosa no tiene un valor objetivo absoluto. Se sostiene además que, al no ser posible el establecimiento de la objetividad de la creencia religiosa, solo si esta se funda en la libertad de conciencia es posible defender la tolerancia religiosa.
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