In argumentation, metaphors are often considered as ambiguous or deceptive uses of language leading to fallacies of reasoning. However, they can also provide useful insights into creative argumentation, leading to genuinely new knowledge. Metaphors entail a framing effect that implicitly provides a specific perspective to interpret the world, guiding reasoning and evaluation of arguments. In the same vein, emotions could be in sharp contrast with proper reasoning, but they can also be cognitive processes of affective framing, influencing our reasoning and (...) behavior in different meaningful ways. Thus, a double (metaphorical and affective) framing effect might influence argumentation in the case of emotive metaphors, such as “Poverty is a disease” or “Your boss is a dictator,” where specific “emotive words” (disease, dictator) are used as vehicles. We present and discuss the results of two experimental studies designed to explore the role of emotive metaphors in argumentation. The studies investigated whether and to what extent the detection of a fallacious argument is influenced by the presence of a conventional vs. novel emotive metaphor. Participants evaluated a series of verbal arguments containing either “non-emotive” or “emotive” (positive or negative) metaphors as middle terms that “bridge” the premises of the argument. The results show that the affective coherence of the metaphor's vehicle and topic plays a crucial role in participants' reasoning style, leading to global heuristic vs. local analytical interpretive processes in the interplay of the metaphorical and the affective framing effects. (shrink)

Bryan Caplan’s The Myth of the Rational Voter treats several immensely important and understudied topics—public ignorance of economics, political ideology, and their connection to policy error—from an orthodox economic perspective whose applicability to these topics is overwhelmingly disproven by the available evidence. Moreover, Caplan adds to the traditional and largely irrelevant orthodox economic notion of rational public ignorance the claim that when voters favor counterproductive economic policies, they do so deliberately, i.e., knowingly. This leads him to assume (without any evidence) (...) that “emotion or ideology” explain mass economic error. Straightforward, unchosen mass ignorance of economic principles—neither “rational” nor “irrational,” but simply mistaken—is a more coherent explanation for economic error, and it is backed up by the vast body of public‐opinion research. (shrink)

Pre-theoretically, it seems obvious that there are deep and multifarious relations between memory and emotions. On the one hand, a large chunk of our affective lives concerns the good and bad events that happened to us and that we preserve in memory. This is one amongst the many ways in which memory is relevant to the nature and causation of emotions. What does recent research teach us about these relations? § 1 surveys some key issues in this regard. On the (...) other hand, which events we happen to preserve in memory very much depends on how we affectively reacted to them when they took place. Emotions are relevant to the nature and causation of memory in this and many other ways. Key issues regarding these relations are surveyed in § 2. (shrink)

This article introduces the key issues and themes that the articles in the Special Issue aim to apply and develop in greater detail. First, we argue that the field of collective remembering can be conceived as a site of active contestation, rather than simply a means of communicating a historic past or our deontic position in relation to these pasts. Approaching collective remembering as a Lieu de Dispute allows us, in turn, to foreground three consequential dimensions of remembrance, which the (...) articles in the issue examine in different ways: that collective remembering is an interpersonal, political and affective practice. This introduction discusses these three dimensions to collective remembering in greater detail, before outlining the remaining contents of the Special Issue. (shrink)

Many proponents of deliberative democracy expect reasonable citizens to engage in rational argumentation. However, this expectation runs up against findings by behavioral economists and social psychologists revealing the extent to which normal cognitive functions are influenced by bounded rationality. Individuals regularly utilize an array of biases in the process of making decisions, which inhibits our argumentative capacities by adversely affecting our ability and willingness to be self-critical and to give due consideration to others’ interests. Although these biases cannot be overcome, (...) I draw on scientifically corroborated insights offered by Adam Smith to show that they can be kept in check if certain affective and cognitive capacities are cultivated. Smith provides a compelling account of how to foster sympathetic, impartial, and projective role-taking in the process of interacting with others, which can greatly enhance our capacity and willingness to critically assess our own interests and fairly consider those of others. (shrink)

The theory of affective intelligence dichotomizes challenging situations into threatening and risky ones. When people perceive a familiar threat, they tend to be dogmatic and partisan, since they are mobilizing decisive action based on habitual behaviors and nearly instinctual perceptions that have proved their worth in similar situations. When facing a novel risk, however, people tend to become more open‐minded and deliberative, since old solutions do not apply. An experiment with students' reactions to challenges to their opinions about a divisive (...) political issue suggests that, indeed, democratic citizens display the different competencies that are demanded by these two different types of situation. The actual conduct of political campaigns, too, can be expected to reflect the differences between trying to guard against defections from one's side by encouraging the appearance of routine partisan combat, and trying to promote defections from the other side by prompting anxiety, hence open‐minded deliberation. (shrink)

Given current studies in moral psychology and following recent cases of wrong behaviour occurred in elite sporting events ? e.g. the racist chants scandals in the English Premier League or the events following Mourinho's poke in the eye scandal ? I shall analyse the extent to which supporters' brain make-up is determining them to behave in an ?unfair way?. Yet this paper is not just a work on descriptive ethics, but a normative ethics work. Therefore, once I have developed the (...) ?psycho-biological account of sports supporters?, I shall explore whether or not a more virtuous account of sports supporting can be drawn. In order to fulfil this normative task I shall appeal to the concept of ?fair play?. The common view of fair play defines it as ?the act of abiding by the rules?. However, my account of fair play is more complex and it is based on the moral principle of respecting others. This is the reason why fair play is not just something related to athletes but to supporters as well. To conclude, I shall sketch the boundaries of fair-play-based supporting behaviour in order to propose some policies or strategies that can help us to promote a ?healthy? and virtuous behaviour among fans. (shrink)

Though scholars have long acknowledged the vital role of affect in politics, recent research has sought to more thoroughly integrate emotions into models of political behavior. Emotions may prove to be the missing piece in a variety of puzzles with which political scientists have struggled for decades. At its core, democracy poses a collective action problem. For each individual citizen, the cost of productive political engagement often outweighs the additional policy benefits to be gained from such behavior. However, for a (...) variety of reasons, emotions appear to motivate citizens to at times break out of “cold” individual utility calculation and engage in politics. Still, emotions may also bias information processing, so scholars should keep this in mind as we continue to build on our understanding of emotion’s role in politics. (shrink)

This article demonstrates how critical realism can resolve persistent theoretical debates in the human rights literature. Critical realism is a philosophy of science that proposes a complex ontological framework to study causal relations. Methodological and theoretical decisions in research are always premised on some ontological presumption whether they are explicitly stated or not. However, much of the social sciences follow the discipline’s empiricist orthodoxy which often dismisses ontological inquiry. As a consequence, theoretical and methodological debates persist without scholars recognizing how (...) they reflect deeper ontological differences. I argue that this is the case with human rights research and demonstrate how critical realism can resolve tensions between universalism and relativism. Critical realism proposes that social relations resolve across multiple ontological levels. This ontological framework can illustrate how universal structures on one level can generate diverse human rights standards on another level relative to the cultural conditions that bring them about. (shrink)

Scholars in the field of education for sustainable development argue that it is vital that educators take emotions into account when teaching about global problems such as climate change. How to do this in the best way is still debated, however. This article aims to contribute to this discussion by arguing for the importance of critical emotional awareness (CEA). CEA is vital for future teachers to gain, but also for their future students to learn to be able to fight sustainability (...) problems in everyday life and in occupational roles. Through theoretical argumentation and insights from empirical studies, the article elaborates on the following questions: Why is CEA important? What components does this concept consist of? Some key characteristics are that CEA combines insights from emotion research and critical social science. It should be anchored in multidisciplinary emotion theories and research and should acknowledge both emotions and ways to cope. It is also vital to recognize that emotions and emotion regulation take place at individual and interactional levels and are, furthermore, influenced by larger societal emotion norms. CEA implies that these aspects are critically discussed in learning situations and that teacher education should give teachers the skills to lead such discussions. (shrink)

El artículo se centra en la relación entre los avances de la neuropolítica y una teoría de la democracia que tiene en la deliberación racional y en la búsqueda de acuerdos su eje central. El punto de partida para este diálogo interdisciplinar es la actual desafección que padecen nuestros sistemas democráticos. A partir de ahí se destacan tanto los peligros de una neuropolítica que comprende los procesos políticos como procesos mentales, como la necesidad de introducir la dimensión afectiva en la (...) política deliberativa. (shrink)

This paper deals with the COVID 19 pandemic problems from the point of view of political epistemology. It analyses the validity of conspiracy theories related to the origin, existence, and premeditation of COVID 19, as well as the effectiveness and legitimacy of the vaccines developed to stop its advance. To this end, the development of the work focuses on what we call the problem of the "formulation" that underlies conspiracy theories, analyzing it in two related dimensions. The first dimension of (...) an epistemic nature provides a demarcation criterion for the rationality of theories based on the falsification criterion. The second dimension accentuates a political aspect analyzed from the standard of the reasonableness of such views. Both factors point out that conspiracy theories around the pandemic leave the world aside, whether in terms of the empirical basis that supports it or the democratic public space necessary for its development deliberation. From this approach, these views result in irrational and unreasonable ones to different degrees. (shrink)

Literary texts activate ones’ metaphorical sensibilities to the myriad possibilities for reflecting on our own lives while inviting us to imagine the complex experiences of others. Readers’ ability...

The role of affection in the mass production of information and the post-truth phenomenon has returned a bias to the analysis of emotions, under which they appear as a key agent in disinformation systems, or as a distorting element that must be eliminated in order to have an "objective" access to the truth through the strict use of reason. In this work we will defend that both positions incur in problematic approaches, and that both are based on premises that deserve (...) a review. From this critical exercise, we will suggest a transversal proposal of minimums from which to carry out the analysis of emotions in the study of post-truth. (shrink)

It is well-established that party identity biases the processing of political information and the evaluation of political actors. This is presumed to avoid cognitive dissonance and achieve positive affect. What happens, however, when individuals diverge from this pattern and do make identity-inconsistent evaluations of political actors – how does this translate into positive and negative emotions toward the candidates? The paper addresses this question using large-N data from the main televised debate of the 2017 German national election by combining survey (...) responses with viewer perceptions measured during the debate. The findings suggest that candidate ratings made during the debate have different valence depending on a person’s party identity. Strikingly, a stronger party identity does not mean a reduced impact of identity-inconsistent evaluations on emotional responses toward a candidate. Rather, only evaluations in accordance with one’s party identity, and hence with lower information value, show a reduced effect on emotional responses. (shrink)

Emotions are often portrayed as subjective judgments that pose a threat to rationality and morality, but there is a growing literature across many disciplines that emphasizes the centrality of emotion to moral reasoning. For engineers, however, being rational usually means sequestering emotions that might bias analyses—good reasoning is tied to quantitative data, math, and science. This paper brings a new pedagogical perspective that strengthens the case for incorporating emotions into engineering ethics. Building on the widely established success of active and (...) collaborative learning environments, in particular the problem-based learning (PBL) philosophy and methodology, the paper articulates new strategies for incorporating emotion into engineering ethics education. An ethics education pilot study is analyzed to explore how PBL can engage students’ emotions. Evidence suggests that PBL empowers students to cultivate value for engineering ethics and social responsibility, and in doing so, redefine the societal role of the engineer. Taking students’ emotions seriously in engineering ethics offers an effective strategy to meaningfully engage students in ethical learning. (shrink)

Our starting point is the idea that different models of citizenship entail different ethos that define the ideal citizen, which in turn presuppose different emotions. We examine four models of citizenship: classic liberal, civic republican, deliberative democratic, and radical democratic. We suggest that their ideal citizens will be guided, respectively, by love of law, love of community or of country, love of truth and of justice, and love of the groups one belongs to and of power. Other political emotions ―such (...) as anger― and emotional processes ―such as empathy― are also directed towards different objects and actors in different ways, as channeled differentially by those forms of love. (shrink)

Deliberative democracy, it is claimed, is essential for the legitimisation of public policy and law. It is built upon an assumption that citizens will be capable of constructing and defending reasons for their moral and political beliefs. However, critics of deliberative democracy suggest that citizens’ emotions are not properly considered in this process and, if left unconsidered, present a serious problem for this political framework. In response to this, deliberative theorists have increasingly begun to incorporate the emotions into their accounts. (...) However, these accounts have tended to focus only upon the inclusion of emotions in the external-collective exchange of reason between citizens. Little work has been done on how the individual will actually cope with emotions internally within their own minds. There has been no consideration of the capacities that citizens will need to perceive, understand and regulate emotions as they formulate reasons both by themselves and with others. Moreover, there has been little consideration of how these capacities might be educated in children so that emotionally competent deliberative citizens can be created. In this paper, emotional intelligence is presented as an essential capacity that can fulfil this role for the deliberative citizen and deliberative democracy more generally. The ‘deliberative school’ is suggested as a potential site for this transformation that can progress from generation to generation, cultivating citizens that are increasingly better equipped to handle emotionally-laden deliberative engagement. (shrink)