Both Matthews and I see addiction as the outcome of developmental processes that arrive at diverse levels of dysfunction for different individuals at different stages. Matthews characterizes "late-stage" addiction in terms of lost control and extreme automaticity, a degree of dysfunction he calls a "disorder" and compares to another disorder -- depersonalization. I don't mind the label "disorder." Yet addiction is no more like depersonalization than it is like other conditions, most notably obsessive-compulsive disorder. Automaticity is never pure or total. (...) My dual focus on the phenomenology and neuroscience of addiction has helped me capture these critical details and differences. In fact, I think we've had enough of comparing, classifying, and defining addiction. It's time to recognize addiction as a thing in itself, unlike anything else. (shrink)

Although I reject neuronormativity -- an idea central to the Brain Disease Model of Addiction -- Henden and Gjelsvik argue that the disease definition might refer to normativity in nonneural domains. They profess that a cognitive dysfunction, or a mismatch of evolutionary intentions, could also qualify as norm violations, thus legitimizing the disease label. The need for dividing lines is questioned as well. I rebut these criticisms in turn, but I must admit they are thought provoking.