Buddhist schools of thought share two fundamental assumptions about language. On the one hand, language is identified with conceptual thinking, which according to the Buddhist doctrine separates us from the momentary and fleeting nature of reality. Language is comprised of generally applicable forms, which fuel the reificatory proclivity for clinging to the distorted – and ultimately fictious – belief in substantial existence. On the other hand, the distrust of language is mitigated by the doctrine of ineffability, which although asserts that (...) reality is beyond the scope of linguistic description, submits that philosophical analyses of key Buddhist concepts is a means of overcoming the limitations that language imposes on our experience and facilitating insight into the nature of reality. This paper provides an overview of Buddhist philosophy of language, with an emphasis on the dialectical view of language as indispensable but ultimately insufficient for contemplation. The Buddhist discussions of ineffability are explicated and compared with its treatment in modern Occidental thought, specifically the similarities and differences with Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. (shrink)

This is a philosophical review of the exhibition dedicated to Literature – Art titled Mukhaputa (Cover page) held on occasion of the Manipal International Literature and Arts Platform 2017 in Manipal, India. The curatorial strategy of the exhibition explores the intersectional relationships between literature and visual arts at large. The context of this critical review is the recent past of modern literature journals in print that encouraged artists and illustrators to converse with literature and in turn poets and authors to (...) be artists in their own right. Through a reflection on the nature of new forms of art works submitted by various artists to the exhibition, the review situates new methods of interdisciplinary curating which is highly contingent and speculative. Curation, thus, demands a new reading in terms of its role in interdisciplinary creative practice. (shrink)

The paper concentrates on the most pressing question of Indian philosophy: what is the exact connotation of a word or what sort of entity helps us to identify the meaning of a word? The paper focuses on the clash between Realism (Nyāya) and Apoha vāda (Buddhist) regarding the debate whether the meaning of a word is particular/universal or both. The paper asserts that though Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṁsakas challenged against Buddhist Apoha vāda, yet they realized that to establish an opinion in (...) support of a word that conceptually denotes a negative meaning first would be a very difficult task. (shrink)

In the Nyāyasūtras (NS), the fundamental text of the Nyāya tradition, testimony is defined as a statement of a reliable speaker (āpta). According to the NS, such a speaker should possess three qualities: competence, honesty and desire to speak. The content of a discourse, including the prescriptions, is also considered reliable due to the status of a given author and the person that communicated it. -/- The Polish philosopher J.M. Bocheński similarly stresses the role of a speaker; he holds that (...) an authoritative source (whose discourse is called testimony) should be competent and truthful. The conditions of trust and superiority also apply. According to Bocheński, being an authority entails a special relation—it has a subject, object and field. Notably, Bocheński develops his own typology of testimony by distinguishing between what he calls epistemic and deontic authority. He asks questions such as: Who can be the subject of an authoritative statement? Which features should the speaker possess? How is authority recognised? Is there a universal or an absolute authority? What is the field of authority? Moreover, which qualities should the listener possess? -/- The Nyāya philosophers, both the ancient ones, like Akṣapāda Gautama, Vātsyāyana, Vācaspati Miśra, and the contemporary scholars of Nyāya, such as B. K. Matilal and J. Ganeri, were also concerned with these issues. -/- The aim of this paper is to discuss the above points in a comparative manner. I will argue that both Bocheński’s and the Nyāya accounts share very similar perspectives and encounter analogous problems. (shrink)

This article – which includes a complete translation of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā chapter 2 together with Candrakīrti’s commentary thereon – argues that notwithstanding the many different and often arcane interpretations that have been offered of Nāgārjuna’s arguments against motion, there is really just one straightforward kind of argument on offer in this vexed chapter. It is further argued that this basic argument can be understood as a philosophically interesting one if it is kept in mind that the argument essentially has to do (...) with whether a personal level of description will admit of an exhaustively impersonal explanation. (shrink)

Brahmānanda Sarasvatī has written an elaborate comment on the following inference cited in Advaitasiddhi: attribute etc. are identical to and different from attributee etc. since they are co-referential. There he wants to prove that every significant case of attribution is a case of identity that coexists with a difference between two demarcators. The identity that coexists with difference is called ‘equality’. This paper will argue that in each case of equality, the realist ontology chooses either identity over difference or the (...) reverse. In the case of ‘the black pot’, the realist ontology prefers difference over identity. In the case of ‘the qualified object is the mere object’, the same ontology prefers identity over difference. Accordingly the ontological ‘entity’ gets projected. This is perhaps because the realist ontology is guided by Ockham’s razor and the grammatical classification of objects. (shrink)

This essay attempts to provide a systematic reconstruction of Nāgārjuna's philosophical thought by understanding it as a critique of the attachment to linguistic expressions and their referents. We first present an outline of Nāgārjuna's philosophy, centering on such notions as 'dependent origination', 'emptiness' and 'self-nature'. Then we discuss Nāgārjuna's dismissal of a metaphysical use of language, particularly his contention that language can function well without assuming the reality of its referents. We also consider his statement that he has no assertion (...) and explain his provisional use of language. Towards the end of the essay, we direct our attention to a paradoxical formula in a Buddhist sutra that should help in evaluating the contemporary significance of Nāgārjuna's linguistic critique. (shrink)

Relation between language and extra-linguistic reality is an important problem of Bhartṛhari’s linguistic philosophy. In the ‘Vākyapadīya,’ this problem is discussed several times, but in accordance with the general perspectivist trend of Bhartṛhari’s philosophy each time it is framed through different concepts and different solutions are provided. In this essay, an attempt is undertaken to summarize the variety of different and mutually exclusive views on language and extra-linguistic reality in VP and to formulate the hidden presuppositions on which the actual (...) viewpoints expressed in the kārikās are based. As a result, the following approaches are formulated: Language is coextensive with external reality. Language, designated as kalpanā/vikalpa, is distinct from reality. Language refers to the secondary/metaphorical reality. Language and reality somehow correlate, because otherwise, practical/linguistic activity would be impossible. The origin of these approaches and their affinities with different schools of Indian philosophy are examined. Approach, according to which correlation between language and reality is functional and not ontological, seems very close to Dharmakīrti’s concept of arthakriyā. This approach accords with Bhartṛhari’s perspectivist philosophical strategy. It enabled him to explain how effective linguistic activity is possible, capturing language in its dynamic aspect, without limitative static ontological constructions. (shrink)

Seeing human nature through the prism of grammar may seem rather unusual. I will argue that this is a symptom for a problem – in both discussions of human nature and grammar: Neither the theory of grammar has properly placed its subject matter within the context of an inquiry into human nature and speciation, nor have discussions of human nature properly assessed the significance of grammar.

Eli Franco has recently suggested to distinguish the two main periods in the history of Indian philosophy, i.e. the older ontological and the new epistemological. In the Vākyapadīya, however, ontology and epistemology are evidently intertwined and interrelated. In this paper ontological and epistemological features of the concepts of paśyantī, pratibhā, sphoţa and jāti are analyzed in order to demonstrate that all these concepts, while being ontologically different, are engaged in similar epistemological processes, i.e. the cognition of a verbal utterance. Thus (...) the identification of sphoţa and jāti as well as of paśyantī and pratibhā met with in some passages of VP and the commentaries implies not the absolute identity of these concepts, but only their overlapping in the sphere of epistemology. Considering concepts of different origin in one epistemological perspective enables to escape controversies in interpretation and provides a kind of consistency in a bit but amorphous work of Bhartŗhari. (shrink)

This paper engages with Johaness Bronkhorst’s recognition of a “correspondence principle” as an underlying assumption of Nāgārjuna’s thought. Bronkhorst believes that this assumption was shared by most Indian thinkers of Nāgārjuna’s day, and that it stimulated a broad and fascinating attempt to cope with Nāgārjuna’s arguments so that the principle of correspondence may be maintained in light of his forceful critique of reality. For Bronkhorst, the principle refers to the relation between the words of a sentence and the realities they (...) are meant to convey. While I accept this basic intuition of correspondence, this paper argues that a finer understanding of the principle can be offered. In light of a set of verses from Nāgārjuna’s Śūnyatāsaptati (45–57), it is maintained that for Nāgārjuna, the deeper level of correspondence involves a structural identity he envisions between understanding and reality. Here Nāgārjuna claims that in order for things to exist, a conceptual definition of their nature must be available; in order for there to be a real world and reliable knowledge, a svabhāva of things must be perceived and accounted for. Svabhāva is thus reflected as a knowable essence. Thus, Nāgārjuna’s arguments attacks the accountability of both concepts and things, a position which leaves us with nothing more than mistaken forms of understanding as the reality of the empty. This markedly metaphysical approach is next analyzed in light of the debate Nāgārjuna conducts with a Nyāya interlocutor in his Vigrahavyāvartanī. The correspondence principle is here used to highlight the metaphysical aspect of the debate and to point out the ontological vision of Nāgārjuna’s theory of emptiness. In the analysis of the Vigrahavyāvartanī it becomes clear that the discussion revolves around a foundational metaphysical deliberation regarding the reality or unreality of svabhāva. In this dispute, Nāgārjuna fails to answer the most crucial point raised by his opponent—what is that he defines as empty? (shrink)

This paper examines three commentaries on the Śabdapariccheda in Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s Ślokavārttika, along with the the seventeenth century Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā work, the Mānameyodaya. The focus is the Mīmāṃsā principle that only sentences communicate qualified meanings and Kumārila’s discussion of a potential counter-example to this claim–single words which appear to communicate such content. I argue that there is some conflict among commentators over precisely what Kumārila describes with the phrase sāmarthyād anumeyetvād, although he is most likely describing ellipsis completion through arthāpatti. (...) The paper attempts both a cogent exegesis and philosophical evaluation of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā view of ellipsis completion, arguing that there remain internal tensions in the account of ellipsis preferred by the Bhāṭṭa, tensions which are not entirely resolved even by the late date of the Mānameyodaya. (shrink)

Linguistic convention is one of the central notions of Indian philosophy of language. The well-known view of samaya/saṃketa is its conception as the agreement initiating the relationship between words and their previously unrelated meanings. However, in Indian philosophy of language, we also encounter two other important but little-researched interpretations of samaya/saṃketa, which consider it as the established usage of words. I present a new classification of traditions of Indian thought based on their view of linguistic convention. This classification is to (...) be verified and expanded in further studies. As far as I know, such a classification has never been undertaken before. 1) Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism, and later classical Yoga of the Tattvavaiśāradī accept samaya/saṃketa as an agreement initiating the relationship between words and their previously unrelated meanings. 2) Bhartṛhari the Grammarian and the continuators of his thought acknowledge samaya/saṃketa as the established usage of words that is rooted in the natural relationship between words and their meanings; the convention manifests the relationship. This view was probably also shared by Mīmāṃsakas and Advaitins. 3) Classical Yoga of the Yogasūtrabhāṣya and probably also earlier Grammar thought of the Mahābhāṣya accept linguistic convention as the established usage of words, but this usage, though having neither a beginning nor an end, is not based on any natural and necessary word–meaning relationship. In this view, linguistic convention not only manifests the word–meaning relationship but also keeps it in existence. Another new contribution of this research is my explanation for why the same Sanskrit term samaya/saṃketa was applied to the different ways of understanding linguistic convention. I explain this through the common aspects of all three kinds of samaya/saṃketa. The first aspect is the content of all these kinds of samaya/saṃketa. Irrespective of how linguistic convention is understood, its content is the same: “such and such a word has such and such a meaning”. The second aspect is the crucial role of linguistic convention in language acquisition, communication, and transmission. (shrink)

Although somewhat neglected in the scholarly debate, Vṛṣabhadeva’s commentary (known as Sphuṭākṣarā or Paddhati, possibly 8th c. CE) on Vākyapadīya’s first chapter, offers a remarkable analysis of Bhartṛhari’s views on metaphysics and philosophy of language. Vākyapadīya’s first four kārikās deal with ontological issues, defining the key elements of Bhartṛhari’s non-dualistic edifice such as the properties of the unitary principle, its powers, the role of time and the ontological status of worldly objects. Vṛṣabhadeva’s interpretation of the kārikās in question is intriguing (...) and seems to be guided by the urgency to find a solution to the riddle which every non-dualistic theory has to face: how is it possible to postulate a unitary principle of reality when reality is cognized as multiple? In accomplishing the task Vṛṣabhadeva proposes various solutions (some of them based on concepts which are hardly detectable in Vākyapadīya and appear close to the ones propounded in certain trends of Advaita Vedānta), finally suggesting an explanation which, focusing on the pragmatic aspect of language, is altogether consistent with Bhartṛhari’s theoretical picture. (shrink)

The role of memory in one’s cognition of sentential meaning is a pivotal topic in Indian philosophical debates on the nature of language. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas claim in their doctrine of abhihitānvaya that words denote word-meanings which in turn lead one to sentential meaning, with memory playing only a limited role in this process. The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas however assign memory a central role and assert that each word in a sentence denotes the connected sentential meaning. This paper is a philosophical (...) and philological study of the arguments presented by the influential Prābhākara thinker Śālikanātha in his Vākyārthamātṛkā-I in order to substantiate the role of memory as part of the doctrine of anvitābhidhāna. The VM-I commences these discussions with an objection of the Bhāṭṭa pūrvapakṣin against this Prābhākara doctrine, and thereafter proceeds to refute this objection by demonstrating the role of memory, specifically in regard to word-meaning. Śālikanātha lays out his refutation by means of several layers of intricate argumentation, and this paper attempts to follow the text closely and present cogently his philosophical reasoning. The aim of this paper is thus to not only demonstrate the early pre-empting of this Bhāṭṭa objection by Śālikanātha himself but also his own responses to this, thereby enabling one to understand with greater clarity a cornerstone of the elaborate doctrine of anvitābhidhāna. (shrink)