Well-known critics of AI such as Hubert Dreyfus and Michael Polanyi tend to confuse cybernetics with AI. Such a confusion is quite misleading and should not be overlooked. In the first place, cybernetics is not vulnerable to criticism of AI as cognitivistic and behaviouristic. In the second place, AI researchers are recommended to consider the cybernetics approach as a way of overcoming the limitations of cognitivism and behaviourism.

A brain model based on glial-neuronal interactions is proposed. Glial-neuronal synaptic units are interpreted as elementary reflection mechanisms, called proemial synapses. In glial networks (syncytia), cyclic intentional programs are generated, interpreted as auto-reflective intentional programming. Both types of reflection mechanisms are formally described and may be implementable in a robot brain. Based on the logic of acceptance and rejection, the robot is capable of rejecting irrelevant environmental information, showing at least a "touch" of subjective behavior. Since reflective intentional programming generates (...) both relevant and irrelevant structures already within the brain, ontological gaps arise which must be integrated. In the human brain, the act of self-reference may exert a holistic function enabling self-consciousness. However, since the act of self-reference is a mysterious function not experimentally testable in brain research, it cannot be implemented in a robot brain. Therefore, the creation of self-conscious robots may never be possible. Finally, some philosophical implications are discussed. (shrink)

The field of information technology is broadened up to the domain of ‘learning’ systems and cybernetics. In covering this extension of the field due recourse is made to the epistemological basis of theory construction. When so comprehended, information technology becomes a philosophical inquiry on a variety of social, scientific and technological issues. A new idea that we refer to as neuro-cybernetics is born. The term neuro-cybernetics is used to delineate the epistemological field of system and cybernetic study. The above-mentioned phenomenological (...) or the epistemic model of a cybernetic and system type is applied to flood control problem in Bangladesh. This example presents an application of the cybernetic model to a physico-human problem. This is the nature of socio-scientific system. In it, organically unifying relations occur between the environment and the human world, with the objective of controlling the perennial problem of floods by using interactive factors. (shrink)

The algebra of sets has, basically, two different types of symbols. One type of symbol (∩, ?, +, ?) defines another set from two other sets. A second type of symbol (?, ?, =, ?) makes a proposition about two sets. When the construction of these two types of symbols is based on the same four-dot matrix as the logic symbols described in a previous paper, the three symbol types then dovetail together into a harmonious whole that greatly simplifies derivation (...) in the algebra of sets. (shrink)

Are minds really dynamical or are they really symbolic? Because minds are bundles of computations, and because computation is always a matter of interpretation of one system by another, minds are necessarily symbolic. Because minds, along with everything else in the universe, are physical, and insofar as the laws of physics are dynamical, minds are necessarily dynamical systems. Thus, the short answer to the opening question is “yes.” It makes sense to ask further whether some of the computations that constitute (...) a human mind are constrained by functional, algorithmic, or implementational factors to be essentially of the discrete symbolic variety (even if they supervene on an apparently continuous dynamical substrate). I suggest that here too the answer is “yes” and discuss the need for such discrete, symbolic cognitive computations in communication-related tasks. (shrink)

This paper puts forward a general framework for thought about human information processing. It is intended to avoid some of the problems of pipeline or stage models of function. At the same time it avoids the snare of supposing a welter of indefinitely many separate processes. The approach is not particularly original, but rather represents the common elements or presuppositions in a number of modern theories. These presuppositions are not usually explicit, however, and making them so reduces the danger of (...) slipping back into earlier modes of thought.The key point is to distinguish between persisting representations and the processes that translate one representation into another. Various classes or groups of persisting representations can be distinguished by the experimental treatments that interfere with them. In particular, there now seem to be several kinds of short-term or temporary storage, different from each other as well as from longterm memory; the translating processes also have several different modes or kinds. A particularly important aspect of the current position is that a model of this general type no longer requires some external agent to direct and control long sequences of behaviour. (shrink)

This paper puts forward a general framework for thought about human information processing. It is intended to avoid some of the problems of pipeline or stage models of function. At the same time it avoids the snare of supposing a welter of indefinitely many separate processes. The approach is not particularly original, but rather represents the common elements or presuppositions in a number of modern theories. These presuppositions are not usually explicit, however, and making them so reduces the danger of (...) slipping back into earlier modes of thought.The key point is to distinguish between persisting representations and the processes that translate one representation into another. Various classes or groups of persisting representations can be distinguished by the experimental treatments that interfere with them. In particular, there now seem to be several kinds of short-term or temporary storage, different from each other as well as from longterm memory; the translating processes also have several different modes or kinds. A particularly important aspect of the current position is that a model of this general type no longer requires some external agent to direct and control long sequences of behaviour. (shrink)

(2013). My Life in Chaos. World Futures: Vol. 69, The Complexity of Life and Lives of Complexity, pp. 248-268.

Abstract Since modernity, the concept of subject supposes both an anthropocentric and a dualistic view of life and reality. In this study, we carry out an analytic interpretation of the Descartes’ notion of subject, in order to build a different dimension of the concept of subject. We discuss the activity of computing, as the manner by which the living subject relates with and in-forms the world. We further examine computing in the aging yeast as an example of living subject and (...) we try to comprehend the maturity of the subjectivity in Descartes’ res cogitans and in our proposed res computans . Content Type Journal Article Category Original Paper Pages 1-12 DOI 10.1007/s10516-011-9177-5 Authors María Belén Campero, Center of Philosophical Investigations, CONICET, Buenos Aires, Argentina Cristián Favre, Institute of Experimental Physiology, CONICET, School of Biochemical Sciences, University of Rosario, Suipacha 570, S2002LRL Rosario, Argentina Journal Axiomathes Online ISSN 1572-8390 Print ISSN 1122-1151. (shrink)