This article is first in a series dedicated to issues in the intellectual history of Mīmāṃsā in early modern India and part of a larger effort to broaden the basis for understanding the new formulations of central topics of the Mīmāṃsā textual-ritual complex in this period. It examines how the Varanasi scholar Khaṇḍadevamiśra makes use of Navyanyāya tools of analysis by putting under the microscope the example of his investigation and new formulation of the signification of agent and agency by (...) the verbal affix in his ample analysis of the cognition of the meaning elements of a sentence. Authors of Mīmāṃsā works in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries gradually and selectively adopt the tools and techniques of cognitive analysis and the characteristic new idiom elaborated by Navyanaiyāyikas a few centuries earlier. This process of adoption arises on the sidelines of the Advaita–Dvaita Vedānta controversy in South India, then subsequently flourishes in Varanasi, as I have followed elsewhere. In his analysis of the topic studied here, Khaṇḍadeva uses the new tools to revisit the Mīmāṃsā tradition in order to advance his new formulation while refuting certain Navyanyāya rival positions. (shrink)

Bhāvanā, “bringing into being,” is one of Mīmāṃsā’s hallmark concepts. It connects text and action in a single structure of meaning. This conjunction was crucially important to Mīmāṃsā’s own interpretive enterprise, and functioned— controversially but influentially—in a broader theory of language. The goal of this paper is to outline bhāvanā’s major contours as it is developed by Kumārilabhaṭṭa and some his followers (Maṇḍanamiśra, Pārthasārathimiśra, Someśvarabhaṭṭa, Khaṇḍadeva, and Āpadeva) and to examine some of the arguments they marshaled in support of it. (...) Bhāvanā is shown to open up, for these Mīmāṃsakas, an understanding of the “deep structure” of Vedic injunctions and the vocabulary for systematically representing it; it accounts for both what people do when they perform an action that is enjoined (ārthī bhāvanā) and what the injunction itself does when it motivates people to performance (śābdī bhāvanā). Bhāvanā has resonances with, and relevance to, contemporary discussions of the nexus of language, understanding, and action, and its value as a carefully-elaborated concept of hermeneutical significance should not be overlooked. (shrink)

This essay engages with two large themes in order to address the social and intellectual practices of nyāya scholars in early colonial Bengal. First, I examine networks that connected scholars with each other and, to a lesser extent, students and households. Exemplified in historical documents of the period, these networks demonstrate that nyāya scholars were part of larger scholar communities in Bengal and across India during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. I map these networks and examine their relevance for how (...) nyāya scholars were organized in early colonial Bengal. Second, I examine circulation patterns of manuscripts of nyāya texts composed in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Bengal. I argue that a contraction in the distribution of nyāya manuscripts of works written in Bengal during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries took place, especially into southern India. The essay concludes by situating nyāya scholars within the context of colonialism and drawing larger conclusions about nyāya intellectual practices in Bengal during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. (shrink)

This article aims to follow the process of adoption of Navya-Nyāya techniques of cognitive analysis in the school of Vedic hermeneutics, Mīmāṃsā, in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, in the larger context of the spread of these techniques in India. I shall argue that this process arises in Mīmāṃsā on the sidelines of the Advaita-Dvaita Vedānta controversy in South India, then subsequently flourishes in Varanasi. These techniques are adopted gradually and selectively, for not all the Mīmāṃsā thinkers choose to (...) use them. (shrink)

Studies of Indian philosophy have generally overemphasized the con-sistency of philosophical systems over time, and consequently slighted later works as derivative. This paper seeks to reassess the “system” as a basic category for analyzing Sanskrit philosophy, in particular by examining the changes that took place in hermeneutics, or Mīmāṃsā, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when it became commonplace for Mīmāṃsā authors to criticize long established Mīmāṃsā positions. At first this criticism is selective and largely directed at more recent authors, (...) but the margins of acceptable criticism are gradually broadened to the point when even the foundational works of the tradition are routinely attacked, and works are produced whose sole purpose appears to be to attack established Mīmāṃsā tenets, sometimes without even attempting to replace them with a more workable set of views. It becomes increasingly difficult to see what if anything one must believe to be considered a Mīmāṃsaka. (shrink)

The study of textual reuse is of fundamental importance in reconstructing lost or partially lost texts, passages of which can be partly recovered through other texts in which they have been embedded. Furthermore, the study of textual reuse also provides one with a deeper understanding of the modalities of the production of texts out of previous textual materials. Finally, it constitutes a unique chance to reconsider the historicity of concepts such as “author”, “originality” and “plagiarism”, which do not denote really (...) existing universals, but have rather evolved—and still evolve—in different ways in different cultural milieus. After a general introduction and an analysis of the historical background of textual reuse in India and Europe, the essay attempts some general conclusions regarding the formulas introducing instances of textual reuse in Classical South Asian texts. (shrink)