Understanding quotation is fundamental to understanding the nature of truth and meaning. Quotation, however, is a remarkably complicated phenomenon, and a vigorous literature on the topic has been growing at an increasing rate.§1 To give you a sense of this work, §1 enlarges upon the significance of studying quotation; §2 presents a rudimentary taxonomy of quotation; and §3 critically surveys theories of how quotation works.

Richard Heck, Jr has recently argued against Russellianism about proper names not in the usual way—by appeal to “intuitions” about the truth conditions of “that”-clause belief ascriptions—but by appeal to our need to specify beliefs in a way that reflects their individuation. Since beliefs are individuated by their psychological roles and not their Russellian contents, he argues, Russellianism is precluded in principle from accounting for our ability to specify beliefs in ordinary language. I argue that Heck thus makes things easier (...) for the Russellian. For by framing the issue as one concerning the specificatory powers of ordinary language in general, rather than just of “that”-clause ascriptions, Heck weakens the implications of any claim about the semantics of that one type of belief-specifying locution. I augment this diagnosis with a positive account of the specificatory usefulness, and attested commonness, of (partly or wholly) quotational belief ascriptions, e.g. “Lois believes that ‘Superman’ is at the meeting.” This proposal is not of the usual sort concerning such locutions since it does not involve the (dubious) claim that they are in some way equivalent to “that”-clause ascriptions. (shrink)

This paper argues that impure direct/mixed quotation – that is, translated (or repaired, improved) direct or mixed quotation – has something interesting to tell us about how quotations ordinarily function. It forces us to focus on two general quotational features. (i) Quotation is not a purely verbal phenomenon, its intuitive content exceeds the limits of what is linguistically articulated; (ii) it presupposes a cooperation between two human beings: the quoter, who performs a quotation, and the addressee of that quotation. In (...) the framework of an inscriptional analysis of direct and mixed quotation, inspired by Goodman’s approach to pure quotation, such a cooperation is described in terms of a pragmatic process of specification of the conventional meaning of a quotation, which consists of interpreting ostensively defined quotation predicates. (shrink)

According to Goodman, a quotation can be treated as a predicate that applies to concrete inscriptions/utterances. Following this approach, Scheffler proposed an inscriptional analysis of direct and indirect speech. An improved version of inscriptionalism will be proposed in this chapter and extended to mixed quotation, that is, to what at first glance appears to be a derivative hybrid case of reporting speech that features a combination of direct and indirect verbal forms. An alternative view of mixed quotation as primary verbal (...) form for reporting speech will be proposed, in virtue of which a unified inscriptional account for reporting speeches will be given. (shrink)

This is a lively, provocative book and many of its arguments are convincing. In this critical study I summarize the book, then discuss some of the authors’ claims, dwelling on three issues: their objections to the view of François Recanati on “pre-semantic” effects; the relation between their theory of quotation and the Tarskian “Proper Name Theory,” which they reject; and their treatment of mixed quotation, which rests on the claim that quotation expressions are “syntactic chameleons.” I argue that the objections (...) to Recanati don’t expose any problem with his view, and that the “Proper Name Theory” has all the virtues of their own proposal. Finally I raise some queries about the technical apparatus of syntactic chameleonism. (shrink)