Russellianism unencumbered

Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2819-2843 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Richard Heck, Jr has recently argued against Russellianism about proper names not in the usual way—by appeal to “intuitions” about the truth conditions of “that”-clause belief ascriptions—but by appeal to our need to specify beliefs in a way that reflects their individuation. Since beliefs are individuated by their psychological roles and not their Russellian contents, he argues, Russellianism is precluded in principle from accounting for our ability to specify beliefs in ordinary language. I argue that Heck thus makes things easier for the Russellian. For by framing the issue as one concerning the specificatory powers of ordinary language in general, rather than just of “that”-clause ascriptions, Heck weakens the implications of any claim about the semantics of that one type of belief-specifying locution. I augment this diagnosis with a positive account of the specificatory usefulness, and attested commonness, of (partly or wholly) quotational belief ascriptions, e.g. “Lois believes that ‘Superman’ is at the meeting.” This proposal is not of the usual sort concerning such locutions since it does not involve the (dubious) claim that they are in some way equivalent to “that”-clause ascriptions.
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-01-13
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Frege's Puzzle.Forbes, Graeme & Salmon, Nathan
Inquiry.Barwise, Jon & Stalnaker, Robert C.

View all 31 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
121 ( #25,079 of 43,961 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
84 ( #6,697 of 43,961 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.