Switch to: References

Citations of:

What it is like

Philosophical Quarterly 38 (January):1-19 (1988)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Laws of Nature: Necessary and Contingent.Samuel Kimpton-Nye - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):875-895.
    This paper shows how a niche account of the metaphysics of laws of nature and physical properties—the Powers-BSA—can underpin both a sense in which the laws are metaphysically necessary and a sense in which it is true that the laws could have been different. The ability to reconcile entrenched disagreement should count in favour of a philosophical theory, so this paper constitutes a novel argument for the Powers-BSA by showing how it can reconcile disagreement about the laws’ modal status. This (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • "Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknown
    This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A new challenge for the physicalist: Phenomenal indistinguishabilty.Ran Lahav - 1994 - Philosophia 24 (1-2):77-103.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • (1 other version)Imagining Experiences Correctly.Phil Joyce - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1):361-369.
    According to Mellor, we know what an experience is like if we can imagine it correctly, and we will do so if we recognise the experience as it is imagined. This paper identifies a constraint on adequate accounts of how we ordinarily imagine experiences correctly: the capacities to imagine and to recognise the experience must be jointly operative at the point of forming an intention to imagine the experience. The paper develops an account of imagining experiences correctly that meets this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • (1 other version)Imagining Experiences Correctly.Phil Joyce - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):361-369.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation