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  1. Intentionality in nature. Against an all-encompassing evolutionary paradigm: Evolutionary and cognitive processes are not instances of the same process.Henri Atlan - 1994 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (1):67–87.
    Three examples of theoretical analysis of evolutionary processes are presented. It is shown that the mechanisms involved have little to do with cognitive processes except for superficial and formal analogies. That is the case not only for classical models of adaptive evolution , but also for more recent ones making use of neural network computation and self-organization theories.Recent works on functional self-organization exhibiting some features of intentionality are discussed in this context. It is argued that Dennett's intentional stance cannot be (...)
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  • Through the agents' minds: Cognitive mediators of social action.Cristiano Castelfranchi - 2000 - Mind and Society 1 (1):109-140.
    Thesis: Macro-level social phenomena are implemented through the (social) actions and minds of the individuals. Without an explicit theory of the agents' minds that founds, agents' behavior we cannot understand macro-level social phenomena, and in particular how they work. AntiThesis: Mind is not enough: the theory of individual (social) mind and action is not enough to explain several macro-level social phenomena. First, there are pre-cognitive, objective social structures that constrain the actions of the agents; second, there are emergent, unaware or (...)
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