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Relaxing a Tension in Adam Smith's Account of Sympathy

John W. McHugh

Journal of Scottish Philosophy 9 (2):189-204 (2011)

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The Limits of Sympathetic Concern and Moral Consideration in Adam Smith.Ryan Pollock - 2019 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 36 (3):257-277.details Smith thinks it possible to sympathize with certain non-sentient beings, such as the human dead. Consequently, some commentators argue that Smith’s theory supports ecocentrism. I reject that Smith’s theory has this implication. Sympathizers in Smith’s theory can imagine themselves as non-sentient beings, but they will lack the relevant evaluative concerns. The situation of a non-sentient being, as that being confronts the situation, remains inaccessible to the sympathizer. I will also address the limits of sympathetic concern within Smith’s theory,; highlight a (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Ways of desiring mutual sympathy in Adam Smith's moral philosophy.John McHugh - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (4):614-634.details ABSTRACTIn this paper, I address the question of what we are really after when we seek Smithian mutual sympathy; I also show how the answer I propose can be used to illuminate a crucial feature of Smith's moral philosophy. The first section develops a Smithian response to egoistic interpretations of the desire for mutual sympathy. The second section identifies a number of different self- and other-relevant ways in which one could desire mutual sympathy. Some of these different ways of desiring (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Beyond sympathy: Smith’s rejection of Hume’s moral theory.Paul Sagar - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (4):681-705.details Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments has long been recognized as importantly influenced by, and in part responding to, David Hume’s earlier ethical theory. With regard to Smith’s account of the foundations of morals in particular, recent scholarly attention has focused on Smith’s differences with Hume over the question of sympathy. Whilst this is certainly important, disagreement over sympathy in fact represents only the starting point of Smith’s engagement with – and eventual attempted rejection of – Hume’s core moral theory. (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 6 citations
From Sympathy to Respect.Roberto Mordacci - 2023 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 40 (4):359-378.details Despite the differences, there is some convergence between Adam Smith's and Immanuel Kant's theories of moral motivation. Both rely on a peculiar feeling, respect, as the proper source of motive in moral matters. An analysis of Smith's and Kant's conception of respect shows that both recognize that it has a specific normative import and plays a decisive role in morality. This convergence offers some support to the idea that Smith's sentimentalism and Kant's rationalism are compatible, at least as far as (...) moral motivation is at issue. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark
Impartiality through ‘Moral Optics’: Why Adam Smith revised David Hume's Moral Sentimentalism.Christel Fricke & Maria Alejandra Carrasco - 2021 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 19 (1):1-18.details We read Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments as a critical response to David Hume's moral theory. While both share a commitment to moral sentimentalism, they propose different ways of meeting its main challenge, that is, explaining how judgments informed by (partial) sentiments can nevertheless have a justified claim to general authority. This difference is particularly manifest in their respective accounts of ‘moral optics’, or the way they rely on the analogy between perceptual and moral judgments. According to Hume, making (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Empathy for the Dead.Ashley Atkins - 2024 - Philosophers' Imprint 24 (1).details This paper argues that profound grief stems largely from our empathy for the dead. The Epicureans defended a version of this idea, claiming that the misery of grief is the product of imagining ourselves in the place of the dead and, from that perspective, seeming to gain insight into both the harmfulness of death and the obligations of the living to the dead—including the obligation to keep that misery alive. This inaugurated a tradition of suspicion of this kind of empathy, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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