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  1. Question pursuit as an epistemic stance.Hakob Barseghyan - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 94 (C):112-120.
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  • On value-laden science.Zina B. Ward - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 85:54-62.
    Philosophical work on values in science is held back by widespread ambiguity about how values bear on sci entific choices. Here, I disambiguate several ways in which a choice can be value-laden and show that this disambiguation has the potential to solve and dissolve philosophical problems about values in science. First, I characterize four ways in which values relate to choices: values can motivate, justify, cause, or be impacted by the choices we make. Next, I put my proposed taxonomy to (...)
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  • Straightening the ‘value-laden turn’: minimising the influence of extra-scientific values in science.Philippe Stamenkovic - 2024 - Synthese 203 (20):1-38.
    Straightening the current ‘value-laden turn’ (VLT) in the philosophical literature on values in science, and reviving the legacy of the value-free ideal of science (VFI), this paper argues that the influence of extra-scientific values should be minimised—not excluded—in the core phase of scientific inquiry where claims are accepted or rejected. Noting that the original arguments for the VFI (ensuring the truth of scientific knowledge, respecting the autonomy of science results users, preserving public trust in science) have not been satisfactorily addressed (...)
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  • Confirmation, or pursuit-worthiness? Lessons from J. J. Sakurai's 1960 theory of the strong force for the debate on non-empirical physics.Pablo Ruiz de Olano - 2023 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 99 (C):77-88.
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  • The diverse aims of science.Angela Potochnik - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:71-80.
    There is increasing attention to the centrality of idealization in science. One common view is that models and other idealized representations are important to science, but that they fall short in one or more ways. On this view, there must be an intermediary step between idealized representation and the traditional aims of science, including truth, explanation, and prediction. Here I develop an alternative interpretation of the relationship between idealized representation and the aims of science. In my view, continuing, widespread idealization (...)
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  • Introduction: Cognitive attitudes and values in science.Daniel J. McKaughan & Kevin C. Elliott - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:57-61.
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  • Assertion, Nonepistemic Values, and Scientific Practice.Paul L. Franco - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (1):160-180.
    This article motivates a shift in certain strands of the debate over legitimate roles for nonepistemic values in scientific practice from investigating what is involved in taking cognitive attitudes like acceptance toward an empirical hypothesis to looking at a social understanding of assertion, the act of communicating that hypothesis. I argue that speech act theory’s account of assertion as a type of doing makes salient legitimate roles nonepistemic values can play in scientific practice. The article also shows how speech act (...)
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  • Addressing the Reproducibility Crisis: A Response to Hudson.Heather Douglas & Kevin C. Elliott - 2022 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 53 (2):201-209.
    In this response to Robert Hudson’s article, “Should We Strive to Make Science Bias-Free? A Philosophical Assessment of the Reproducibility Crisis,” we identify three ways in which he misrepresents our work: he conflates value-ladenness with bias; he describes our view as one in which values are the same as evidential factors; and he creates a false dichotomy between two ways that values could be considered in science for policy. We share Hudson’s concerns about promoting scientific reproducibility and reducing bias in (...)
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