This paper examines accounts of the moral wrongness of killing persons in addition to determining what conclusions, if any, can be drawn from the morality of killing persons about the equality of persons, and vice versa. I will argue that a plausible way of thinking about the moral wrongness of killing implies that the permissibility of killing innocent, nonthreatening persons depends on a person’s age. I address objections to this conclusion and discuss some potential implications of the view.

Distributive theories evaluate distributions of goods based on candidate recipients’ characteristics, e.g. how well off candidates are, how deserving they are, and whether they fare below sufficiency. But such characteristics vary across possible worlds, so distributive theories may differ in terms of the world which for them settles candidates’ characteristics. This paper examines how distributive theories differ in terms of whether candidate recipients’ relevant characteristics are grounded in the possible world that would take place if the distributor does not intervene (...) (call it the “input” world) or if they are grounded in each possible world that the distributor can bring about through different decisions (call each an “output” world). We illustrate the importance of this distinction in relation to one distributive theory, prioritarianism. As we show, both input and output versions of prioritarianism are plausible interpretations of the literature, and there are good reasons to take input prioritarianism seriously. Ultimately, however, we argue that input prioritarianism should be rejected. (shrink)

This paper shows that versions of prioritarianism that focus at least partially on well-being levels at certain times conflict with conventional views of prudential value and prudential rationality. So-called timeslice prioritarianism, and pluralist views that ascribe importance to timeslices, hold that a benefit matters more, the worse off the beneficiary is at the time of receiving it. We show that views that evaluate outcomes in accordance with this idea entail that an agent who delays gratification makes an outcome worse, even (...) if it is better for the agent and worse for no one else. We take this to show that timeslice prioritarianism and some pluralist views violate Weak Pareto, and we argue that these versions of prioritarianism are implausible. (shrink)

Prioritarianism pertains to the generic idea that it matters more to benefit people, the worse off they are, and while prioritarianism is not uncontroversial, it is considered a generally plausible and widely shared distributive principle often applied to healthcare prioritisation. In this paper, I identify social justice prioritarianism, severity prioritarianism and age-weighted prioritarianism as three different interpretations of the general prioritarian idea and discuss them in light of the effect of pandemic consequences on healthcare priority setting. On this analysis, the (...) paper arrives at the following three conclusions: that we have strong prioritarian reasons for special concern about the vulnerable and socially disadvantaged in reference to pandemic effects, that severity of illness is an important factor in identifying the worse off in priority setting but that this must not over-ride the special priority to the socially disadvantaged and that the maximisation rationale of the age-weighted view runs against the core prioritarian idea, and the age-weighted prioritarianism is thus unfitting as a prioritarian response to the COVID-19 case. (shrink)

This paper considers the simple two-person two-period case of distributive judgement, and argues (a) that sensible intertemporal distributive principle should consider both the distribution of people's life time well-being and the distribution of people's well-being at each period and (b) that, if (a) is correct, Egalitarianism is more acceptable than Prioritarianism since the latter must choose either one.

Torbjörn Tännsjö has written a clear and thought-provoking book on healthcare priority setting. He argues that different branches of ethical theory—utilitarianism, egalitarianism, and prioritarianism—are in general agreement on real-world healthcare priorities, and that it is human irrationality that stands in the way of complying with their recommendations. While I am generally sympathetic to the overall project and line of argumentation taken by the book, this paper raises two concerns with Tännsjö’s argument. First, that he is wrong to set aside deontic (...) constraints as irrelevant or as pointing in the same direction as consequentialism. Secondly, that his argument against prioritarianism in favor of utilitarianism is insufficient and under-developed. Given these problems, I conclude that we should welcome Tännsjö’s contribution but with these qualifications in mind. (shrink)

It is a common view that benefits to the worse off should be given priority when health benefits are distributed. This paper addresses how to understand who is worse off in this context when individuals are differently well off at different times. The paper argues that the view that this judgment about who is worse off should be based solely on how well off individuals are when their complete lives are considered (i.e. 'the complete lives view') is implausible in this (...) context. Instead, it is argued that a pluralistic stance toward this issue should be accepted. This pluralistic stance recognizes that also the view that only focuses on how well off individuals are now and in the future (i.e. 'the forward-looking view') is relevant. The argument is based on appeals to intuitive judgments concerning who is worse off in different cases and reference to various underlying reasons why priority to benefits to the worse off is justified. (shrink)

Ageism is the view that it is of greater moral value to allocate health care resources to younger people than to older people. In medical ethics, it is well-known that standard interpretations of distributive principles such as utilitarianism and egalitarianism imply some form of ageism. At times, ethicists argue as if practical complications are the only or main reason for not abiding to ageism. In this article, we argue that inferences to ageism from such distributive principles tend to commit what (...) we call the anticipation-blindness fallacy: A much too narrow focus on life quality benefits of health care treatments inclines us to overlook the importance of life quality benefits of health care safety, that is the mere trust in and expectation of being treated and cared for as one grows old. This is a key omission because health safety has value for a much larger population and for much longer time. Taking health safety into account therefore has important implications as for how ageist we ought to be. (shrink)

This paper critically examines prevailing egalitarian theories (which assess inequality between two individuals on the basis of their lifetime experience). The paper proposes an alternative theoretical framework: theDignified Lives Approach. This theoretical framework, which rests on deontological foundations, considers all human beings as of equal moral worth, and advocates treating each individual with equal concern and respectat any given time. The paper articulates five essential principles of equality founded in the notion of equal concern and respect: the principle ofindividual assessment, (...) the principle ofequal influence, the principle ofsufficiency, the principle ofsocial inclusion, and the principle ofautonomy. Focusing on senior workers, the paper reveals that age discrimination may be as unjust as other forms of discrimination. It therefore articulates a strong, moral case for eradicating age discrimination which is well supported by recent judicial developments. (shrink)