Philosophical interpretations of theories generally presuppose that a theory can be presented as a consistent mathematical formulation that is interpreted through models. Algebraic quantum field theory (AQFT) can fit this interpretative model. However, standard Lagrangian quantum field theory (LQFT), as well as quantum electrodynamics and nuclear physics, resists recasting along such formal lines. The difference has a distinct bearing on ontological issues. AQFT does not treat particle interactions or the standard model. This paper develops a framework and methodology for interpreting (...) such informal theories as LQFT and the standard model. We begin by summarizing two minimal epistemological interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics (NRQM): Bohrian semantics, which focuses on communicables; and quantum information theory, which focuses on the algebra of local observables. Schwinger's development of quantum field theory supplies a unique path from NRQM to QFT, where each step is conceptually anchored in local measurements. LQFT and the standard model rely on postulates that go beyond the limits set by AQFT and Schwinger's anabatic methodology. The particle ontology of the standard model is clarified by regarding the standard model as an informal modular theory with a limited range of validity. (shrink)

In place of earlier instrumentalist and phenomenalist interpretations of science both Quine and Sellars have developed highly influential realist positions centering around the doctrine that accepting a theory as explanatory and irreducible rationally entails accepting the entities posited by the theory. A growing reaction against this realism is partially based on perceived inadequacies in the doctrines of Quine and Sellars, but even more on reconstructions of scientific explanations which do not involve such ontic commitments. Three types of anti-realistic positions are (...) considered and criticized. Hesse's neo-Duhemian position couples a statistical theory of inference to a downgrading of purely theoretical statements. Sneed uses the method of axiomatrization through set-theoretic predicates to supply a reconstruction of Kuhn's account of scientific development. Here Ramsey-reduction sentences serve to eliminate purely theoretical terms. The longest section deals with van Fraassen's semantic model based on a state-space representation of scientific theories and the use of this model in interpreting quantum mechanics. It is argued that the model is valuable, but that the anti-realist interpretation accorded it is not justified and entails serious inconsistencies. (shrink)

The idea that science aspires to and routinely achieves truths about the world has been challenged in recent writings. Rather than beginning with a theory of scientific development, or of scientific explanation, we begin with a consideration of truth claims in ordinary discourse, particularly with Davidson's truth-functional semantics. Next we consider the way in which some framework features of ordinary language discourse are extended to and modified in scientific discourse. Two areas are treated in more detail: quantum theory, and the (...) peculiar problem of semantic entailment it involves; and quantum field theory. These supply a basis for criticizing some historicist and logicist treatments of the truth of scientific claims. (shrink)

Rom Harré's proposed Copernican Revolution in the philosophy of science is a very ambitious undertaking. It challenges established views, proposes a radically new model for scientific explanation, and forces a rethinking of the foundations of the field. In his treatment of the natural sciences, Harré rejects all deductivist accounts of scientific explanation basically on the grounds that such accounts seriously distort the methods of explanation actually operative in science. In the social sciences Harré, in collaboration with Secord, rejects mechanistic, positivistic, (...) and behavioristic accounts of human behavior [5]. In place of these discarded interpretations he substitutes a new realism which stresses the role that models play in supplying accounts of observed patterns of phenomena in terms of the things and processes whose interactions are responsible for the manifest phenomena. This revolution, if successfully carried out, would indeed be a valuable contribution to the philosophy of science. (shrink)