Rachlin's thought-provoking analysis could be strengthened by greater openness to evolutionary interpretation and the use of the directed attention concept as a component of self-control. His contribution to the understanding of prosocial behavior would also benefit from abandoning the traditional (and excessively restrictive) definition of altruism.

The concept of human gene therapy came on the heels of fundamental discoveries on the nature and working of the gene. However, realistic prospects to correct the underlying cause of recessive genetic disorders through the transfer of wild‐type alleles of defective genes had to wait for the arrival of recombinant DNA technology. These techniques permitted the isolation and insertion of genes into the first recombinant delivery systems. The realization that viruses are natural gene carriers provided inspiration for gene therapy and, (...) as engineered vectors, viruses became prominent gene delivery vehicles. Nonetheless, when put in the context of human and non‐human primate studies, all vectors fell short of success regardless of their viral or non‐viral origin. Recognition of issues such as inefficient gene transfer and short‐lived or scant expression in the relevant cell type(s) prompted researchers to refine and develop several gene delivery systems, in particular those based on retroviruses, adeno‐associated viruses and adenoviruses. Concomitantly, available technology was deployed to tackle disorders that require few genetically corrected cells to attain therapy. BioEssays 27: 506–517, 2005. © 2005 Wiley periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

First, a brief history is provided of Popper's views on the status of evolutionary biology as a science. The views of some prominent biologists are then canvassed on the matter of falsifiability and its relation to evolutionary biology. Following that, I argue that Popper's programme of falsifiability does indeed exclude evolutionary biology from within the circumference of genuine science, that Popper's programme is fundamentally incoherent, and that the correction of this incoherence results in a greatly expanded and much more realistic (...) concept of what is empirical, resulting in the inclusion of evolutionary biology. Finally, this expanded concept of empirical is applied to two particular problems in evolutionary biology — viz., the species problem and the debate over the theory of punctuated equilibria — and it is argued that both of them are still mainly metaphysical. (shrink)

Although “theory” has been the prevalent unit of analysis in the meta-study of science throughout most of the twentieth century, the concept remains elusive. I further explore the leitmotiv of several authors in this issue: that we should deal with theorizing (rather than theory) in biology as a cognitive activity that is to be investigated naturalistically. I first contrast how philosophers and biologists have tended to think about theory in the last century or so, and consider recent calls to upgrade (...) the role of theory in the life sciences against the background of the recent “data deluge” in molecular biology, systems biology, etc. I then review thinking about theory in biology in relation to physical theory as a positive or negative exemplar. I conclude by discussing various aspects of a positive program for “naturalizing theorizing.”. (shrink)

Karl Popper’s world 3 theory proposes that the products of the human mind can be considered a third world, partially autonomous of the mental and physical worlds, and real, because it can produce effects on both. When he first introduced the idea in 1960, he took even his close colleagues and students by surprise. Yet tracing the development of his idea shows a great deal in Popper’s previous work and thought led up to what seemed his startlingly new proposal. And (...) far from being the philosophy of his dotage, as some sneered, his world 3 proposal, once fully shaped, became a keystone of his thought. (shrink)

Many scientists and philosophers of science are troubled by the relative isolation of developmental from evolutionary biology. Reconciling the science of development with the science of heredity preoccupied a minority of biologists for much of the twentieth century, but these efforts were not corporately successful. Mainly in the past fifteen years, however, these previously dispersed integrating programmes have been themselves synthesized and so reinvigorated. Two of these more recent synthesizing endeavours are evolutionary developmental biology and developmental systems theory. While the (...) former is a bourgeoning and scientifically well-respected biological discipline, the same cannot be said of DST, which is virtually unknown among biologists. In this review, we provide overviews of DST and EDB, summarize their key tenets, examine how they relate to one another and to the study of epigenetics, and survey the impact that DST and EDB have had on biological theory and practice. (shrink)

Many situations in human life present choices between (a) narrowly preferred particular alternatives and (b) narrowly less preferred (or aversive) particular alternatives that nevertheless form part of highly preferred abstract behavioral patterns. Such alternatives characterize problems of self-control. For example, at any given moment, a person may accept alcoholic drinks yet also prefer being sober to being drunk over the next few days. Other situations present choices between (a) alternatives beneficial to an individual and (b) alternatives that are less beneficial (...) (or harmful) to the individual that would nevertheless be beneficial if chosen by many individuals. Such alternatives characterize problems of social cooperation; choices of the latter alternative are generally considered to be altruistic. Altruism, like self-control, is a valuable temporally-extended pattern of behavior. Like self-control, altruism may be learned and maintained over an individual's lifetime. It needs no special inherited mechanism. Individual acts of altruism, each of which may be of no benefit (or of possible harm) to the actor, may nevertheless be beneficial when repeated over time. However, because each selfish decision is individually preferred to each altruistic decision, people can benefit from altruistic behavior only when they are committed to an altruistic pattern of acts and refuse to make decisions on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)