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  1. Networked Learning and Three Promises of Phenomenology.Lucy Osler - forthcoming - In Phenomenology in Action for Researching Networked Learning Experiences.
    In this chapter, I consider three ‘promises’ of bringing phenomenology into dialogue with networked learning. First, a ‘conceptual promise’, which draws attention to conceptual resources in phenomenology that can inspire and inform how we understand, conceive of, and uncover experiences of participants in networked learning activities and environments. Second, a ‘methodological promise’, which outlines a variety of ways that phenomenological methodologies and concepts can be put to use in empirical research in networked learning. And third, a ‘critical promise’, which suggests (...)
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  • Observation, Interaction, Communication: The Role of the Second Person.Dan Zahavi - 2023 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 97 (1):82-103.
    Recent years have seen an upsurge of interest in the second-person perspective, not only in philosophy of mind, language, law and ethics, but also in various empirical disciplines such as cognitive neuroscience and developmental psychology. A distinctive and perhaps also slightly puzzling feature of this ongoing discussion is that whereas many contributors insist that a proper consideration of the second-person perspective will have an impact on our understanding of social cognition, joint action, communication, self-consciousness, morality, and so on, there remains (...)
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  • Collaborative Inhibition: A Phenomenological Perspective.Daniel Gyollai - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    The tendency for people to remember less as members of a group than they would be capable of were they to remember alone is a phenomenon known as collaborative inhibition. The article offers a phenomenological account of this highly counterintuitive effect of group remembering. It argues that the mutual failure to live up to one’s potential does not warrant the standard, strongly negative views about the role of others in recall. Rather, the phenomenon may imply that sharedness itself becomes constitutive (...)
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  • Karl Löwith on the I–thou relation and interpersonal proximity.Felipe León - 2024 - Continental Philosophy Review 57 (2):141-163.
    Current research on second-person relations has often overlooked that this is not a new topic. Addressed mostly under the heading of the “I–thou relation,” second-person relations were discussed by central figures of the phenomenological tradition, including Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, but also quite extensively by much lesser-known authors, such as Karl Löwith, Ludwig Binswanger, and Semyon L. Frank, whose work has been undeservedly neglected in current research. This paper starts off by arguing that, in spite of the rightly acknowledged (...)
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  • The unity and plurality of sharing.Dan Zahavi - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Many accounts of collective intentionality target rather sophisticated types of cooperative activities, i.e., activities with complex goals that require prior planning and various coordinating and organizing roles. But although joint action is of obvious importance, an investigation of collective intentionality should not merely focus on the question of how we can share agentive intentions. We can act and do things together, but it is not obvious that the awe felt and shared by a group of Egyptologists when they gain entry (...)
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