When is the future? Is it to come or is it already here? This question serves as the frame for three further questions: why is utopia a bad concept and in what way is fabulation its superior counterpart? If the object of fabulation is the creation of a people to come, how do we get from the present to the future? And what is a people to come? The answers are that the future is both now and to come, now (...) as the becoming-revolutionary of our present and to come as the goal of our becoming; utopia is a bad concept because it posits a pre-formed blueprint of the future, whereas a genuinely creative future has no predetermined shape and fabulation is the means whereby a creative future may be generated; the movement from the revolutionary present toward a people to come proceeds via the protocol, which provides reference points for an experiment which exceeds our capacities to foresee; a people to come is a collectivity that reconfigures group relations in a polity superior to the present, but it is not a utopian collectivity without differences, conflicts and political issues. Science fiction formulates protocols of the politics of a people to come, and Octavia Butler's science fiction is especially valuable in disclosing the relationship between fabulation and the invention of a people to come. (shrink)

Tras elaborar una versión de la Historia Universal motorizada por la producción deseante, Deleuze adoptó un viraje anti-historicista, desplazándose a los devenires no históricos y multiplicando perspectivas negativas sobre la historia. En el marco del debate entre quienes le adjudican posiciones exclusivamente anti-historicistas y quienes le atribuyen una filosofía de la historia o una metodología historicista, proponemos elucidar las críticas deleuzianas a la historia sirviéndonos de la distinción entre la historia como realidad objetiva y la disciplina histórica. Además, analizamos la (...) primacía otorgada a la filosofía sobre la historia a partir de su concepción del acontecimiento y su temporalidad. (shrink)

RESUMEN En este artículo abordamos la cuestión del poder en el pensamiento de Deleuze. Según nuestra hipótesis, no hay en su obra un único concepto de poder sino diferentes enfoques no incompatibles entre sí pero que no se dejan reducir a un solo punto de vista. Esta variedad de abordajes puede ser reunida alrededor de dos posiciones generales adoptadas por Deleuze: primero, tiende a relativizar su eficacia respecto de otros elementos más fundamentales, realzando así los límites o la impotencia del (...) poder; segundo, le quita valor con relación a otras entidades y procesos en los que deposita su apuesta filosófica. Nos proponemos desarrollar estas perspectivas a fin de ofrecer un panorama integral de una temática relevante de la filosofía política deleuziana. ABSTRACT In this article, we address the question of power in Deleuze's thinking. According to our hypothesis, there is not a single concept of power in his work, but different approaches not incompatible with each other but that cannot be reduced to a single point of view. This variety of approaches can be gathered around two general positions about power, adopted by Deleuze: first, he tends to relativize its effectiveness with respect to other more fundamental elements, thus enhancing the limits or impotence of power; second, he takes away value in relation to other entities and processes in which he places his philosophical commitment. We intend to develop these perspectives in order to offer a comprehensive overview of a relevant theme of Deleuzian political philosophy. (shrink)

It has gone largely unnoticed that when Deleuze opposes the “private thinker” to the “public professor,” he is invoking the existential thought of Lev Shestov. The public professor defends established values and preaches submission to the demands of reason and the State; the private thinker opposes thought to reason, “idiocy” to common sense, a people to come to what exists. Private thinkers are solitary, singular and untimely, forced to think against consensus and “the crowd.” Deleuze takes from Shestov and Kierkegaard (...) the idea that genuine thinking manifests itself in a thinking which rebels against rational necessity, a theme central to Shestov’s leading French interpreter, Benjamin Fondane. Although Deleuze at first expresses doubts as to whether Shestov’s critique of reason can overcome the legislative reason of Kant, or whether it is entirely free of ressentiment, I argue that Shestov and Fondane’s anti-rationalism is more radical than Deleuze sometimes admits, and show how Deleuze’s attitude toward Shestov became more unreservedly positive over the years. On the other hand, against Shestov and Fondane, I agree with Deleuze that the private thinker is in solidarity with the “strange powers” which can remake the world, and thus with “the people to come.” Nonetheless, I argue that Deleuze’s philosophy cannot form the basis of a politics of egalitarian consensus, but that “the people to come” can only be a “broken chain” of untimely and singular exceptions. (shrink)

El artículo enfoca la crítica de la imagen dogmática en Deleuze desde un análisis retrospectivo del papel que desempeña la noción de «imagen del pensamiento» en su obra. Tras desgranar brevemente los distintos sentidos e interpretaciones con que el autor la utiliza y cerrar la introducción con la exposición del uso plenamente positivo que ese sintagma acabará adquiriendo en él, nos remontamos hasta el uso crítico y cronológicamente anterior –que no primero– de la expresión, donde la palabra «Imagen» señala esa (...) preconcepción tradicional, común a la filosofía y al buen sentido, de un pensamiento pretendidamente «natural», con el fin de arrojar una luz nueva sobre los principales ejes en torno a los cuales semejante Imagen se estructura. (shrink)

En el marco del debate sobre los lineamientos fundamentales de la ética de Deleuze, diversos autores han reparado en nociones destacadas de su obra: el deseo, el devenir, la afirmación, el nomadismo. Mi propuesta en este artículo es desarrollar una vía poco estudiada, que gira alrededor de la idea de prudencia práctica experimental. Según mi hipótesis, este concepto reúne perspectivas relevantes de la producción deleuzeana posterior a L'Anti-Œdipe, en particular su orientación vitalista, su opción por la desubjetivación y su apelación (...) a una dimensión ascética vinculada con el deseo como impulsor de la experimentación. Within the realm of debate on fundamental layouts of Deleuze's ethics, several authors have concentrated on significant notions in his work: desire, becoming, affirmation, nomadism. In this article my proposal is to develop a road, scarcely studied yet, in connection with the idea of experimental practical prudence. Respect to my hypothesis, this concept assembles relevant perspectives of Deleuze's post L'Anti-Œdipe production, especially his orientation towards vitalism, his choice for desubjectivation and his appeal to an ascetic dimension linked to desire as motor to experimentation. (shrink)

In 1990, Antonio Negri pointed out some problems with Deleuze's political philosophy. Substituting infra-structures for life or desire, as constitutive dimensions of power formations, did not imply giving up on Marx, but it certainly did imply a change in the table of conceptual analysis and a profound renovation of the questions that pertain to militant praxis. Taking this into account, we intend to explore the sense of a rare fidelity to Marx, and a certain idea of intellectual commitment that, reframing (...) its objects and its instruments, pretends to renew political thinking in order to confront the unforeseeable of new knowledge, new techniques and new political facts. (shrink)