En este artículo nos proponemos indagar acerca del lugar y significado que asume la categoría de autonomía estética en lo que Hegel denomina “consideración liberal de lo bello”. A tales fines, analizamos los aspectos de su teoría de la religión del arte, cuyo modelo puede encontrarse en la organización ético-política de la polis griega, así como también los presupuestos filosóficos de su célebre teorema acerca del carácter pasado del arte “en su determinación suprema”. La hipótesis que nos guía en esta (...) lectura sostiene que la estética hegeliana se encuentra tensionada por un movimiento doble que impide ubicar al arte en un lugar fijo: al mismo tiempo en que sostiene la necesidad de una categoría de libertad para la determinación conceptual de lo bello, ella es motivo de una constante complejización por una perspectiva que la excede. Esa perspectiva filosófico-histórica se fundamenta en una categoría del sujeto moral que justifica la interpretación del arte como medio de tránsito hacia figuras más avanzadas del espíritu. (shrink)

Adorno's moral philosophy has often been accused of making aporetic prescriptions that are too taxing for moral agents. In this article, I defend his approach in terms of a theory of moral dilemmas. My guideline is Adorno's famous sentence that wrong life cannot be lived rightly. I argue that this claim is not distinctly prescriptive, as most of Adorno's critics believe, but is a claim about moral reality. Emphasizing realist aspects of his moral theory, I suggest that wrong life is (...) neither inconceivable nor an amoral or skeptical trope. Instead, Adorno's sentence about wrong life can be interpreted as a claim about the salience of particular moral facts. This, I conclude, allows Adorno to envisage moral reasons that motivate moral conduct case by case, although they are blocked overall. (shrink)

Benjamin’s Critique of Violence (1921) has been a relevant source of legal and political philosophy about the nature of law, from Derrida to Menke. In this article, we rebuild the reading of Benjamin’s Critique proposed by Menke and consider the appropriateness of violence in the law not as a tragic tension, but as a condition for its reproduction. Finally, we will consider its paradoxical nature as a confirmation of the difference between the force of law and social-normative elements such as (...) recognition [ Anerkennung]. (shrink)

Lyotard defines being postmodern as an ‘incredulity toward metanarratives’. Such incredulity includes, in particular, skepticism vis-à-vis Enlightenment ideals like autonomy. Motivated by such skepticism, several educational scholars put into question education for autonomy as it is practiced in the formal settings of national school systems. More specifically, they criticize that practices of autonomy education can have certain normalizing and ideological e￿ects that undermine the aim of creating autonomous subjects. This article examines these critiques of education for autonomy and argues that (...) they are best understood as calls for reforming educational practices, and not as outright rejections of education for autonomy. Thus, since the allegedly ‘postmodern’ critiques of autonomy education cannot be plausibly understood as radical ruptures with Enlightenment ideals, the article concludes that these critiques represent (merely) constructive self-critical reflections on what Habermas dubbed the ‘unfinished project of modernity’. (shrink)