Francisco Sanches (1551–1623) was an important figure in the history of philosophical scepticism, and most specifically in the later sixteenth and early seventeenth century. Sanches gained notoriety through his controversial text, That Nothing is Known. His skeptical ideas concerning what could be known of the phenomenal world, influenced the work of other philosophers like René Descartes. In fact, in the last twenty-five to thirty years, his work has at last been acknowledged as having served as a background source of Descartes’ (...) refutation of scepticism. Sanches was not only a philosopher; he was also a physician, and a professor of medicine – a fact that doubtlessly tempered his scepticism. In recent years, there has been a growing interest in Sanches, as he has come to be seen as a significant philosopher in the history of scepticism, along with Montaigne, Descartes, and Hume. Some contemporary thinkers have gone as far as comparing his notion of language and metaphysics to that of someone like Wittgenstein. (shrink)

I analyze the complex relations between Pascal and the three figures of Montaigne, Descartes, and St. Augustine, and the relations the first two figures bear to St. Augustine. For Pascal's philosophy, one is in effect a resource , another a way of thinking that he makes his own , and yet another serves as a model . I further investigate Pascal's anti-Augustinism, that is, some of the points of resistance in Pascal against the thought of St. Augustine. Central to this (...) investigation is the famous rapprochement between the cogitos of Augustine and Descartes, which requires a consideration of what, for Pascal, it means "to say the same thing." This analysis leads us to two conclusions: first, Augustine's The City of God should be placed among the number of works that Pascal did not read; second, there are fundamental philosophical reasons for Pascal to reject certain theses central to that work. Above all, there should no longer be any need to assume a merely abstract conception of an unproblematic Augustinianism in Pascal. (shrink)

: In the concluding pages of his Epistolae duae de motu impresso a motore translato (1642), Pierre Gassendi provides a brief summary of the explanation of the tides found in Galileo's Dialogue over the Two Chief World Systems (1632). A comparison between the two texts reveals, however, that Gassendi surreptitiously modifies Galileo's theory in some crucial points in the vain hope of rendering it more compatible with the observed phenomena. But why did Gassendi not acknowledge his departures from the Galilean (...) model? The present article argues that cautiousness was just one of the reasons that stopped the French priest from turning Galileo's theory into his own theory. He was probably also aware of the fact that Kepler's model of planetary motion, which he endorsed in the Epistolae, could not be reconciled with Galileo's explanation of the tides. In the postumously published Syntagma philosophicum (1658), Gassendi tried to mend this major inconsistency by arguing that Galileo's theory of the tides not only remained valid, but became even more coherent, if one attributed to the Earth an elliptic orbit. But given that in the Syntagma Gassendi officially adhered to the Tychonic system, his effort to reconcile Kepler and Galileo, while already unconvincing by itself, appears completely futile. (shrink)

In the lively discussions on Galileo's laws of motion after the Pisan's death, we observe what might be called a new “Galilean affair.” That is, a trial brought against his new science of motion mainly by French and Italian Jesuits with the substantial adherence of M. Mersenne. This new trail was originated by Gassendi's presentation of Galileo's de motu not simply as a perfectly coherent doctrine, but also as a convincing argument in favor of the truth of Copernicanism.

In the lively discussions on Galileo's laws of motion after the Pisan's death, we observe what might be called a new “Galilean affair.” That is, a trial brought against his new science of motion mainly by French and Italian Jesuits with the substantial adherence of M. Mersenne. This new trail was originated by Gassendi's presentation of Galileo's de motu not simply as a perfectly coherent doctrine, but also as a convincing argument in favor of the truth of Copernicanism.