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Switch to: References
Citations of:
Phénoménologie de la perception
Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 5 (4):466-466 (1949)
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Je m’oppose ici à la théorie « structurale » de la sensation développée par Kurt Koffka dans les années 1920, et reprise notamment par Merleau-Ponty, qui en fait le centre théorique des analyses de la psychologie de la forme. Je commence donc par examiner cette théorie et les faits sur lesquels elle repose, en montrant notamment, à l’aide de la méréologie husserlienne, qu’ils ne peuvent paraître corroborer une théorie structurale de la sensation que si l’on confond « abstraire » et (...) |
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resumo Neste artigo, pre t e ndemos mostrar como a concepção de Merleau- Po nty acerca das relações ent re sujeito perceptivo e mu ndo muda no decorrer de sua obra. Em seu livro Fenomenologia da Percepção, public a do em 1945, Merleau- Ponty atribui a tal sujeito a capacida de de assimilar ade q ua da mente o ser do mu ndo. No ent a nto, no início dos ano s cinqüenta, seu estudo da obra do psicólogo Kurt Koffka (...) |
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The body is made up of parts. This basic assumption is central in most neuroscientific studies of bodily sensation, body representation and motor action. Yet, the assumption has rarely been considered explicitly. We may indeed ask how the body is internally segmented and how body parts can be defined. That is, how can we sketch the mereology of the body? Here we distinguish between a somatosensory mereology and a motor mereology. |
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Human freedom was Jean-Paul Sartre’s central philosophical preoccupation throughout his career. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the cornerstone of his moral and political thought, Being and Nothingness, contains an extensive and subtle account of the metaphysical freedom that he considered fundamental to the kind of existence that humans have. Although rooted in phenomenology, Sartre’s account of freedom draws very little on analysis of the experience of freedom itself. It is rather based on a general phenomenological account of perceptual experience (...) |
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In Moran, D. (ed.): Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge, 2008. |
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Ce texte a déjà paru dans L'espace Géographique, n° 1, 1er trim. 2007, p. 15-26. Nous remercions Rachel Thomas de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Résumé : La thématique de la marche en ville a occupé une grande partie de la littérature du XIXe et du début du XXe siècle. Au point qu'aujourd'hui, la figure du flâneur, décrite par Walter Benjamin, domine encore nos représentations. Pour autant, si marcher en ville requiert un art du voir dont le flâneur (...) |
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There seems to be no dimension of bodily awareness that cannot be disrupted. To account for such variety, there is a growing consensus that there are at least two distinct types of body representation that can be impaired, the body schema and the body image. However, the definition of these notions is often unclear. The notion of body image has attracted most controversy because of its lack of unifying positive definition. The notion of body schema, onto which there seems to (...) |
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Resumo: O problema da intersubjetividade, tal como colocado pela filosofia da consciência, exigiu de Merleau-Ponty uma investigação de alguns aspectos essenciais envolvidos no fenômeno da comunicação, tais como o valor expressivo da palavra e a questão da verdade, o que acabou por inserir o filósofo no cenário das grandes discussões linguísticas. Pelo aprofundamento especulativo em direção à camada pré-reflexiva da existência, a análise da linguagem e da intersubjetividade favoreceram não apenas a compreensão da questão da criação de novos significados: ela (...) |
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Resumen: Los objetivos de mi trabajo son: explorar la génesis de la función llamada “arco intencional” en la infancia, entenderla como un proceso de desarrollo paulatino y analizar los procesos intermedios que intervienen en su definición. Asimismo, intentaré demostrar que el concepto de arco intencional, aunque poco desarrollado por Merleau-Ponty, conlleva consecuencias que impregnan y sostienen gran parte de su teoría perceptual. Esclarecer la trama conceptual que lo fundamenta no sólo podrá arrojar luz sobre la génesis de la percepción en (...) |
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In this paper, I explore some of the temporal structures of racialized experience – what I call racialized time. I draw on the Martiniquan philosopher and psychiatrist Frantz Fanon, in particular his book ‘Black Skin, White Masks,’ in order to ask how racism can be understood as a social pathology which, when internalized or ‘epidermalized,’ may result in aberrations of affect, embodiment and agency that are temporally lived. In this regard, I analyze the racialized experience of coming ‘too late’ to (...) |
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En este artículo investigamos las aproximaciones teórico-prácticas entre integración cerebral y corporal que la filosofía fenomenológica anticipaba desde los comienzos del siglo veinte. A partir de nuestro trabajo práctico en la educación y la terapia psicomotriz, hemos encontrado en la virtualidad creadora de Bergson y en la perspectiva corporal de Merleau-Ponty, un inicio de reflexión teórica sobre la vertiente holística del saber que la neurociencia ha ido refrendando paulatinamente con sus descubrimientos. |
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