The M → W thesis that a meaningful life must be a worthwhile life follows from an appealing approach to the axiology of life. Yet one of the most prominent voices in the recent philosophy of life literature, Thaddeus Metz, has raised multiple objections to that thesis. With a view to preserving the appeal of the axiological approach from which it follows, I here defend the M → W thesis from Metz’s objections. My defense yields some interesting insights about both (...) a meaningful life and a worthwhile life: a meaningful life should be firmly distinguished from a life with meaning, the value of a meaningful life must outweigh whatever disvalue the life has, a worthwhile life at a given time needn’t be a life worth continuing at that time, and the M → W thesis doesn’t preclude the possibility of something being part of what constitutes the meaningfulness of a life without also being part of what constitutes the worthwhileness of the life. (shrink)

While research on meaningfulnesss in life is becoming increasingly popular in analytic philosophy, there is still a dearth of literature on the topic of meaninglessness. This is surprising, given that a better understanding of the nature of meaninglessness may help to illuminate features of meaningfulness previously unobserved or misunderstood. Additionally, the topic of meaninglessness is interesting in its own right - independent of what it can tell us about meaningfulness. In my dissertation, I construct and defend my own conception of (...) meaninglessness. -/- I adopt Thaddeus Metz's (2013) analysis of meaninglessness presented in his new book, Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study. For Metz, meaninglessness is not the absence of meaningfulness but a positively bad state to be in - one that can detract from the overall meaningfulness of a life. I distinguish between the following: negative meaning (i.e., meaninglessness as a dis-value), positive meaning (i.e., meaningfulness), and lives that lack positive meaning. I defend a conception of negative meaning. In contrast, most conceptions of meaninglessness are conceptions of lives where positive meaning is absent. Philosophers defending these conceptions have yet to acknowledge the existence of negative meaning. I explain why conceptions of meaninglessness (as the absence of positive meaning) are inadequate and I provide support for the existence of negative meaning. (shrink)

When pessimists claim that human life is meaningless, they often also assert that the universe is “blind to good and evil” and “indifferent to us”. How, if it all, is the indifference of the universe relevant to whether life is meaningful? To answer this question, and to know whether we should be concerned that the universe is indifferent, we need a clearer and deeper understanding of the concept of “cosmic indifference”, which I will seek to provide. I will argue that (...) the lives of many individuals are meaningful and that human life, in general, is somewhat meaningful, despite the indifference of the universe. Furthermore, I will seek to demonstrate that even if the universe cared about us, or had preferences for how we live our lives, that this likely would not enhance the quality of our lives. (shrink)

This paper draws on an in-depth phenomenological analysis of some interviews taken from volunteers, inviting them to reflect on their lived experiences of meaningfulness in the context of volunteering and citizenship. It is found that while some testimonies reinforce the standard conceptions of meaningfulness, other testimonies vary from it. The main challenge of this contribution consists in phenomenologically describing this alternative picture of meaningfulness, depicted as the event of witnessing. In a final part, the authors consider how volunteering is at (...) times especially prone to further experiences of witnessing. (shrink)

Zur Klärung ihrer Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede.

Why does the ruling class in all countries of the world today act so weirdly and sometimes irresponsibly? Maybe because they are all bored. They don’t know what to do with themselves, or even what to do with their power. The deepest cause of the modern crisis is the lack of new ideas. First of all, ideas that justify your life and death. These ideas are called meanings of life, final values, final goals, final goods, human life's ends, reasons to (...) live, etc. Philosophers and psychologists pick out from five to twenty known final values that cannot be reduced to one another. The existing final values are not but the final values system itself is outdated and has not been updated for a long time. To get out of the existential crisis, we need to look for new final values. New final values mean new ethical standards, new philosophies, new religions, new ideologies, new social institutions, etc. The more final values we know, the richer our culture is, the freer we are and the more expanded (more flexible, sophisticated, etc.) our consciousness is. (shrink)

Written from a broadly atheist point of view, this paper explores the religious dimension of moral experience, that is, whether in order to be moral and/or to live a life that in our own eyes means something it is necessary to believe in something that transcends what we can verify through science or direct observation and even what we can clearly articulate. I investigate the question through an interpretation of the work of four very different writers, namely Hans Jonas, Alfred (...) North Whitehead, Albert Camus, and Cormac McCarthy, who all contribute valuable insights that suggest the impossibility of a moral life, and indeed any decent human life at all, that is based purely on tangible reality and the rationally justifiable. (shrink)

This paper draws on an in-depth phenomenological analysis of some interviews taken from volunteers, inviting them to reflect on their lived experiences of meaningfulness in the context of volunteering and citizenship. It is found that while some testimonies reinforce the standard conceptions of meaningfulness, other testimonies vary from it. The main challenge of this contribution consists in phenomenologically describing this alternative picture of meaningfulness, depicted as the event of wit(h)nessing. In a final part, the authors consider how volunteering is at (...) times especially prone to further experiences of wit(h)nessing. (shrink)

Este trabajo busca reflexionar en torno al siguiente problema: ¿cuál es la mejor forma de concebir la felicidad en la filosofía contemporánea? Para ello, dividiremos esta interrogante en dos. En primer lugar, indagaremos si acaso la felicidad es algo similar a lo que los griegos entendían por “eudaimonia”, i.e., una vida buena o digna de ser vivida; o si, en cambio, la felicidad es mejor entendida como un estado de la mente, postura que comienza a recibir mayor aceptación desde los (...) inicios de la modernidad. Nuestra opinión es que actualmente la felicidad se debería concebir de la segunda forma: en primer lugar, “eudaimonia” es un término que está revestido de un innegable componente evaluativo. Esto, sumado al “criterio de pertinencia descriptiva” —según el cual, la definición técnica de un concepto no debería alejarse demasiado de la concepción cotidiana del mismo— y al hecho de que en el lenguaje vernáculo “felicidad” es de naturaleza eminentemente descriptiva y no evaluativa, nos lleva a concluir que el uso técnico de este término debe ser también descriptivo, coincidiendo así con un estado mental más que con una vida buena. Una vez resuelta esta dimensión del problema, procedemos a abordar la segunda cara del mismo: si la felicidad es un estado mental, ¿cómo debe describirse ese estado? Las teorías más aceptadas al respecto son el hedonismo con respecto a la felicidad, la satisfacción con la vida como un todo, y la condición emocional positiva. Ninguna de estas propuestas está libre de dificultades; sin embargo, concluimos que la teoría más prometedora es la de la condición emocional positiva, puesto que las incongruencias internas y los inconvenientes que debe resolver son de menor gravedad. De esta manera proponemos que actualmente la mejor manera de concebir la felicidad es como un estado mental que se puede describir como una condición emocional positiva, la cual consistiría, grosso modo, en la posesión de emociones positivas y/o placenteras, así como también en propensiones o disposiciones de ánimo positivos. (shrink)

Der Beitrag untersucht zwei Vorschläge von Susan Wolf und Thaddeus Metz zur Eigenständigkeit des sinnvollen Lebens gegenüber dem Leben in Wohlergehen sowie dem moralischen Leben und entwickelt diese weiter. Während beide Vorschläge sich auf einen Ansatzpunkt zur Entwicklung ihrer Abgrenzungskriterien beschränken – Arten von Gütern oder Arten motivierender Gründe –, basiert die hier verfochtene Eigenständigkeitsthese auf der Idee, dass eine Kombination beider erforderlich ist, um eine zufriedenstellende Unterscheidung des sinnvollen Lebens vom Leben in Wohlergehen und dem moralisch geführten Leben zu (...) erreichen. Demnach ergibt sich ein sinnvolles Leben durch Tätigkeiten, die sich dafür eignen, Dinge von fi- nalem Wert zu achten, wenn dies erstens unabhängig von der Aussicht auf hedonisch verstandenes Wohlergehen geschieht und zweitens aus motivierenden Gründen, die sich auf einen finalen Wert des Gegenstands beziehen. Beide Komponenten des Abgrenzungsvorschlags begründen die Eigenständigkeit, die der Wertdimension des sinnvollen Lebens beim Beurteilen der Güte eines Lebens zukommt: So sorgt der eigene Wert der handlungswirksam werdenden motivierenden Gründe innerhalb des sinnvollen Lebens dafür, dass dem Leben des Handelnden auch unabhängig vom Erfolg seiner Bemühungen bereits ein Wert zugewiesen werden kann – der Wert der Sinnhaftigkeit. Derlei motivierende Gründe spielen für die Bewertung der moralischen Güte eines Lebens keine Rolle, wenigstens wenn Letzteres wesentlich nach Maßgabe der Erfüllung moralischer Pflichten bewertet wird. Und sie spielen für das Leben hedonischen Wohlergehens keine Rolle, weil in dessen Bewertung allein das Maß erreichten Wohlergehens einfließt, da das bloße Bemühen darum dem Handelnden nicht positiv angerechnet werden kann. (shrink)

Purpose The role of entrepreneurship as a major engine for innovation, economic growth and job creation has made policymakers argue for infusing entrepreneurship into all levels of education. It is argued that citizens must develop their entrepreneurial skills in order to cope with our increasingly globalized, fast-paced and uncertain world. Making the leap of faith from entrepreneurship into education is however rife with challenges and failures. Most attempts have resulted in isolated initiatives impacting only a small number of interested students (...) on higher levels of education. Common challenges to wider adoption are lack of definitional clarity around what exactly signifies “entrepreneurial” education, impeding organizational structures, lack of resources, assessment difficulties and fear of capitalism. To address these challenges, the purpose of this thesis is to articulate and qualify a tentatively new educational philosophy grounded in entrepreneurship, allowing teachers to use value creation as a stepping stone between entrepreneurship and education when attempting to infuse entrepreneurship into education. Result An educational philosophy grounded in entrepreneurship has been defined in this thesis as letting students learn through creating value for others, giving teachers prescriptive advice on what, how and why issues in education. This is inherently entrepreneurial in its reliance on a widespread view of entrepreneurship as being about new value creation for others and constituted by a set of teachable entrepreneurial methods. The resulting process is rich with interaction between people and triggers a multitude of emotional learning events, allowing for more engaged students and deeper learning of entrepreneurial as well as subject specific knowledge, skills and attitudes. Method The tentatively new educational philosophy proposed here was developed through an abductive five-year action research process of constant iterations between theory and practice. A total of nine empirical studies on all levels of education were drawn from, involving a few hundred primary, secondary, tertiary and continuing education teachers, around 2000 students and around 100 different educational institutions in three European countries. Two main action research cycles were conducted, each spanning 3-4 years in time. Theory from entrepreneurship and education guided the research, as well as theory from fields such as psychology, philosophy, anthropology, economics and methodology. A number of methodological developments were made in the research process, such as a new “proxy” theory of assessing entrepreneurial education, a mobile app based experience sampling informed interview technique and analytical frameworks for key emotional events and entrepreneurial competencies. Novelty This is the first attempt that has been made to propose an educational philosophy grounded in entrepreneurship. Questions explored in order to qualify it included why educational philosophy is important when infusing entrepreneurship into education and what is new with an educational philosophy grounded in entrepreneurship. Compared to existing educational philosophies such as traditional, progressive and experiential education, it can contribute with a purposeful movement between often unconnected and opposing philosophical positions rather than being yet another flag on the philosophical playing field of education. Whether this makes it an entirely new educational philosophy or merely a novel combination of established ones remains to be determined. Limitations Some important challenges and limitations with the proposed educational philosophy have emerged. It could be viewed as too excluding to view entrepreneurial education as being solely about education that includes value creation attempts. Asking students to focus on knowledge that can be useful for others could also be viewed as an overly utilitarian emphasis. The interdisciplinary challenge of bridging the two very different scholarly fields of education and entrepreneurship was also shown to be significant. It remains to be seen whether value creation as a stepping stone will allow scholars and practitioners to keep their feet dry when attempting to infuse entrepreneurship into education. (shrink)