Is it fair to leave the next generation a public debt? Is it defensible to impose legal rules on them through constitutional constraints? From combating climate change to ensuring proper funding for future pensions, concerns about ethics between generations are everywhere. In this volume sixteen philosophers explore intergenerational justice. Part One examines the ways in which various theories of justice look at the matter. These include libertarian, Rawlsian, sufficientarian, contractarian, communitarian, Marxian and reciprocity-based approaches. In Part Two, the authors look (...) more specifically at issues relevant to each of these theories, such as motivation to act fairly towards future generations, the population dimension, the formation of preferences through education and how they impact on our intergenerational obligations, and whether it is fair to rely on constitutional devices. (shrink)

According to the so-called Classical Theory, concepts are mentally represented by individually necessary and jointly sufficient application conditions. One of the principal empirical objections against this view stems from evidence that people judge some instances of a concept to be more typical than others. In this paper we present and discuss four empirical studies that investigate the extent to which this ‘typicality effect’ holds for the concept of basic needs. Through multiple operationalizations of typicality, our studies yielded evidence for a (...) strong effect of this kind: Participants tended to recall the same core examples of the concept in a free-listing task. They judged some basic needs to be more typical than others. The items that were judged to be more typical were listed more frequently in the free-listing task. These items were listed earlier on in the free-listing task. Typical basic needs, as well as non needs, were classified faster than atypical basic needs in a reaction time study. These findings suggest that the concept of basic needs may have a non-classical structure. If so, the quest for a simple and robust intensional analysis of the concept may be futile. (shrink)

In 1987, the Brundtland Commission urged nations to improve present conditions without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs. Against the background of this appeal for sustainable development, there is a call for intergenerational justice, under a sufficientarian framework. Despite their strong relation, we claim that, to some degree, intergenerational sufficientarianism disregards relevant sustainability notions. This neglect undermines intergenerational sufficientarianism in the context of sustainability, here operationalized as sustainable development. In response, we propose the concept of irreplaceable (...) goods as a necessary bridge between the two frameworks. Simultaneously, we stress the need for scholars to consider sufficientarianism as a valid alternative to egalitarianism for achieving resource justice. To harmonize intergenerational sufficientarianism and sustainability, we firstly delineate sustainability theoretical notions that influence fair distributive futures. Secondly, we incorporate those sustainability constraints into the conceptual background of intergenerational sufficientarianism. We also establish the concept of irreplaceable goods as a pivot and anchor for further theoretical development on the sufficient well-being of future generations. Finally, we discuss the implications of this concept in terms of expenditure and investment by contemporary people. With the proposed adjustments, we advocate that intergenerational sufficientarianism is a robust framework to deliver just futures. (shrink)

From the day on which humans are born they need things. Some of these needs seem “basic,” such as our needs for food, water or shelter. Everybody has these needs. We cannot escape them. We also cannot escape the serious harm that arises when these needs remain unsatisfied. It is thus no wonder that in thinking about what we ought to do some researchers have suggested to first and foremost focus on people's basic needs. Such need‐based theories must answer three (...) main questions: What are basic needs? What are their implications for normative questions? And how can these needs and their satisfaction be measured? Proponents must also defend these theories against objections, such as against the objections that the theories are paternalistic, materialistic, and passivity‐promoting. Depending on their goals and contexts (distributive justice, sustainable development, human rights, etc.), appeals to basic needs may take various different forms. (shrink)