L’emploi par Poincaré de la notion de convention au sujet des hypothèses géométriques signale un déplacement par rapport aux problématiques traditionnelles. La découverte des géométries non euclidiennes montre qu’il n’y a pas de cadre spatial unique ; plusieurs systèmes sont possibles. On affirme ainsi l’existence d’un aspect essentiel de la connaissance qui ne dérive pas des faits et ne relève ni de l’inné ni de l’intuition. L’introduction de la notion de convention, dont il s’agit de prendre la mesure, ouvre la (...) voie à une prise en compte des facteurs décisionnels en science. Nous nous proposons, dans cet article, d’analyser l’argumentation de Poincaré en reconstruisant sa position face aux doctrines de Kant et de Mill.By understanding geometrical hypotheses as conventions, Poincaré significantly alters the traditional philosophical discussion of space. The discovery of non-Euclidean geometries proves that there is not a single spatial framework ; several systems are possible. Thus, there is an essential feature of knowledge that derives neither from empirical facts nor from intuition or innate understanding. The introduction of the notion of convention, whose significance is at issue here, provides a way of understanding the element of free choice in science. This article aims at analyzing Poincaré’s reasoning, by contrasting his viewpoint with that of Kant and Mill. (shrink)

The first Ukrainian translation of the most famous Quine’s article (1951), which became one of the classic texts of Analytical Philosophy.

Dans son intervention au colloque Koyré (Paris, 1986), Ernest Coumet a suggéré que le terme « révolution scientifique » ne désigne pas chez Koyré un événement historique, mais un idéaltype, au sens de Max Weber. L'auteur discute d'abord cette thèse de Coumet et expose les arguments que ce dernier apporte pour la soutenir. Dans la deuxième partie de l'article, il critique l'usage de la notion de révolution en histoire des sciences, en s'opposant en particulier à la possibilité de distinguer dans (...) les productions des savants une « pensée scientifique » qui serait influencée par la « pensée philosophique » et dont les bouleversements marqueraient l'avènement d'une révolution. (shrink)

What is the contribution of Duhem’s work to the modern historiography? His interpreters have been discussing this question and ordinarily have recognized that the main aspect in his extensive work is connected with his research of medieval science. It has become customary to speak of the “discovery of medieval science” as his foremost historiographic achievement. This paper aims to discuss some aspects of Duhem’s historiography more for its promotion of a new historical perspective than for its results. Duhem’s legacy for (...) modern historiography can be investigated from the characteristics that mark this new perspective, as regarded by Thomas Kuhn. (shrink)

To many contemporary scholars, Émile Meyerson is a footnote in an obscure history: early twentieth-century French philosophy of science. While the traditions of épistémologie are beginning to enjoy the scrutiny they deserve, Meyerson’s role remains overlooked. This article provides an overview of Meyerson’s philosophical project to help sow the seeds for a more systematic recuperation of its legacy. By orienting his work historically, I elucidate the nature of Meyerson’s critique of positivism, his distinctive method, and the implications these have for (...) the relation between science and philosophy. In particular, I show that for Meyerson positivisme refers not only to the doctrine of Auguste Comte but to a general philosophical tendency. Inseparable from Meyerson’s critique of this tendency is his implementation of a new methodology—épistémologie—according to which reason must be understood through the historical development of science. Épistémologie reveals that positivism not only is an incomplete account of science but is detrimental to its progress. Accordingly, Meyerson hopes to secure science’s right to function according to its own immanent principles, thereby providing prolegomena to all future metaphysics through a historical determination of the nature and limits of human reason. (shrink)

In his celebrated historic-epistemological work Identité et réalité, Émile Meyerson claimed that the scientific conservation principles were first suggested and accepted for philosophical reasons, and only afterwards were submitted to experimental tests. One of the instances he discussed in his book is the principle of mass conservation in chemical reactions. Meyerson pointed out that several authors, from Antiquity to Kant, accepted the idea of quantitative conservation of matter; and Lavoisier himself was strongly influenced by a priori ideas, using this principle (...) instead of attempting to test it. This paper will review Meyerson’s claim and historic evidence, focusing especially the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when the principle of mass conservation was tested in highly accurate experiments. Instead of confirming the principle, some of those experiments led to the detection of anomalies. Hans Landolt, for instance, noticed that there were some small violations of the principle. He observed mass variations of about 10−6 in chemical reactions produced in hermetically sealed glass tubes. Since Landolt was a famous chemist, his results produced a strong response. Several researchers repeated his experiments, with different results. Landolt himself improved his experiments, with a balance that could detect mass changes of 10−7. After changes of the experimental procedure, the chemical reactions did not show significant mass changes. There was not, however, any “crucial experiment” “proving” that mass was conserved. The observed anomalies were set aside mainly by theoretical reasons, after the discovery of radioactivity and the development of the theory of relativity. (shrink)

Gerald Holton has famously described Einstein’s career as a philosophical “pilgrimage”. Starting on “the historic ground” of Machian positivism and phenomenalism, following the completion of general relativity in late 1915, Einstein’s philosophy endured (a) a speculative turn: physical theorizing appears as ultimately a “pure mathematical construction” guided by faith in the simplicity of nature and (b) a realistic turn: science is “nothing more than a refinement ”of the everyday belief in the existence of mind-independent physical reality. Nevertheless, Einstein’s mathematical constructivism (...) that supports his unified field theory program appears to be, at first sight, hardly compatible with the common sense realism with which he countered quantum theory. Thus, literature on Einstein’s philosophy of science has often struggled in finding the thread between ostensibly conflicting philosophical pronouncements. This paper supports the claim that Einstein’s dialog with Émile Meyerson from the mid 1920s till the early 1930s might be a neglected source to solve this riddle. According to Einstein, Meyerson shared (a) his belief in the independent existence of an external world and (b) his conviction that the latter can be grasped only by speculative means. Einstein could present his search for a unified field theory as a metaphysical-realistic program opposed to the positivistic-operationalist spirit of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

The explanatory power of structures in analytical sociologists’ agent-based models brings into question methodological individualism. We defend that from an explanatory point of view, the syntactic properties of models require semantic conditions of interpretation drawn from a conceptual research framework; in such a framework, social/relational structures have only partial, explanatory power ; and taking the explanation further through generative mechanism modeling necessitates calling upon methodological individualism’s generic framework of interpretation that relies on social actors’ rational capacity. According to this interpretive (...) framework, forces in action in society are governed by the subjective meaning of/the reasons for individual actions. (shrink)

Nous savons bien aujourd'hui que, dès l'Antiquité, leCorpus Aristoteli-cuma été constitué, mis en ordre et commenté de manière à faire ressortir, en tout, la cohérence des doctrines du Stagirite, dont ses écrits, tels qu'il nous les a laissés, ne portaient pas la marque évidente. Le sentiment que ce travail de mise en forme, poursuivi par la tradition, devait avoir oblitéré quelque chose de la nature de la pensée aristotélicienne conduisit à soulever la question qui sert d'intitulé à la présente étude.

In diesem Beitrag lege ich dar, dass in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts das Konzept von Werkstoffen (materials) als charakteristischer ontologischer Typus eines neuen Forschungs- und Wissenschaftsstils aufkam. Das soll nicht heißen, dass Werkstoffe niemals zuvor wissenschaftlich bearbeitet worden wären. Zweifellos hatten sich zahlreiche wissenschaftliche Disziplinen mit den Eigenschaften einer ganzen Reihe von Werkstoffen befasst. Doch wurden dabei Werkstoffe nicht als generische, also alle Arten von Stoffen umfassende, Entität betrachtet.Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist zu verstehen, wie Werkstoffe als Gattungseinheit entstanden (...) sind und zu Objekten einer Wissenschaft wurden, die so unterschiedliche Dinge wie Papier, Holz, Metalle, Beton, Keramik, Polymere, Halbleiter und Kohlenstoff-Nanoröhren umfasst. Im Bemühen, die historischen Begleitumstände des Auftretens von Werkstoffen zu bestimmen, werde ich diese zunächst in historischer und ontologischer Hinsicht einordnen. Wie war es möglich, all diese Dinge in einer einzigen Gattung zu vereinigen? Dann wende ich mich dem sich verändernden Status von Werkstoffen zu, ein Resultat der erfolgreichen Materialforschung. Werkstoffe sind nicht länger die Vorbedingungen, die dem Entwurfsprozess Beschränkungen auferlegen, sondern werden nun selbst spezifisch entworfen. Solche materials by design sind echte, individuell zugeschnittene Schöpfungen und nicht nur einfach Handelsprodukte. Zudem birgt der Wandel ihres ontologischer Status ein Paradox mit seiner Tendenz zur Entmaterialisierung von Technik. (shrink)

Résumé Partant du principe que la philosophie de la connaissance de Poincaré est cohérente, j’essaie de faire voir que son conventionnalisme en géométrie et en physique n’est qu’une conséquence de son intuitionnisme. Après avoir rappelé, dans la première section, ce qu’est l’intuitionnisme et décrit ce que l’intuitionnisme de Poincaré a de spécifique, je montre, dans la deuxième section, comment celui-ci retentit sur la conception de l’espace. Dans la troisième section, j’applique les conclusions précédemment établies à la question très controversée de (...) la découverte de la relativité restreinte en renvoyant dos à dos les historiens : il n’a rien manqué à Poincaré pour découvrir la relativité restreinte, car, cette théorie étant incompatible avec son intuitionnisme, il n’avait aucune raison d’y adhérer.Taking for granted that Poincaré’s epistemology is consistent, I attempt to show that his geometrical and physical conventionalism is no more than a consequence of his intuitionism. After having rehearsed the issues defining intuitionism and describing what is particular to Poincaré’s version in the first section of the paper, I show, in the second section, how Poincaré’s intuitionism influenced his conception of space. In the last section, I apply these now established conclusions to a very contested issue, the discovery of the special theory of relativity. Rejecting the view of historians on both sides of the issue, I argue that Poincaré had everything he would have needed to discover the special theory of relativity, but that since this theory is incompatible with his intuitionism, he had no reason to adopt it. (shrink)

Il s’agit d’affronter la « figure » d’Ettore Majorana et d’en proposer un premier « profil philosophique ». La question des « fictions » apparaît alors centrale chez Majorana. On établit ensuite la dimension surrationaliste et européenne de ses affinités électives avec Giovanni Gentile Junior. Les deux oeuvres sont restituées dans le cadre d’un mathématisme constructif et inductif (Gaston Bachelard, puis Robert Blanché) qui s’oppose au géométrisme classique (Emile Meyerson) et au pythagorisme spiritualiste (Arthur Eddington).

Il s’agit d’affronter la « figure » d’Ettore Majorana et d’en proposer un premier « profil philosophique ». La question des « fictions » apparaît alors centrale chez Majorana. On établit ensuite la dimension surrationaliste et européenne de ses affinités électives avec Giovanni Gentile Junior. Les deux oeuvres sont restituées dans le cadre d’un mathématisme constructif et inductif (Gaston Bachelard, puis Robert Blanché) qui s’oppose au géométrisme classique (Emile Meyerson) et au pythagorisme spiritualiste (Arthur Eddington).