Adolf Meyer-Abich spent his career as one of the most vigorous and varied advocates in the biological sciences. Primarily a philosophical proponent of holistic thought in biology, he also sought through collaboration with empirically oriented colleagues in biology, medicine, and even physics to develop arguments against mechanistic and reductionistic positions in the life sciences, and to integrate them into a newly disciplinary theoretical biology. He participated in major publishing efforts including the founding of Acta Biotheoretica. He also sought international contacts (...) and worked for long stretches in Chile, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and the United States. His career straddled the Nazi period, which led him into a complex dance of support for and resistance to the regime. Despite the relative failure of his conceptual innovations to catch on, his ideas and writings sit squarely within the trajectory of thought and argument that has led to today’s reinvigoration of thought about conceptual integration in evolutionary developmental biology. (shrink)

As we owe the division of ecology into autecology and synecology to botanists, the arguments for this subdivision and also the definitions and contents of both subsciences as given bySchröter, Flahault &Schröter, Gams andDu Rietz are communicated in full. The same is the case with the division of ecology given by the zoologistsAdams andChapman. Moreover the opinions of these authors in this respect are critisized in detail as well as in their general aspects. This critique is connected with the author's (...) own positive opinion, which is given at the end of the paper, where also the remarks covered by the first two papers of this series are summarised.In ecology as a biological science either the individual or the complex of individuals has to occupy a central position. Therefore science about the environment, especially the abiotic one, as well as science about a definite region or spot of the earth ought not to be incorporated in biology.In autecology the individual occupies a central position, it is one of the subsciences of idiobiology, it is a science about the relations to environment, taken in the broadest sense. Dependent upon the contents of this we have many definitions of ecology, the most important ones being: 1) ecology is a biogeographical subscience; 2) ecology is taken in the sense of ethology; 3) ecology is taken as a science of the teleological relations of the individual to its environment and the objects in it, thus of the non-causal relations, the causal ones being assigned to physiology. These non-causal relations appear under four aspects, all called teleological, i.e. the true purpose-notion, relation in the sense of requirement, that in the sense of wholeness, and of adaptation and the degree of adaptation. Adaptation is taken in a broad sense, covering as well the degree of adaptation , as the latitude of the possibility of adaptation and the degree of variability of the individual to adapt itself. The proposal is made to confine the term autecology to this teleological aspect of the relations of the individual, i.e. of all its characters, not of the epharmonic ones only, to environment.In synecology the complex of individuals, showing direct real connections during individual life, occupies a central position, with equal scientific interest for all members of the complex. Synecology contains all biological scientific contents about this matter. The application ofTschulok's system of subsciences to synecology is critisized and the development of the system of these subsciences is left to its developmental fate in time. Considering the importance of the knowledge of the tendencies of thought for the development of synecology an attempt is made to state those already applied in synecology; author distinguishes the systematical, the mathematical, the causal, the historical, the teleological and the essential tendency of thought. Also the difference in the tendencies of thought shows that autecology and synecology are to be separated in a logical system of biological subsciences.Puisque c'est aux botanistes que nous devons la division de l'écologie en autécologie et synécologie, l'auteur passe en revue tous les arguments qui ont amené les biologistes à faire cette subdivision, ainsi que les définitions de ces deux subsciences et les matières qu'elles comprennent, comme elles sont données parSchröter, Flahault &Schröter, Gams etdu Rietz. Il en fait de même pour la division de l'écologie faite par les zoologistesAdams etChapman. En outre il discute les opinions de ces auteurs sous ce rapport, dans leurs détails aussi bien que dans leurs aspects généraux. Cette discussion est en rapport avec l'opinion positive de l'auteur, qu'il expose à la fin de l'article, où se trouvent résumées également les remarques qui se trouvaient déjà dans les deux premiers articles de cette série.Dans l'écologie, en tant que science biologique, l'individu — ou bien l'ensemble des individus — doit occuper une position centrale. C'est pourquoi ni la science qui concerne le milieu, en particulier le milieu abiotique, ni la science qui se rapporte à une région ou un endroit défini de la terre, ne devrait être incorporée dans la biologie.Dans l'autécologie l'individu occupe une position centrale. Cette science est une des subsciences de l'idiobiologie; elle se rapporte aux relations entre le sujet et son milieu — „milieu” pris dans le sens le plus large du mot. Selon les significations diverses qu'on peut attacher aux termes „relations” et „milieu”, nous avons plusieurs définitions de l'écologie, parmi lesquelles les plus importantes suivent ci-dessous:1)L'écologie est une subscience biogéographique; 2) le terme „écologie” est pris dans le sens d'éthologie; 3) l'écologie est considérée comme la science des relations téléologiques entre l'individu et son milieu et les objets se trouvant dans ce milieu; elle est donc considérée comme la science des relations non-causales, les relations causales étant conférées à la physiologie. Ces relations non-causales se présentent sous quatre aspects, tous appelés téléologiques, c. à. d. la vraie notion de but, les relations dans le sens de besoins, les relations dans le sens de „tout” et les relations dans le sens d'adaptation et de degré d'adaptation.Le mot „adaptation” est pris dans un sens étendu, comprenant aussi bien le degré d'adaptation que l'amplitude de la possibilité d'adaptation et le degré de variabilité dans l'adaptation de l'individu à son milieu. L'auteur propose de restreindre le terme „autécologie” à cet aspect téléologique des relations entre l'individu et son milieu; il s'agit ici, bien entendu, de toutes les qualités de l'individu et non seulement des qualités epharmoniques.Dans la synécologie l'ensemble des individus montrant des rapports directs et réels durant la vie individuelle occupe une position centrale et offre un intérêt scientifique pareil pour tous les membres de l'ensemble. La synécologie comprend tout ce qu'il y a à dire sur cette matière par rapport à la science biologique. L'application du système des subsciences deTschulok à la synécologie est critiquée par l'auteur, qui juge prématuré de s'occuper déjà d'un tel système de subsciences: l'avenir seul nous apprendra quel système se développera ici. Vu l'importance d'une connaissance exacte des différentes tendances de penser pour le développement de la synécologie, l'auteur s'efforce de rassembler celles qui ont déjà été appliquées dans la synécologie; il distingue les tendances de penser systématique, mathématique, causale, historique, téléologique et essentielle . En outre les différences entre ces tendances de penser démontrent, que l'autécologie et la synécologie doivent être séparées dans un système logique de subsciences biologiques. (shrink)

Notwithstanding the general rise of experimental disciplines in biology in the first decades of our century, in Germany and in the Netherlands the interest in the idealistic morphological tradition flourished, and compensated for a reductionistic causal approach to natural phenomena. This article analyses the influence of the German idealistic morphologists W. Lubosch and A. Meyer on the development of C.J. van der Klaauw's epistemology. It discusses the gradual incorporation of non-causal principles into van der Klaauw's concept of biology. Van der (...) Klaauw's epistemological concept of holistic biology was shaped in a critical confrontation with German idealistic morphology, and his early considerations can be interpreted as a direct impulse towards the development of his theory of functional components. Van der Klaauw's theories, being an alternative to the reductionistic experimental sciences, were among the causes of the fact that in the first half of our century biology in the Netherlands took a course deviating from the development of biology in the Anglo-American countries. (shrink)

During the early twentieth century, the Swiss Zoologist Adolf Naef (1883–1949) established himself as a leader in German comparative anatomy and higher level systematics. He is generally labeled an ‘idealistic morphologist’, although he himself called his research program ‘systematic morphology’. The idealistic morphology that flourished in German biology during the first half of the twentieth century was a rather heterogeneous movement, within which Adolf Naef worked out a special theoretical system of his own. Following a biographical sketch, we present an (...) English translation of a previously unpublished typescript from Naef’s estate, which Naef intended as the introduction to a textbook on Comparative Anatomy for which he was unable to find a publisher before his sudden death in 1949. The typescript contains Naef’s mature thoughts with unprecedented conciseness, focus, and clarity. The density of Naef’s text warrants a historical and contextual explication of its content. (shrink)

The Copernican revolution with which Kant transformed the question of whether knowledge is possible into the query as to how knowledge is possible, constitutes one stage in the development of epistemology from a speculative to an observational science — i.e., one that proceeds from the investigation of concrete, existent objects rather than from a small number of presupposed concepts. This path, leading from speculation to examination of the concrete objects of research — for epistemology, to the investigation of the various (...) individual sciences — is long and arduous, and even now it has been traversed only a small part of the way. Although epistemological research has for a long time had some relation to mathematics and physics, and a more concrete exploration of biology and the humanities has recently been launched as well, we undoubtedly still stand at the very beginning of this enterprise. One major task for the epistemological inquiry into a specific discipline is bound up with tracing the course of development of that science — in particular, the radical shifts and readjustments in a science that promise to furnish the epistemologist with valuable information. Seen from this angle, psychology also currently deserves the special attention of epistemology. (shrink)

Methoden. Im obigen Artikel ist die „Phylogenie des Stammbaumes” untersucht worden. Beginnend mitHaeckel werden 26 Typen phylogenetischer Symbole kritisch besprochen, d.h. nicht die Resultate, sondern nur die Methoden, z.B. bezüglich Systematik und Phylogenie, lebender und ausgestorbener Organismen, geologischer Perioden, Stufen und homologer Variationen, geographischer Verbreitung, Diversität, etwaiger Bedeutung der Einzelheiten, Mono-, Bi- und Polyrheithrie , usw. Der Faktor Zeit wird dabei für phylogenetische Systeme als der wesentlichste betrachtet. Der Autor hat daher in seinen- neuen Darstellungen die Begriffe „Zeit-Stufen” oder „Zeit-Globen-Oberflächen” (...) eingeführt; diese stehen senkrecht zum „Zeit-Radius”. Auf diesem Grunde wird ein neues Kriterium zur Unterscheidung systematischer und phylogenetischer Vorstellungen denjenigen anderer Autoren hinzugefügt. Erläuterungen. Nach einer Übersicht über die besprochenen Schemen im 1. Teil werden die Verhältnisse zwischen systematischen und phylogenetischen Darstellungen sowie die Verbindung ihrer Symbole untersucht. Es wird gezeigt, dass viele Einzelheiten solcher Konstruktionen oft, wissentlich oder unwissentlich, keine bestimmte Bedeutung haben. Der Verfasser hat versucht zu zeigen, dass es erwünscht wäre, möglichst mit allen Einzelheiten einer symbolischen Darstellung irgendeine Bedeutung zu verbinden: Linien und Entfernungen in der Ebene, Winkel in räumlichen Schemen. Die letztgenannten werden besonders für solche Arten von phylogenetischen Systemen empfohlen, bei denen der Faktor Zeit stets eine der Dimensionen bildet. Dieser Grundsatz wird mit der Evolution systematischer Einzelheiten in Verbindung gebracht, und Merkmals-Phyletik, homologe Variationen, Stufen, Polyrheithrie, Analogie und Homologie, Konvergenz und Verwandtschaft, etc. werden kurz im Lichte der Vererbungslehre besprochen. Es istHayata's extrem dynamischen Ansichten zu verdanken, dass das Statische in den systematischen und phylogenetischen Darstellungen aufgelockert worden ist. Méthodes. Dans l'article inséré ci-dessus il s'agit de ce qu'on pourrait appeler „la phylogénie de l'arbre généalogique”. En commençant parHaeckel , l'auteur discute 26 types divers de symboles phylogénétiques, c.à.d. seulement les méthodes , par exemple en ce qui concerne la taxonomie et la phylogénie, les organismes récents et éteints, les périodes géologiques, les niveaux et les variations homologues, la distribution géographique, la diversité, la signification éventuelle des détails, la mono-, bi- et polyrheithrie , etc. Le Temps est considéré comme l'élément le plus essentiel dans tout système phylogénétique. Par conséquence, l'auteur a introduit dans ses nouvelles représentations les idées de „Niveaux” ou de „Surfaces des Sphères du Temps” qui sont imaginés perpendiculaires au Radius-Temps. Dans l'ordre de ces idées un nouveau critère est ajouté à ceux donnés par d'autres auteurs pour la distinction des systèmes taxonomiques et des représentations phylogénétiques. Justifications. Après une récapitulation des systèmes, énumérés dans la première partie, les relations des constructions taxonomiques et phylogénétiques, ainsi que les connections de leurs symboles sont discutées. Souvent plusieurs détails sont, sciemment ou insciemment, dépourvus de toutes signification. L'auteur a essayé de démontrer qu'il serait désirable d'attribuer autant que possible de significations définies au détails d'une représentation symbolique de la nature décrite: aux lignes et aux distances dans le plan, aux angles dans l'espace. Les constructions tridimensionales sont particulièrement recommandées pour plusieurs systèmes phylogénétiques; dans de tels systèmes le Temps devrait toujours remplir la fonction d'une des dimensions. Ce principe est mis en rapport avec l'évolution des unités taxonomiques; phylogénie des charactères, variations homologues, niveaux, polyrheithrie, analogie et homologie, convergence et relations héréditaires, tous ces sujets sont brièvement discutés dans leurs rapports avec la Génétique. Selon l'opinion de l'auteur, c'est aux idées ultra-dynamiques d'Hayata que la taxonomie et la phylogénie doivent la pénétration féconde du dynamisme dans leurs systèmes trop souvent statiques. (shrink)

In this study the relationship between functional morpholoy and evolutionary biology is analysed by confronting the main concepts in both disciplines.Rather than only discussing this connection theoretically, the analysis is carried out by introducing important practical and experimental studies, which use aspects from both disciplines. The mentioned investigations are methodologically analysed and the consequences for extensions of the relationship are worked out. It can be shown that both disciplines have a large domain of their own and also share a large (...) common ground. Many disagreements among evolutionary biologists can be reduced to differences in general philosophy (idealism vs. realism), selection of phenomenona (structure vs. function), definition of concepts (natural selection) and the position of the concept theory as an explaining factor (neutralists vs. selectionists, random variation, determinate selection, etc.). (shrink)

A good division of biology is important for clarity of thought, presentation of the problems and nowadays also for science policy. Various classifications are in use, depending upon different parameters. A division can be based on objects and on aspects. A modern classification on objects is based on the levels of organisation. Methodological principles play a role in the background.

In biology, and particularly in morphology, various types of explanation are found,e.g. causal, teleological, historical, etc.In this article an attempt has been made to analyse the relations between the various explanations to strive for an encompassing explanatory theory.The general structure of the explanatory theories appeared to be very similar, but the terms defining the phenomena and the types of the relations within the theories differ. To obtain a unifying theory it is necessary to develop methods to connect or transform the (...) different elements.An important aspect is that the definition of selected phenomena depends on the explanation pursued. (shrink)

The theory of concepts advanced in the dissertation aims at accounting for a) how a concept makes successful practice possible, and b) how a scientific concept can be subject to rational change in the course of history. Traditional accounts in the philosophy of science have usually studied concepts in terms only of their reference; their concern is to establish a stability of reference in order to address the incommensurability problem. My discussion, in contrast, suggests that each scientific concept consists of (...) three components of content: 1) reference, 2) inferential role, and 3) the epistemic goal pursued with the concept's use. I argue that in the course of history a concept can change in any of these three components, and that change in one component—including change of reference—can be accounted for as being rational relative to other components, in particular a concept's epistemic goal.This semantic framework is applied to two cases from the history of biology: the homology concept as used in 19th and 20th century biology, and the gene concept as used in different parts of the 20th century. The homology case study argues that the advent of Darwinian evolutionary theory, despite introducing a new definition of homology, did not bring about a new homology concept (distinct from the pre-Darwinian concept) in the 19th century. Nowadays, however, distinct homology concepts are used in systematics/evolutionary biology, in evolutionary developmental biology, and in molecular biology. The emergence of these different homology concepts is explained as occurring in a rational fashion. The gene case study argues that conceptual progress occurred with the transition from the classical to the molecular gene concept, despite a change in reference. In the last two decades, change occurred internal to the molecular gene concept, so that nowadays this concept's usage and reference varies from context to context. I argue that this situation emerged rationally and that the current variation in usage and reference is conducive to biological practice.The dissertation uses ideas and methodological tools from the philosophy of mind and language, the philosophy of science, the history of science, and the psychology of concepts. (shrink)