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I. Frege as a Realist

Michael Dummett

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 19 (1-4):455-468 (1976)

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Frege's Critical Arguments for Axioms.Jim Hutchinson - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):516-541.details Why does Frege claim that logical axioms are ‘self‐evident,’ to be recognized as true ‘independently of other truths,’ and then offer arguments for those axioms? I argue that he thinks the arguments provide us with the justification that we need for accepting the axioms and that this is compatible with his remarks about self‐evidence. This compatibility depends on philosophical considerations connected with the ‘critical method’: an interesting approach to the justification of axioms endorsed by leading philosophers at the time. Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Frege's alleged realism.Hans D. Sluga - 1977 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 20 (1-4):227 – 242.details Michael Dummett, following an established line of reasoning, has interpreted Frege as a realist. But his claim that Frege was arguing against a dominant idealism is untenable. While there are passages in Frege's writings that seem to support a realistic interpretation, others are irreconcilable with it. The issue can be resolved only by examining the historical context. Frege's thought is, in fact, related to the philosophy of Hermann Lotze. Frege is best regarded as a transcendental idealist in the Lotze-Kant tradition. (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 17 citations
II. Frege as Idealist and then Realist.Michael D. Resnik - 1979 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):350-357.details Michael Dummett argued that Frege was a realist while Hans Sluga countered that he was an objective idealist in the rationalist tradition of Kant and Lotze. Sluga ties Frege's idealism to the context principle which he argues Frege never gave up. It is argued that Sluga has correctly interpreted the pre?1891 Frege while Dummett is correct concerning the later period. It is also claimed that the context principle was dropped prior to 1891 to be replaced by the doctrine of unsaturated (...) entities. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark 7 citations
Recent work on Frege.Crispin Wright - 1983 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):363 – 381.details Download Export citation Bookmark
Ann Dummett's Contribution to the Understanding of Immigration and Racism.Kimberly Ann Harris - 2015 - Critical Philosophy of Race 3 (1):20-27.details This is a bibliography of Ann Dummett's work. Download Export citation Bookmark
Platonism in Lotze and Frege Between Psyschologism and Hypostasis.Nicholas Stang - 2018 - In Sandra Lapointe (ed.), Logic from Kant to Russell. New York: Routledge. pp. 138–159.details In the section “Validity and Existence in Logik, Book III,” I explain Lotze’s famous distinction between existence and validity in Book III of Logik. In the following section, “Lotze’s Platonism,” I put this famous distinction in the context of Lotze’s attempt to distinguish his own position from hypostatic Platonism and consider one way of drawing the distinction: the hypostatic Platonist accepts that there are propositions, whereas Lotze rejects this. In the section “Two Perspectives on Frege’s Platonism,” I argue that this (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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