Platonism in Lotze and Frege Between Psyschologism and Hypostasis

In Sandra Lapointe (ed.), Logic from Kant to Russell. Routledge. pp. 138–159 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In the section “Validity and Existence in Logik, Book III,” I explain Lotze’s famous distinction between existence and validity in Book III of Logik. In the following section, “Lotze’s Platonism,” I put this famous distinction in the context of Lotze’s attempt to distinguish his own position from hypostatic Platonism and consider one way of drawing the distinction: the hypostatic Platonist accepts that there are propositions, whereas Lotze rejects this. In the section “Two Perspectives on Frege’s Platonism,” I argue that this is an unsatisfactory way of reading Lotze’s Platonism and that the Ricketts-Reck reading of Frege is in fact the correct way of thinking about Lotze’s Platonism.
Keywords
PhilPapers/Archive ID
STAPIL
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-02-22
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-02-22

Total views
84 ( #36,419 of 51,556 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
21 ( #26,828 of 51,556 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.