Antirealism about metaphysical explanation is relatively underexplored. This paper maps out the territory for the antirealist, explaining what it would take to be an antirealist given various different conceptions of metaphysical explanation, and of the relationship between metaphysical explanation and grounding.

Theorists of grounding believe that this notion has an intimate connection with metaphysical explanation. However, they struggle to harmonize the objective mind-independent features of grounding and the context-sensitive aspects of metaphysical explanation. As a reconciliatory approach, I offer a framework of metaphysical explanation that draws from perspectival realist views in the philosophy of science. According to the proposed view, our understanding of grounding claims is inescapably situated in agent-dependent perspectives that aim to aptly latch onto a grounding structure out there. (...) To defend its merits, I discuss how this grounding perspectivalism offers an insightful analysis of disagreements concerning the priority and asymmetry of what grounds what. Exploring some of the deeper implications of the proposed framework, I conclude by stirring controversy: contrary to a popular view, grounding perspectivalism implies that metaphysical explanation should not be regarded as a guide to grounding. -/- . (shrink)