Opponents of euthanasia sometimes argue that it is incompatible with the purpose of medicine, since physicians have an unconditional duty never to intentionally cause death. But it is not clear how such a duty could ever actually be unconditional, if due consideration is given to the moral weight of countervailing duties equally fundamental to medicine. Whether physicians' moral duties are understood as correlative with patients' moral rights or construed noncorrelatively, a doctor's obligation to abstain from intentional killing cannot be more (...) than a defeasible duty. (shrink)

Fair allocation of scarce healthcare resources has been much studied within philosophy and bioethics, but analysis has focused on a narrow range of cases. The Covid-19 pandemic provided significant new challenges, making powerfully visible the extent to which health systems can be fragile, and how scarcities within crucial elements of interlinked care pathways can lead to cascading failures. Health system resilience, while previously a key topic in global health, can now be seen to be a vital concern in high-income countries (...) too. Unfortunately, mainstream philosophical approaches to the ethics of rationing and prioritisation provide little guidance for these new problems of scarcity. Indeed, the cascading failures were arguably exacerbated by earlier attempts to make health systems leaner and more efficient. This paper argues that health systems should move from simple and atomistic approaches to measuring effectiveness to approaches that are holistic both in focusing on performance at the level of the health system as a whole, and also in incorporating a wider range of ethical concerns in thinking about what makes a health system good. (shrink)

Physicians frequently ask whether they should give patients what they want, usually when there are considerations pointing against doing so, such as medicine’s values and physicians’ obligations. It has been argued that the source of medicine’s values and physicians’ obligations lies in what has been dubbed “the internal morality of medicine”: medicine is a practice with an end and norms that are definitive of this practice and that determine what physicians ought to do qua physicians. In this paper, I defend (...) the claim that medicine requires a morality that is internal to its practice, while rejecting the prevalent characterization of this morality and offering an alternative one. My approach to the internal morality of medicine is constructivist in nature: the norms of medicine are constructed by medical professionals, other professionals, and patients, given medicine’s end of “benefitting patients in need of prima facie medical treatment and care.” I make the case that patients should be involved in the construction of medicine’s morality not only because they have knowledge that is relevant to the internal morality of medicine—namely, their own values and preferences—but also because medicine is an inherently relational enterprise: in medicine the relationship between physician and patient is a constitutive component of the craft itself. The framework I propose provides an authoritative morality for medicine, while allowing for the incorporation, into that very morality, of qualified deference to patient values. (shrink)

In this chapter, I consider the idea that physician-assisted death might come into question in the cases of psychiatric patients who are incapable of making autonomous choices about ending their lives. I maintain that the main arguments for physician-assisted death found in recent medical ethical literature support physician-assisted death in some of those cases. After assessing several possible criticisms of what I have argued, I conclude that the idea that physicianassisted death can be acceptable in some cases of psychiatric patients (...) who lack autonomy ought to be taken into account in assessing the moral and legal acceptability of physician-assisted death. (shrink)

Our study provides a review of argument-based scientific literature to address conscientious objections to end-of-life procedures. We also proposed a taxonomy based on this study that might facilitate clarification of this discussion at a basic level. The three clusters of our taxonomy include (1) nonconventional compatibilists that claim that conscientious objection against morally repugnant social conventions is compatible with professional obligation, (2) conventional compatibilists that suggest that conscientious objection against social convention is permissible under certain terms of compromise, and (3) (...) conventional incompatibilists that aver that conscientious objection is incompatible with the privileges and obligations of a health care provider. We conclude with three moments of reflective pause. The first pause reflects on the question of the health of a society's pluralism. The second pause results in suggested practice guidelines for conscientious objection to facilitate cooperation. The final pause reveals the need for further research to uncover a global perspective. (shrink)

The practice of health-care professional involvement in capital punishment has come under scrutiny since the implementation of lethal injection as a method of execution, raising questions of the goals of medicine and the ethics of medicalized procedures. The American Medical Association and other professional associations have issued statements prohibiting physician involvement in capital punishment because medicine is dedicated to preserving life. I address the three primary arguments against health-care professionals being involved in lethal injection and argue that they are not (...) strong enough to prohibit physician involvement in the lethal injection process. (shrink)

The last twenty-five years of published literature and curriculum development in bioethics suggest that the field enjoys a successful and stable marriage to philosophical ethical theory. However, the next twenty-five years could be very different. I believe the marriage is troubled. Divorce is conceivable and perhaps likely. The most philosophical parts of bioethics may retreat to philosophy departments, while bioethics continues on its current course toward a more interdisciplinary and practical field.I make no presumption that bioethics is integrally linked to (...) philosophical ethical theory. Indeed, I assume that the connection is contingent and fragile. Many individuals in law, theological ethics, political theory, the social and behavioral sciences, and the health professions carefully address mainstream issues of bioethics without finding ethical theory essential or breathtakingly attractive. This is not surprising. Moral philosophers have traditionally formulated theories of the right, the good, and the virtuous in the most general terms. (shrink)

In response to physicians who refuse to provide medical services that are contrary to their ethical and/or religious beliefs, it is sometimes asserted that anyone who is not willing to provide legally and professionally permitted medical services should choose another profession. This article critically examines the underlying assumption that conscientious objection is incompatible with a physician’s professional obligations (the “incompatibility thesis”). Several accounts of the professional obligations of physicians are explored: general ethical theories (consequentialism, contractarianism, and rights-based theories), internal morality (...) (essentialist and non-essentialist conceptions), reciprocal justice, social contract, and promising. It is argued that none of these accounts of a physician’s professional obligations unequivocally supports the incompatibility thesis. (shrink)

Philosophy of medicine has traditionally examined two issues: the scientific ontology for medicine and the epistemic significance of the types of evidence used in medical research. In answering each question, philosophers have typically brought to bear tools from traditional analytic philosophy. In contrast, this volume explores medical knowledge from the perspective offered by social epistemology.While many of the same issues are addressed, the approach to these issues generates both fresh questions and new insights into old debates. In addition, the broader (...) purview offered by social epistemology opens up opportunities to address new topics such as the role of consensus conferences, epistemic injustice, the value of medical knowledge, continuing medical education, and industry funding. This article situates and summarizes the contributions to this special issue. (shrink)

Recent controversial cases of killings by police have generated competing Black Lives Matter and Blue Lives Matter movements. Blue Lives Matter proponents claim that the focus on and protests in light of police killings of unarmed black persons is unwarranted. Part of this dispute turns on the moral evaluation of the killing of citizens by law enforcement. To address the dispute, I develop an account of the special moral obligations of law enforcement and show how it can be applied. I (...) argue that members of law enforcement have special moral obligations against killing citizens. The account generates moral guidance for law enforcement in a number of other ways. It implies, finally, that the Blue Lives Matter proponents fundamentally misunderstand the ethics of law enforcement. (shrink)

Objectives: To present an analysis of “futility” that is useful in the clinical setting.Design: Literature review.Material and methods: According to Medline more than 750 articles have been published about medical futility. Three criteria singled out 43 of them. The authors' opinions about futility were analysed using the scheme: “If certain conditions are satisfied, then a particular measure is futile” and “If a particular measure is futile, then certain moral consequences are implied”.Results: Regarding conditions, most authors stated that judgments about futility (...) should be made by physicians. The measure was usually some kind of medical treatment, and the goals related to quality of life, physiological improvement, or prolongation of life. The probability of success in reaching the goal was in most cases described in semiquantitative terms. Regarding consequences, the authors stated that health care professionals may withhold or withdraw a futile measure, most often after a dialogue with the patient , but sometimes without informing the patient , or with one-way information . Over time more and more articles recommend that the patient should be involved in joint decision making. Based on this literature review a clinical model was developed.Conclusions: The model, requiring that conditions and consequences should be made explicit, may, in “futility situations”, facilitate both the collection of the necessary information and make the moral implications visible. It also makes communication about measures considered to be futile possible without using such ambiguous terms as “futile”. (shrink)

In this paper the author argues that a narrative approach to understanding assisted suicide has been compromised by the notion that all narratives must be both coherent and unified. He asks what we are to do with those narratives that cannot seem to cohere or be other than full of disunity? Is suicide the only way to make meaning out of suffering? He then proposes that the narrative found in the Gospel of Mark leads Christians to a life in hope (...) and compassion in spite of apparent incoherence and disunity and threats of abandonment and suffering. (shrink)

Objective: Little empirical evidence exists to support either side of the ongoing debate over whether legalising physician aid in dying would undermine patient trust.Design: A random national sample of 1117 US adults were asked about their level of agreement with a statement that they would trust their doctor less if “euthanasia were legal [and] doctors were allowed to help patients die”.Results: There was disagreement by 58% of the participants, and agreement by only 20% that legalising euthanasia would cause them to (...) trust their personal physician less. The remainder were neutral. These attitudes were the same in men and women, but older people and black people had more agreement that euthanasia would lower trust. However, overall, only 27% of elderly people and 32% of black people thought that physician aid in dying would lower trust. These views differed with physical and mental health, and also with education and income, with those having more of these attributes tending to view physician aid in dying somewhat more favourably. Again, however, overall views in most of these subgroups were positive. Views about the effect of physician aid in dying on trust were significantly correlated with participants’ underlying trust in their physicians and their satisfaction with care. In a multivariate regression model, trust, satisfaction, age, and white/black race remained independently significant.Conclusion: Despite the widespread concern that legalising physician aid in dying would seriously threaten or undermine trust in physicians, the weight of the evidence in the USA is to the contrary, although views vary significantly. (shrink)

The laws and ethical guidelines governing decision making for incompetent patients evolved from controversies in which family members refused life-sustaining interventions. These cases led to a consensus that advance directives to limit interventions should be respected and that a surrogate designated by the patient or specified by statute could refuse interventions, even when other relatives disagreed. Surrogate decision-making statutes and ethical principles about respect for delegated autonomy promote an active role for family members or other surrogates in medical decisions for (...) incompetent patients. Inviting surrogates to participate actively in medical decisions recognizes the importance of the patient's personal community and assures that decisions will reflect the patient's own preferences and values.The standard approach to decisions for incompetent adults gives advance directives priority over a surrogate's substituted judgment, which in turn has priority over assessments of the patient's best interest. A patient may express advance directives by appointing a proxy, stating specific preferences, or articulating general values. We use case examples to illustrate the limitations of all three types of advance directives. (shrink)

What role should the physician's conscience play in the practice of medicine? Much controversy has surrounded the question, yet little attention has been paid to the possibility that disputants are operating with contrasting definitions of the conscience. To illustrate this divergence, we contrast definitions stemming from Abrahamic religions and those stemming from secular moral tradition. Clear differences emerge regarding what the term conscience conveys, how the conscience should be informed, and what the consequences are for violating one's conscience. Importantly, these (...) basic disagreements underlie current controversies regarding the role of the clinician's conscience in the practice of medicine. Consequently participants in ongoing debates would do well to specify their definitions of the conscience and the reasons for and implications of those definitions. This specification would allow participants to advance a more philosophically and theologically robust conversation about the means and ends of medicine. (shrink)

This paper looks at the ambiguities which PAS (physician assisted suicide) and voluntary active euthanasia (VAE ) present to the patient, his or her loved ones and the health-care team. The author pleads for a greater emphasis on humanizing the experience of the dying so that a team can meet their physical, emotional and spiritual needs.

Against the backdrop of ancient, mediaeval and modern Catholic teaching prohibiting killing (the rule against killing), the question of assisted suicide and euthanasia is examined. In the past the Church has modified its initial repugnance for killing by developing specific guidelines for permitting killing under strict conditions. This took place with respect to capital punishment and a just war, for example. One wonders why in the least objectionable instance, when a person is already dying, suffering, and repeatedly requesting assistance in (...) dying, there is still such widespread condemnation of assisted suicide and euthanasia. In a Gedankexperiment, I suggest that certain stories of martyrdom in the history of the Christian Church shed some light on the role of taking one’s life, or putting one’s life in danger out of love. I further suggest that requesting assisted suicide and/or euthanasia from the motive of love of one’s family or care givers might possibly qualify as one instance of justifiable euthanasia, although I acknowledge that the Church will not be making changes in its stance any time soon. (shrink)

With breathtalung speed, traditional criminal prohibitions against assisted suicide have been declared unconstitutional in twelve states, including California and New York. This poses great promise and great peril. The promise is that competent terminally ill patients, as a compassionate measure of last resort, will have the option of putting an end to their suffering by physician-assisted suicide. More sigmficant, legally permitting this controversial option may be a catalyst for doctors, health care institutions, and society to improve the care of the (...) dying. PAS should be limited only to those relatively few competent patients who continue to suffer intolerably despite unrestrained efforts to palliate and who face a continued existence that they regard as worse than death. When dying patients know they will not be abandoned to miserable and pointless suffering if palliative care fails, they will be fortified to cope better with the process of dying.The immediate peril is that PAS will become a quick fix, available on demand to any patient diagnosed as terminally ill, thus bypassing palliative care and producing premature deaths. (shrink)

For more than two decades euthanasia and assisted suicide have been openly debated in the Netherlands. This development started in 1973 when the Regional Court in Leeuwarden decided a case in which a physician had administered a deadly dose of morphine to her terminally ill mother on the mother's serious and persistent request. In this case the court concluded that the average Dutch physician no longer considered it his or her duty to prolong a patient's life under all circumstances. The (...) court accepted that in specific cases a physician is allowed to prevent serious and irreversible suffering, even if the patient's life is short ened. This case was the first in which a legal opening for euthanasia or assisted suicide was created. In this specific case the physician was formally declared guilty, but the court gave her a suspended sentence of one week imprisonment. This decision started a debate on euthanasia and assisted suicide throughout all levels of Dutch society. (shrink)

We describe the results and implications of a literature review that identifies the number of normative and empirical articles, respectively, that have appeared in Nursing Ethics in each year from 1994 to 2017. The results of our analysis suggest a powerful trend away from normative scholarship and toward empirical investigation within the field of nursing ethics, both overall and comparatively. We argue that there are several important negative consequences of this trend, and we propose some potential solutions to address them.

The standard argument in favor of the practice of voluntary physician-assisted death, by means of assisted suicide or active euthanasia, rests on liberal, individualistic grounds. It appeals to two moral considerations: (1) personal self-determination—the right to choose the circumstances and timing of death with medical assistance; and (2) individual well-being—relief of intolerable suffering in the face of terminal or incurable, severely debilitating illness. One of the strongest challenges to this argument has been advanced by Daniel Callahan. Callahan has vigorously attacked (...) the practice of physician-assisted death and the goal of legalization as deep affronts to values of community: “By assuming that the relief of suffering is a goal important enough to legitimate killing as a way of achieving it, we corrupt the idea of such relief as a social goal and duty. We cease helping to bear one another's suffering, but eliminate altogether the person who suffers. We thereby jeopardize both the future of self-determination and the kind of community that furthers its members' capacity to bear one another's suffering. Why bear what can be eliminated altogether?” In another passage Callahan remarks, “For there is a deep sense in which suicide and euthanasia are likely to represent, at least in part, a failure of the community, whether that of the intimate community of family and friends, or the larger civic community, to respond to the needs of another.”. (shrink)