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Shared Epistemic Responsibility

Episteme 18 (4):493-506 (2021)

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  1. Collective inaction, omission, and non-action: when not acting is indeed on ‘us’.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-19.
    The statement that we are currently failing to address some of humanity’s greatest challenges seems uncontroversial—we are not doing enough to limit global warming to a maximum of 2 °C and we are exposing vulnerable people to preventable diseases when failing to produce herd immunity. But what singles out such failings from all the things we did not do when all are unintended? Unlike their individualist counterparts, collective inaction and omission have not yet received much attention in the literature. collective (...)
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  • The collective epistemic reasons of social-identity groups.Veli Mitova - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):1-20.
    In this paper, I argue that certain social-identity groups—ones that involve systematic relations of power and oppression—have distinctive epistemic reasons in virtue of constituting this group. This claim, I argue further, would potentially benefit at least three bodies of scholarship—on the epistemology of groups, on collective moral responsibility, and on epistemic injustice.
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  • Epistemic Obligations and Free Speech.Boyd Millar - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    Largely thanks to Mill’s influence, the suggestion that the state ought to restrict the distribution of misinformation will strike most philosophers as implausible. Two of Mill’s influential assumptions are particularly relevant here: first, that free speech debates should focus on moral considerations such as the harm that certain forms of expression might cause; second, that false information causes minimal harm due to the fact that human beings are psychologically well equipped to distinguish truth and falsehood. However, in addition to our (...)
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  • Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms.Will Fleisher & Dunja Šešelja - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science:1-41.
    Discussion of epistemic responsibility typically focuses on belief formation and actions leading to it. Similarly, accounts of collective epistemic responsibility have addressed the issue of collective belief formation and associated actions. However, there has been little discussion of collective responsibility for preventing epistemic harms, particularly those preventable only by the collective action of an unorganized group. We propose an account of collective epistemic responsibility which fills this gap. Building on Hindriks' (2019) account of collective moral responsibility, we introduce the Epistemic (...)
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  • We Should Redefine Scientific Expertise: An Extended Virtue Account.Duygu Uygun Tunc - unknown
    An expert is commonly considered to be somebody who possesses the right kind of knowledge and skills to find out true answers for questions in a particular domain. However, this common conception that focuses only on an individual’s knowledge and skills is not very useful to understand the social epistemic dimension and the epistemically interdependent nature of contemporary scientific expertise, which becomes increasingly more relevant due to the rise of large interdisciplinary research collaborations. The typical scientific expert today relies substantially (...)
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  • How We Fail to Know: Group-Based Ignorance and Collective Epistemic Obligations.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2022 - Political Studies 70 (4):901-918.
    Humans are prone to producing morally suboptimal and even disastrous outcomes out of ignorance. Ignorance is generally thought to excuse agents from wrongdoing, but little attention has been paid to group-based ignorance as the reason for some of our collective failings. I distinguish between different types of first-order and higher order group-based ignorance and examine how these can variously lead to problematic inaction. I will make two suggestions regarding our epistemic obligations vis-a-vis collective (in)action problems: (1) that our epistemic obligations (...)
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