Silicon Valley and its innovation center counterparts have come upon food and agriculture as the next frontier for their unique style of innovation and impact. But what exactly can the tech sector, with expertise in information and communication technologies, bring to a domain in which the biophysical materiality of soil, plants, animals and human bodies have most challenged farmers and food companies? Based on a detailed analysis of all of the companies that have pitched their products at events sponsored by (...) the Silicon Valley-based convener, Foodbytes!, we show that a large proportion of tech-driven solutions are digital technologies transferred from other domains. These technologies at best inform decision-making on the ecological processes of food and farming, but do not provide tools to treat them, and otherwise provide business solutions not even aimed at major challenges in food and farming. Drawing on a small set of interview data, we additionally suggest that tech entrepreneurs migrate to food and agriculture because it seems purposeful, exciting, or lucrative, but sometimes lack a clear understanding of the problems they might solve with their digital technologies. In making our case about the mismatch of problem and solution, we bring into conversation recent critiques of digital solutionism with abiding concerns in agrarian political economy and critical food studies regarding the role of the biological in both challenging food production and spurring technological intervention. (shrink)

Technology plays an important role in business and society. This has resulted in the belief that technology is in a unique position to solve organizational and societal problems. However, technology is not regarded as equally impactful by all. To explore these differences, we designed a technosolutionism scale to measure the extent to which individuals deem technological solutions to be better-suited to address organizational and societal problems. In Studies 1a and 1b, exploratory and confirmatory analyses indicated two reliable factors: (1) near-term (...) and (2) long-term focused technosolutionism. Study 2 confirmed the scale’s convergent and discriminant validity. Next, we tested the predictive validity of the technosolutionism scale. We argue that a propensity to consider intelligent technologies as being able to provide solutions should also predict preferences in areas where technological solutions are being considered in response to organizational issues. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrate that the technosolutionism scale relates to preferences for a robot over a human in job replacement decisions and preferences for artificial intelligence managers over human managers in managerial decision-making tasks, respectively. This is an important finding as current research indicates that people are generally against being replaced or being managed by intelligent technologies, whereas our findings indicate that this preference flips when it comes to those with a higher propensity for technosolutionism. Our technosolutionism scale can be used to gauge the extent to which individuals believe that technology is uniquely placed to solve problems, such that they opt for intelligent technological solutions over and above other (human) solutions. (shrink)

This essay adopts three accounts of “the social” to get a clearer picture of why there is a barrier faced by the government when implementing contact tracing mobile applications. In Hong Kong's context, the paradox involves declining trust of the government's protection of data privacy and growing concern about data surveillance since the 2019 social unrest I argue that exploring the idea of sociality is valuable in that it re-reconfigures the datafication of pandemic control by revealing different sets of social (...) relations, particularly the asymmetrical power relation between the government and its people. The refusal to download or use the mobile app also shows that the public has a faith in human agency and human resistance in data-saturated cities. (shrink)

We are experiencing a historical moment characterized by unprecedented conditions of virality: a viral pandemic, the viral diffusion of misinformation and conspiracy theories, the viral momentum of ongoing Hong Kong protests, and the viral spread of #BlackLivesMatter demonstrations and related efforts to defund policing. These co-articulations of crises, traumas, and virality both implicate and are implicated by big data practices occurring in a present that is pervasively mediated by data materialities, deeply rooted dataist ideologies that entrench processes of datafication as (...) granting objective access to truth and attendant practices of tracking, data analytics, algorithmic prediction, and data-driven targeting of individuals and communities. This collection of papers explores how data is figuring in the making of the discourses, lived realities, and systemic inequalities of the uneven impacts of the coronavirus pandemic. (shrink)

The COVID-19 global pandemic has stretched the capacities of public health institutions and health systems around the world, opening the door to a range of technologically-driven solutions. In this article, we seek to historicize the expanding role of digital health technologies and examine the political-economic context from which they have emerged. Drawing on critical insights from science and technology studies, we maintain that the rise of digital health technologies has been catalyzed by broad shifts in global health governance that have (...) expanded the role of market forces in public health and a unique set of political and economic crises that have accelerated the adoption of digital technologies—often under the guise of appeals to technological innovation to address “unprecedented” crises. These interrelated historical trends, we contend, are critical for understanding current state responses to the pandemic and possibilities for more equitable and democratic applications of technology in public health. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 3, Page 305-312, March 2022.

COVID-19 has hit a world in which social protection schemes are increasingly augmented with digital measures. Digital identity schemes are especially being adopted to match citizens’ data with social protection entitlements, enabling authentication through demographic and, increasingly, biometric data at the point of access. In this commentary, I discuss three sets of implications that COVID-19 has yielded on digital social protection, whose central trade-off – increasing the probabilities of accurate user identification, at the cost of greater exclusions – has become (...) even more problematic during the crisis. I argue that three forms of data injustice – legal, informational and design-related, previously identified in datafied social protection schemes, will need to be monitored in the post-pandemic scenario. I finally observe that the crisis exposes the long-term need to place digitality within social protection schemes that expand user entitlements rather than constraining them. Implications of such reflections are drawn for the study of data-based social welfare interventions. (shrink)