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  1. Symbols and Computation A Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind.Steven Horst - 1999 - Minds and Machines 9 (3):347-381.
    Over the past several decades, the philosophical community has witnessed the emergence of an important new paradigm for understanding the mind.1 The paradigm is that of machine computation, and its influence has been felt not only in philosophy, but also in all of the empirical disciplines devoted to the study of cognition. Of the several strategies for applying the resources provided by computer and cognitive science to the philosophy of mind, the one that has gained the most attention from philosophers (...)
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  • Analytic functionalism without representational functionalism.Terence Horgan - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):51-51.
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  • On doing research on consciousness without being aware of it.Daniel Holender - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):612-614.
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  • “Consciousness” is the name of a nonentity.Deborah Hodgkin & Alasdair I. Houston - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):611-612.
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  • Qualitative characteristics, type materialism and the circularity of analytic functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50-51.
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  • Searle's vision of psychology.James Higginbotham - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):608-610.
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  • Unraveling introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49-50.
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  • Intentionality: Some distinctions.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):607-608.
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  • First-person current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.
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  • Does Representational Content Arise from Biological Function?Richard J. Hall - 1990 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990 (1):193-199.
    Let us assume that some organisms, humans at least and the other higher animals, have internal states and behavioral states that represent things external to themselves. One of the questions that everyone would like answered about these states is: In virtue of what does such a representational state get the specific content that it has? An answer to this question that’s popular just now is: In virtue of its biological function. I believe there is a deep reason why such an (...)
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  • Know my own mind? I should be so lucky!Jennifer M. Gurd & John C. Marshall - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):47-48.
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  • On behalf of phenomenological parity for the attitudes.Keith Gunderson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):46-47.
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  • Cladistic classification and functional explanation.P. E. Griffiths - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (2):206-227.
    I adopt a cladistic view of species, and explore the possibility that there exists an equally valuable cladistic view of organismic traits. This suggestion seems to run counter to the stress on functional views of biological traits in recent work in philosophy and psychology. I show how the tension between these two views can be defused with a multilevel view of biological explanation. Despite the attractions of this compromise, I conclude that we must reject it, and adopt an essentially cladistic (...)
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  • Psychosemantics and the rich/thin debate.E. J. Green - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):153-186.
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  • Self-ascription of belief and desire.Robert M. Gordon - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):45-46.
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  • Theories and illusions.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):90-100.
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  • Theories and qualities.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):44-45.
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  • How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.
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  • The psychology of folk psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
    The central mission of cognitive science is to reveal the real nature of the mind, however familiar or foreign that nature may be to naive preconceptions. The existence of naive conceptions is also important, however. Prescientific thought and language contain concepts of the mental, and these concepts deserve attention from cognitive science. Just as scientific psychology studies folk physics (McCloskey 1983, Hayes 1985), viz., the common understanding (or misunderstanding) of physical phenomena, so it must study folk psychology, the common understanding (...)
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  • Functionalism, the theory-theory and phenomenology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):101-108.
    The ordinary understanding and ascription of mental states is a multiply complex subject. Widely discussed approaches to the subject, such as functionalism and the theory-theory (TT), have many variations and interpretations. No surprise, then, that there are misunderstandings and disagreements, which place many items on the agenda. Unfortunately, the multiplicity of issues raised by the commentators and the limitations of space make it impossible to give a full reply to everyone. My response is divided into five topics: (1) Which version(s) (...)
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  • Competing accounts of belief-task performance.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):43-44.
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  • Unconscious mental processes.Clark Glymour - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):606-607.
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  • Animal animation.Andrew Gleeson - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):137-169.
    The original publication can be found at www.springerlink.com.
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  • No representations without rules: The prospects for a compromise between paradigms in cognitive science.James W. Garson - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (1):25-37.
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  • Mice in mirrored mazes and the mind.James W. Garson - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):123-34.
    The computational theory of cognition (CTC) holds that the mind is akin to computer software. This article aims to show that CTC is incorrect because it is not able to distinguish the ability to solve a maze from the ability to solve its mirror image. CTC cannot do so because it only individuates brain states up to isomorphism. It is shown that a finer individuation that would distinguish left-handed from right-handed abilities is not compatible with CTC. The view is explored (...)
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  • Grammar and consciousness.Robert Freidin - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):605-606.
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  • Consciousness as physiological self-organizing process.Walter J. Freeman - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):604-605.
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  • On the evolution of intentionality as seen from the intentional stance.Jeffrey E. Foss - 1994 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):287-310.
    Like everyone with a scientific bent of mind, Dennett thinks our capacity for meaningful language and states of mind is the product of evolution (Dennett [1987, ch. VIII]). But unlike many of this bent, he sees virtue in viewing evolution itself from the intentional stance. From this stance, ?Mother Nature?, or the process of evolution by natural selection, bestows intentionality upon us, hence we are not Unmeant Meaners. Thus, our intentionality is extrinsic, and Dennett dismisses the theories of meaning of (...)
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  • Goldman has not defeated folk functionalism.James H. Fetzer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):42-43.
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  • Recall or regeneration of past mental states: Toward an account in terms of cognitive processes.K. Anders Ericsson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):41-42.
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  • Alexander's dictum and the reality of familiar objects.Crawford L. Elder - 2003 - Topoi 22 (2):163-171.
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  • Folk Terms and Agency.Jane Duran - 1991 - Philosophica 47 (1):111-124.
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  • Searle's Freudian slip.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):603-604.
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  • Language and the deep unconscious mind: Aspectualities of the theory of syntax.B. Elan Dresher & Norbert Hornstein - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):602-603.
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  • Concept individuation, possession conditions, and propositional attitudes.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Noûs 39 (1):140-66.
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  • Concepts and epistemic individuation.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):290-325.
    Christopher Peacocke has presented an original version of the perennial philosophical thesis that we can gain substantive metaphysical and epistemological insight from an analysis of our concepts. Peacocke's innovation is to look at how concepts are individuated by their possession conditions, which he believes can be specified in terms of conditions in which certain propositions containing those concepts are accepted. The ability to provide such insight is one of Peacocke's major arguments for his theory of concepts. I will critically examine (...)
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  • The anthropology of folk psychology.Steven Daniel - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):38-39.
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  • The ability versus intentionality aspects of unconscious mental processes.Maria Czyzewska, Thomas Hill & Pawel Lewicki - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):602-602.
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  • How directly do we know our minds?Maria Czyzewska & Pawel Lewicki - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):37-38.
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  • Aspects and algorithms.Andy Clark - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):601-602.
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  • Accessibility “in principle”.Noam Chomsky - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):600-601.
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  • The naked truth about first-person knowledge.Michael Chandler & Jeremy Carpendale - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):36-37.
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  • Self-ascription without qualia: A case study.David J. Chalmers - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36.
    In Section 5 of his interesting article, Goldman suggests that the consideration of imaginary cases can be valuable in the analysis of our psychological concepts. In particular, he argues that we can imagine a system that is isomorphic to us under any functional description, but which lacks qualitative mental states, such as pains and color sensations. Whether or not such a being is empirically possible, it certainly seems to be logically possible, or conceptually coherent. Goldman argues from this possibility to (...)
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  • Categorization, theories and folk psychology.Nick Chater - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):37-37.
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  • There's more to mental states than meets the inner “l”.Kimberly Wright Cassidy - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):34-35.
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  • Conscious mental episodes and skill acquisition.Richard A. Carlson - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):599-599.
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  • Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Systematicity, and Stimulus‐Independence.Elisabeth Camp - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):275-311.
    I argue that we can reconcile two seemingly incompatible traditions for thinking about concepts. On the one hand, many cognitive scientists assume that the systematic redeployment of representational abilities suffices for having concepts. On the other hand, a long philosophical tradition maintains that language is necessary for genuinely conceptual thought. I argue that on a theoretically useful and empirically plausible concept of 'concept', it is necessary and sufficient for conceptual thought that a thinker be able to entertain many of the (...)
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  • Knowing levels and the child's understanding of mind.Robert L. Campbell & Mark H. Bickhard - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):33-34.
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  • Towards an ecology of mind.George Butterworth - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):31-32.
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  • Intention itself will disappear when its mechanisms are known.Bruce Bridgeman - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):598-599.
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