In this paper, I challenge a familiar argument -- a composite of arguments in the literature -- for the view that “Why be moral?” is a pseudo-question. I do so by refuting a component of that argument, a component that is not only crucial to the argument but important in its own right. That component concerns the status of moral reasons in replies to “Why be moral?”; consequently, this paper concerns reasons and rationality no less than it concerns morality. The (...) work I devote to those topics shows not only that the argument I address is unsound, but that the conclusion of that argument is false. “Why be moral?” is no pseudo-question. (shrink)

One clear reason why human agents often act badly is because they are insufficiently attentive to moral considerations and concerns, or tempted to ignore these in pursuit of more immediate satisfactions. In so far as madness, insanity or mental instability may be regarded as undermining moral agency, it might also be supposed that such madness attaches more to the non-moral than the moral reasons or motives of agents. Still, the well-known quote from Chesterton at the start of this paper may (...) give pause to conventional thought on this matter. With reference to the ideas of Plato and Freud, as well as attention to literary and cinematic "case studies," this paper argues that moral reasons and motives – of an apparently Chestertonian kind – may be a prime source of morally "insane" conduct. (shrink)