This paper combines views of Wittgenstein and Heidegger into an account of mind/ action. It does this by suggesting that these two philosophers be viewed in part as descendants of Life?philosophy (Lebensphilosophie). Part I describes the conception of life that informs and emerges from these thinkers. Parts Two and Three detail particular aspects of this conception: Wittgenstein on the constitution of states of life and Heidegger on the flow?structure of the stream of life. The Conclusion offers reasons for believing their (...) combined viewpoint. (shrink)

We know that Helmuth Plessner complained about his anthropological magnum opus, published in 1928, being overshadowed by Heidegger from the beginning. When the latter, in turn, responded to Plessner, for example to his preface toStufen, it was always anonymously; Heidegger never actually mentioned Plessner in any publication. Plessner on the other hand emphasized that he had developed his concept without any knowledge ofSein und Zeit, even though since 1924, he had shown strong interest in the yet-unknown colleague’s work. Thus, it (...) appeared to the public that they philosophised independently of one another.In fact, the situation is much more complicated. This paper tries, above all, to identify the sources of the peculiar discomfort caused on both sides by the work of the respective other, as well as to delineate the philosophical effects. Notably in Heidegger’s case, not enough is known about this. Heidegger starts out, in the 1920’s, cultivating a strong anti-anthropological affect; however, after his triumphal success, both with his publication and in the institutional field, in 1927/1928, he finds himself in an orientation crisis; it is from this point onwards that traces of Plessner’s anthropology can be found in his thinking. Ultimately, Plessner will prove a serious source of irritation as well as of inspiration for Heidegger.Additionally, from a systematic point of view, the present text retraces the main points of Plessner’s critique (subjectivity, disembodiedness of fundamental ontology). The investigation makes use of a broader corpus of text than was available to Plessner and Heidegger’s contemporaries, and concentrates on two questions: Did Plessner understand his opponent? Is he able to raise valid objections? It becomes obvious that Plessner is right in complaining about disembodiedness (even though his ownLeibphilosophy remains conceptually diffuse), while some differentiation is advisable concerning the subjectivism charge. (shrink)

The article takes Helmuth Plessner’s Political Anthropology from 1931 as a postfoundationalist theory of society avant la lettre - which is very similar to the later works of Claude Lefort, Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal Mouffe. Or, the article takes Plessner’s essay as an ‘ontology’ of the Political. After introducing remarks on the historical debates, in which Plessner aimed to intervene, his theory of the Political is reconstructed, within the three categories of ‘unfathomability’, of the constitutive outside, and of the vulnerability (...) of the human body. In a third and last step, Plessner’s most central and most problematic category for the Political - the ‘popular existence’ - is discussed: The ‘people’ is made visible as being a key notion of postfoundational theories of modern democracy, for it is - beneath the ‘Individual’ - one of the imaginary foundations, one of the foundational outsides of a democratically instituted collective. (shrink)

This paper presents and discusses Karl Löwith’s anthropological critique of existential analytic that is formulated in his Habilitation thesis (Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen, 1928), where he develops an anthropological counter-paradigm, i. e.Mitanthropologie, in opposition to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. Given the extent and the complexity of such a subject, I will limit the present inquiry to two specific topics: theMiteinandersein(Being-with-one-another) and above all theSein zum Tode(Being-towards-death). In practice, I will first explain the basic features of Mitanthropologie together with (...) the crucial critique that it levels atBeing and Time. I will follow by outlining the importance of theTodesfrage(the question of death) within the existential analytic by means of a comparison between Heidegger’sBeing-towards-deathand Kierkegaard’sSickness unto death(Krankheit zum Tode). Finally, I will expound Löwith’s objection toBeing-towards-death, which is expressed in the alternative formulaFreiheit zum Tode(Freedom-towards-death). (shrink)

This paper focuses on a neglected part of Dilthey’s œuvre that consists of papers on 16th–17th century philosophical issues. These papers are closer to interpretive articles than to original works, and so they are neither considered Dilthey’s original contributions to his own philosophy nor studied as part of the secondary literature. One of the most characteristic features of Dilthey’s philosophic style is the historical-systematic method mostly repudiated as concealing the real statement of the author “between the lines,” i.e. behind historical (...) analyses. Therefore these papers are not reckoned among Dilthey’s great works of enduring significance. This paper aims to make the reader more sensitive to the world and claims of these papers by way of an intermediary approach to them that acknowledges their intermediary position between a historical description and a systematic analysis. This is to be accomplished by having a look at the “pantheism” of Georg Misch, Dilthey’s largely forgotten pupil and son-in-law. (shrink)

In this article I consider Eugen Fink’s critique of Husserlean approach to language in phenomenology, first of all in the ‘middle’ and ‘late’ periods of Husserlean works since Ideas I. Fink was Husserl’s student and assistant and, also, he was influenced by Heidegger’s ideas. In his works he criticized insufficient attention and unworked position to language in Husserl’s works. He believed that language is very important to the whole theory of phenomenology, that we cannot carry out true phenomenological reduction without (...) clarifying what language is, how it is related to our thinking, is it possible to think without language and is it possible to carry out a complete phenomenological reduction. (shrink)