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  1. What is relative confirmation?David Christensen - 1997 - Noûs 31 (3):370-384.
    It is commonly acknowledged that, in order to test a theoretical hypothesis, one must, in Duhem' s phrase, rely on a "theoretical scaffolding" to connect the hypothesis with something measurable. Hypothesis-confirmation, on this view, becomes a three-place relation: evidence E will confirm hypothesis H only relative to some such scaffolding B. Thus the two leading logical approaches to qualitative confirmation--the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) account and Clark Glymour' s bootstrap account--analyze confirmation in relative terms. But this raises questions about the philosophical interpretation (...)
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  • A Survey of Inductive Generalization.John D. Norton - unknown
    Inductive generalization asserts that what obtains in known instances can be generalized to all. Its original form is enumerative induction, the earliest form of inductive inference, and it has been elaborated in various ways, largely with the goal of extending its reach. Its principal problem is that it supplies no intrinsic notion of strength of support so that one cannot tell if the generalization has weak or strong support.
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  • Assessing Theories. The Problem of a Quantitative Theory of Confirmation.Franz Huber - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Erfurt
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  • Repeated Independent Discovery and ‘Objective Evidence’ in Science: An Example from Geology.A. M. C. Sengor - 2006 - Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 244:113.
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  • Chomsky defensor de las contrastaciones cruciales.José Maria Gil - 2010 - Páginas de Filosofía (Universidad Nacional del Comahue) 11 (14):127-145.
    Noam Chomsky supone, de forma equivocada, que en la ciencia hay contrastaciones cruciales. La confirmación de las hipótesis de una teoría x no nos habilita para desestimar la teoría z, incompatible con x. Se sugiere, como alternativa, un “principio de complementariedad en lingüística”, en virtud del cual podría aceptarse que alguna teoría lingüística zes científica si ésta caracteriza ciertos fenómenos lingüísticos aun cuando resulte incompatible con la de Chomsky.
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  • Sobre la confirmación de hipótesis en lingüística.José María - 2007 - Theoria 16 (2):77-90.
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