Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Parasitism and Disjunctivism in Nyāya Epistemology.Matthew R. Dasti - 2012 - Philosophy East and West 62 (1):1-15.
    From the early modern period, Western epistemologists have often been concerned with a rigorous notion of epistemic justification, epitomized in the work of Descartes: properly held beliefs require insulation from extreme skepticism. To the degree that veridical cognitive states may be indistinguishable from non-veridical states, apparently veridical states cannot enjoy high-grade positive epistemic status. Therefore, a good believer begins from what are taken to be neutral, subjective experiences and reasons outward—hopefully identifying the kinds of appearances that properly link up to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Dharmakīrti's theory of truth.Shoryu Katsura - 1984 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (3):215-235.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • The Identity That Doesn’t Deny Difference: A Non-dualist Argument.Nirmalya Guha - 2021 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 49 (2):257-289.
    Brahmānanda Sarasvatī has written an elaborate comment on the following inference cited in Advaitasiddhi: attribute etc. are identical to and different from attributee etc. since they are co-referential. There he wants to prove that every significant case of attribution is a case of identity that coexists with a difference between two demarcators. The identity that coexists with difference is called ‘equality’. This paper will argue that in each case of equality, the realist ontology chooses either identity over difference or the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • No Black Scorpion is Falling: An Onto-Epistemic Analysis of Absence. [REVIEW]Nirmalya Guha - 2013 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 41 (2):111-131.
    An absence and its locus are the same ontological entity. But the cognition of the absence is different from the cognition of the locus. The cognitive difference is caused by a query followed by a cognitive process of introspection. The moment one perceptually knows y that contains only one thing, z, one is in a position to conclude that y contains the absence of any non-z. After having a query as to whether y has x one revisits one’s knowledge of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Truth, relativism and western conceptions of indian philosophy.Roy W. Perrett - 1998 - Asian Philosophy 8 (1):19 – 29.
    We (relatively few) Western analytic philosophers who also work on classical Indian philosophy commonly encounter puzzlement or suspicion from our colleagues in Western philosophy because of our Indian interests. The ubiquity of these attitudes is itself revealing of Western conceptions of Indian philosophy, though their origins lie in cultural history often unknown to those who hold them. In the first part of this paper I relate a small but significant slice of that history before going on to distinguish and illustrate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Some problems of perception in Navya-Nyāya.Pradyot Kr Mandal - 1987 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 15 (2):125-148.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Traditions of truth – changing beliefs and the nature of inquiry.Jonardon Ganeri - 2005 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 33 (1):43-54.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Reference and existence in nyāya and buddhist logic.Bimal Krishna Matilal - 1970 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 1 (1):83-110.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Philosophy of Logic.J. N. Mohanty - 2018 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 35 (1):3-14.
    The paper addresses three main issues drawing on Husserl’s writings on logic. First, what gives the logical objects their objective status, given the fact that these are intimately connected with human mental processes? Second, if logical objects are objective then how is logical knowledge at all possible? The answer to this question leads to a transcendental foundation of formal logic. Third, how do the principles of logic apply to the real world? This question can be addressed by positing a formal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark