This paper describes a study about inter-understanding between Portuguese and Spanish. Based on Peano’s work, the study resorts to the logical relation of intersection between sets and applies it to words in Portuguese and Spanish meaning the same. The material is a text that is the abstract of a psychology paper. Each of the words in that text, which is written in Portuguese, is compared to its corresponding Spanish word by means of the relation of intersection. This is made by (...) considering the letters in the words to be elements in sets. The results show the potential that this methodology can have to provide percentages of inter-understanding between the two languages (and between any pair of languages). (shrink)

Denying the antecedent is an invalid form of reasoning that is typically identified and frowned upon as a formal fallacy. Contrary to arguments that it does not or at least should not occur, denying the antecedent is a legitimate and effective strategy for undermining a position. Since it is not a valid form of argument, it cannot prove that the position is false. But it can provide inductive evidence that this position is probably false. In this role, it is neither (...) defective nor deceptive. Denying the antecedent provides inductive support for rejecting a claim as improbable. (shrink)

The precedent studies on the validity of Modus ponens and Modus tollens have been carried out with most regard to a major type of conditionals in which the conditional clause is a sufficient condition for the main clause. But we sometimes, in natural language arguments, find other types of conditionals in which the conditional clause is a necessary or necessary and sufficient condition for the main clause. In this paper I reappraise, on the basis of new definitions of Modus ponens (...) and Modus tollens, their validity/invalidity in natural language arguments in consideration of all types of conditionals. (shrink)

Peter Wason provided his four-card selection task over five decades ago. It keeps causing difficulties from both the linguistic, the psychological, and the cognitive point of view. Many psychology theories have been proposed in order to remove its problems. This paper tries to offer one more possible account. That account is based on the method of extension and intension presented by Rudolf Carnap. Hence, it resorts to the concept of state-description. The basic ideas of the argumentation are two: 1) people (...) might tend to consider state-descriptions when processing information, and 2) if conditionals are not expressed with a clear contextual framework, they might be interpreted as biconditionals. (shrink)

Pfeifer defiende que los seres humanos no interpretan los enunciados condicionales como condicionales materiales, sino como eventos condicionales. Para probarlo, plantea dos experimentos basados en la tesis de Aristóteles y, a partir de los resultados que obtiene, argumenta que es obvio que sus participantes entendieron los enunciados condicionales que se les presentaron como eventos condicionales. No obstante, si tenemos en cuenta el fenómeno de la perfección del condicional y que los enunciados condicionales pueden ser interpretados como bicondicionales, se puede pensar (...) en una explicación alternativa para los resultados de Pfeifer sin necesidad de admitir su tesis relativa a que los enunciados condicionales se interpretan como eventos condicionales. En este trabajo, tratamos de demostrarlo. Pfeifer holds that human beings do not interpret conditional statements as material conditionals, but as conditional events. To demonstrate it, he presents two experiments based on Aristotle´s thesis and, from the outcomes he obtained, he argues that it is obvious that his participants understood the conditional statements that were presented as conditional events. However, if we consider that conditional perfection phenomenon and conditional statements can be interpreted as biconditional statements, we can think of an alternative explanation for Pfeifer´s outcomes without admitting his thesis, namely, that conditional statements are interpreted as conditional events. In this paper, I try to prove that. (shrink)

Recientemente, son muchos los trabajos que han aparecido en el área de la psicología y de la ciencia cognitiva con el propósito de analizar las maneras de razonar y las capacidades intelectuales de sujetos diagnosticados como autistas. Tal es el caso de una investigación de McKenzie, Evans y Handley. Nosotros revisamos en este trabajo su investigación y sostenemos que contiene problemas metodológicos. Así, tratamos de mostrar cuáles son dichos problemas y proponemos la estructura que, a nuestro juicio, deberían tener experimentos (...) futuros en la misma línea y con el mismo objetivo. Recurrimos, igualmente, al concepto de neurodiversidad para apoyar nuestro enfoque y para defender que los resultados de McKenzie, Evans y Handley pueden ser interpretados de diversas maneras y en función de distintos marcos teóricos. Recently, many papers have been presented in the area of cognitive science and psychology in order to analyze modes of reasoning and intellectual abilities in individuals diagnosed as autistic. Such is the case of a research by McKenzie, Evans and Handly. In this paper, I review that research and argue that contains methodological problems. So, I try to show what these problems and hold that future experiments in the same way and with the same objective should be another structure. I focus equally on the concept of neurodiversity to support my approach and hold the outcomes presented by Mckenzie, Evans and Handly can be interpreted in different ways and according to various theoretical approaches. (shrink)

There is an Aristotelian thesis that can be considered controversial. That is the thesis related to a denied conditional with only one propositional variable and in which, in addition, one of its clauses is also denied. While the thesis is not a tautology, people tend to accept it as true. Pfeifer’s approach can account for this fact. However, I try to show that this problem can also be explained from other alternative frameworks, in particular, from that of the mental models (...) theory, that of López-Astorga based on the pragmatic phenomenon of conditional perfection, and that of the mental logic theory. Likewise, I indicate the difficulties regarding Aristotle’s thesis of the mental models theory and López-Astorga’s proposal, and conclude that the account of the mental logic theory is the strongest alternative to Pfeifer’s explanation and that what is clearly obvious is that conditional should not be materially interpreted. (shrink)

La teoría de los contratos sociales es un enfoque cognitivo que apareció décadas atrás y que defiende que la mente humana se encuentra dotada con sistemas neurocognitivos evolutivos. Estos sistemas regulan diferentes situaciones sociales, por ejemplo, los intercambios y las negociaciones, y nos permiten detectar infractores de reglas o individuos que no cumplen acuerdos. En este trabajo, revisamos críticamente las tesis de este enfoque a partir de los argumentos lingüísticos de Moldovan sobre la perfección del condicional. Nuestra conclusión apunta a (...) que, si trasladamos los planteamientos de Moldovan a un plano más psicológico, podemos explicar los resultados de los experimentos que apoyan la teoría de los contratos sociales a partir del procesamiento de la información realizado por los participantes, sin necesidad de suponer sistema neurocognitivo evolutivo alguno.Social contracts theory is a cognitive approach that emerged decades ago and holds that human mind has evolved neurocognitive systems. These systems regulate different social situations, for example, exchanges and contracts, and allow detecting offenders and individuals that do not fulfill agreements. In this paper, I check critically the theses of this approach by means of the Moldovan’s linguistic arguments about conditional perfection. In this way, I conclude that, if we apply the Moldovan’s approach in a more psychological level, we can explain the outcomes of the experiments that support social contracts theory by means of the information processing made by the participants and we do not need to suppose that there are evolved neurocognitive systems. (shrink)

Recent work on conditional reasoning argues that denying the antecedent [DA] and affirming the consequent [AC] are defeasible but cogent patterns of argument, either because they are effective, rational, albeit heuristic applications of Bayesian probability, or because they are licensed by the principle of total evidence. Against this, we show that on any prevailing interpretation of indicative conditionals the premises of DA and AC arguments do not license their conclusions without additional assumptions. The cogency of DA and AC inferences rather (...) depends on contingent factors extrinsic to, and independent of, what is asserted by DA and AC arguments. arguments do not license their conclusions without additional assumptions. The cogency of DA and AC inferences rather depends on contingent factors extrinsic to, and independent of, what is asserted by DA and AC arguments. (shrink)

Stoic logic assumes five inference schemata attributed to Chrysippus of Soli. Those schemata are the well-known indemonstrables. A problem related to them can be that, according to standard propositional calculus, only one of them, modus ponens, is clearly indemonstrable. Nevertheless, I try to show in this paper that the mental logic theory enables to understand why the Stoics considered such schemata to be basic kinds of arguments. Following that theory, four of them can be linked to ‘Core Schemata’ of mental (...) logic and the only one that is more controversial is modus tollens. However, as I also comment, some assumptions of Stoic philosophy, which can be interpreted from the mental logic theory, can explain why this last argument was included into the set of the indemonstrablesas well. (shrink)

The history of fallacy theory is long, distinguished and, admittedly, checkered. I offer a bird eye view on it, with the aim of contrasting the standard conception of fallacies as attractive and universal errors that are hard to eradicate with the contemporary preoccupation with “non-fallacious fallacies”, that is, arguments that fit the bill of one of the traditional fallacies but are actually respectable enough to be used in appropriate contexts. Godden and Zenker have recently argued that reinterpreting alleged fallacies as (...) non-fallacious arguments requires supplementing the textual material with something else, e.g. probability distributions, pragmatic considerations, dialogical context. Thus fallacies remain gappy on all accounts, and this is the hallmark of their failure. However, I argue that such gappiness is typically unproblematic, and thus no more flawed than enthymematic argumentation in general. This, in turn, calls into question the usefulness of the very notion of fallacy. (shrink)

Attridge and Inglis try to check whether or not the ‘Theory of Formal Discipline’ is correct. This theory states that learning mathematics improves logical reasoning, and Attridge and Inglis review it by means of an experiment. Their conclusion is that, indeed, learning mathematics improves conditional inferences causing that conditionals are interpreted as defective. In this paper, I analyze Attridge and Inglis´s experiment and hold that it has a methodological problem and that hence does not really prove that learning mathematics lead (...) to defective interpretations of conditionals. Equally, the paper includes a brief reflection on how the mental models theory can explain the results achieved by Attridge and Inglis. (shrink)

It has been argued that a fragment of discourse that constitutes a fallacy of denying the antecedent at the level of what is literally said may not be a fallacy at the level of speaker meaning. The pragmatic phenomenon involved here is known as conditional perfection. I argue that the account of conditional perfection in van der Auwera and Horn has several problems, and I discuss several possible alternatives.