Williams puts forward and develops his theory of integrity on the basis of criticizing utilitarianism and Kantian ethics as too demanding to make enough room for personal projects. Instead, his integrity theory advocates that we should act out of commitments with which we deeply identify ourselves. In doing so, we express who we really are and make our life meaningful. If not so, our integrity would be violated and we may lose ourselves. Such a description of the self in moral (...) life is criticized as solipsism for that it makes the relationship between one’s projects and himself only be regulated by himself. This paper aims to point out that such criticism is inappropriate. To show the inaccuracy of the criticism, the author will analyze the relationship between the self and others in two aspects. The first aspect is about the structure of formation of desires and others, and the second one is about the action responsibility and others. After analysis, in the first aspect of desires, the self needs others to form and stabilize desires, beliefs and motivations to cooperate with others. Others help the self to sustain the sense of reality to prevent the self from forming wishful thinking. As to action, others’ need for response is an important element in ascribing the self’s action responsibility. The self acquires self-conception, self-cognition and self-identity through the interaction with others. Thus, others play an essential role in Williams’ theory of integrity. Although there are some flaws in Williams’ integrity theory, to reexamine his theory is conducive to our understanding of moral life. (shrink)

Reasons evidentialism is the view that normative reasons can be analyzed in terms of evidence about oughts (i.e., propositions concerning whether or not S ought to phi). In this paper, I defend a new reason-evidentialist account according to which normative reasons are evidence against propositions of the form S ought not to phi. The arguments for my view have two strands. First of all, I argue that my view can account for three difficulty cases, cases where (i) a fact is (...) both a reason for S to phi and a reason for S not to phi, (ii) a fact is both evidence for the proposition that S ought to phi and evidence for the proposition that S ought not to phi, and (iii) the subject is genuinely torn, as far as reasons are concerned, between phi-ing and not phi-ing. Second, I argue that my view can account for what a reason against S phi-ing is. (shrink)

There has been a movement aiming to teach agents about their privilege by making the information about their privilege as costless as possible. However, some argue that in risk-sensitive frameworks, such as Lara Buchak’s (2013), it can be rational for privileged agents to shield themselves from learning about their privilege, even if the information is costless and relevant. This threatens the efficacy of these information-access efforts in alleviating the problem of elite-group ignorance. In response, I show that even within the (...) same framework, in this case David Kinney and Liam Kofi Bright’s (2021), the rationality of this information avoidance rests on shaky ground in practice. In this framework, whether an agent should avoid information depends on the precise details of (1) how relevant they expect the information to be, (2) their priors about the value of various options, and (3) their risk attitudes. The model suggests that the rationality of elite-group ignorance is a function of structural factors that are pervasive but nonetheless not insurmountable, thus offering a way out of pessimism about elite group education. (shrink)

This study aims to examine the development of global mindset, which is rarely addressed in a Korean international business journal. We investigate whether the global mindset is a static state that is difficult to change or a dynamically changeable competence. Based on the global mindset literature, we categorize the global mindset into three dimensions - cognition, skills and attitudes - and analyze the nature (static or dynamic) of each dimension. We collect survey questions from 269 undergraduate students. We use paired (...) sample t-tests to analyze whether the undergraduates have changed their global mindsets in terms of cognition, skills and attitudes after taking the international business class during a semester. Results reveal that the levels of cognition and skills have increased after the class, but the attitude level shows no significant difference before and after the class. The results also show that overall global mindsets after the class become higher than before the class. We also find the positive moderating effects of global motivation and international experience on the relationship between the international business class and the global mindset. It means that the effectiveness of international business class on the global mindset is strengthened with the high levels of global motivation and international experience. After the conclusion, we suggest future research topics related to the global mindset which have been rarely addressed in the field of the Korean international business academy. (shrink)

Constitutional democracies unilaterally enact the laws that regulate immigration to their territories. When are would-be migrants to a constitutional democracy morally justified in breaching such laws? Receiving states also typically enact laws that require their existing citizens to participate in the implementation of immigration restrictions. When are the individual citizens of a constitutional democracy morally justified in breaching such laws? In this article, I take up these questions concerning the justifiability of noncompliance with immigration law, focusing on the case of (...) nonviolent – or mere – noncompliance. Dissenting from Javier Hidalgo’s view, I argue that the injustice of an immigration law is insufficient to make mere noncompliance justified. Instead, I contend that only if an immigration law lacks legitimate authority are individuals justified in breaching it, since the subjects of an institution with legitimate authority are under a content-independent moral duty to comply with its rules. I further argue that a constitutional democracy’s regimes of law regulating immigration and requiring its citizens’ participation in implementing these regulations have legitimate authority. Nevertheless, when a particular immigration law is egregiously unjust, its legitimacy is defeated. (shrink)

I provide an alternative to the two prevailing accounts of justice in immigration policy, the free migration view and the state discretion view. Against the background of an internationalist conception of domestic and global justice that grounds special duties of justice between co-citizens in their shared participation in a distinctive scheme of social cooperation, I defend three principles of justice to guide labor immigration policy: the Difference Principle, the Duty of Beneficence, and the Duty of Assistance. I suggest how these (...) principles are to be applied in both ideal and nonideal circumstances. Finally, I argue that the potential conflict between these principles has often been overstated, and propose priority rules for genuine cases of conflict. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have recently proposed several alleged cases of “knowledge from falsehood,” i.e., cases of inferential knowledge epistemised by an inference with a false crucial premise. This paper examines such cases and argues against interpreting them as cases of knowledge from falsehood. Specifically, I argue that the inferences in play in such cases are in no position to epistemise their conclusions.

Several authors have recently argued against intellectualism, the view that one’s epistemic position with respect to p depends exclusively on one’s truth-relevant factors with respect to p. In this paper, I first examine two prominent arguments for the anti-intellectualist position and find both of them wanting. More precisely, I argue that these arguments, by themselves, are underdetermined between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. I then manifest the intuitive plausibility of intellectualism by examining the ordinary conversational pattern of challenging a claim.

To resolve the lottery paradox, the “no-justification account” proposes that one is not justified in believing that one's lottery ticket is a loser. The no-justification account commits to what I call “the Harman-style skepticism”. In reply, proponents of the no-justification account typically downplay the Harman-style skepticism. In this paper, I argue that the no-justification reply to the Harman-style skepticism is untenable. Moreover, I argue that the no-justification account is epistemically ad hoc. My arguments are based on a rather surprising finding (...) that the no-justification account implies that people living in Taiwan typically suffer from the Harman-style skepticism. (shrink)

Simion and Kelp explain the trustworthiness of an AI based on that AI’s disposition to meet its obligations. Roughly speaking, according to Simion and Kelp, an AI is trustworthy regarding its task if and only if that AI is obliged to complete the task and its disposition to complete the task is strong enough. Furthermore, an AI is obliged to complete a task in the case where the task is the AI’s etiological function or design function. This account has a (...) strength in that it can provide a unificatory rationale for the trustworthy-making properties of AIs. According to this account, being explainable, being safe, and being transparent are the trustworthy-making properties of an AI because an AI can fulfill its etiological or design functions in the case where it is explainable, safe, and transparent. This paper shows that though Simion and Kelp’s account has a strength, this account is not satisfactory for two reasons. The first reason is that an AI’s trustworthiness is not determined just by the AI’s disposition to meet obligations, and the second reason is that it is difficult to explain how an AI’s etiological function and design function have to do with that AI’s obligations. To provide a full-fledged account, Simion and Kelp should dismiss these concerns. (shrink)

While investigating the value of achievements, Dunkle claims that lucky achievements are possible. For instance, if a person does great works, then it is possible that the works have the status of achievements, even if luck plays a crucial role in doing the great works. Rather than examining Dunkle’s claim, this paper proceeds discussion under the assumption that lucky achievements are possible. In particular, based on this assumption, this paper suggests a new approach to the nature of achievement named the (...) Comparative Value Approach. According to the comparative value approach, a product can have the status of an achievement if the product is valuable in an achievement-relevant domain, and in that domain the product is valuable more than most other items which either have been achieved or can be achieved by others. This paper shows that the comparative value approach successfully explains the cases of achievements, including the cases of lucky achievements. Besides this reason, this paper provides three more reasons to show that the comparative value approach is a feasible view of achievements. The comparative value approach can accommodate the fact that there are various kinds of achievements; the approach can explain the relation between the nature of achievement and the achievement-value of a product; and the approach can show why in determining the status of a product it matters that for average people achieving a similar kind of product is sufficiently difficult. Based on these four reasons, this paper concludes that the comparative value approach is a plausible understanding of achievements. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that our initial intuitions regarding knowledge attributions in stakes-shifting cases (e.g., Cohen’s Airport) are best explained by standards variantism, the view that the standards for knowledge may vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way. Against standards variantism, I argue that no prominent account of the standards for knowledge can explain our intuitions regarding stakes-shifting cases. I argue that the only way to preserve our initial intuitions regarding such cases is to endorse position variantism, the view (...) that one’s epistemic position may vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way. Some had argued that epistemic position is incompatible with intellectualism. In reply, I point out that position variantism and intellectualism are compatible, if one’s truth-relevant factors with respect to p can vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way. (shrink)

Is the societal-level of analysis sufficient today to understand the values of those in the global workforce? Or are individual-level analyses more appropriate for assessing the influence of values on ethical behaviors across country workforces? Using multi-level analyses for a 48-society sample, we test the utility of both the societal-level and individual-level dimensions of collectivism and individualism values for predicting ethical behaviors of business professionals. Our values-based behavioral analysis indicates that values at the individual-level make a more significant contribution to (...) explaining variance in ethical behaviors than do values at the societal-level. Implicitly, our findings question the soundness of using societal-level values measures. Implications for international business research are discussed. (shrink)

Some cases show that counterfactual conditionals (‘counterfactuals’ for short) are inherently ambiguous, equivocating between forward-tracking and backtracking counterfactu- als. Elsewhere, I have proposed a causal modeling semantics, which takes this phenomenon to be generated by two kinds of causal manipulations. (Lee 2015; Lee 2016) In an important paper (Hiddleston 2005), Eric Hiddleston offers a different causal modeling semantics, which he claims to be able to explain away the inherent ambiguity of counterfactuals. In this paper, I discuss these two semantic treatments (...) and argue that my (bifurcated) semantics is theoretically more promising than Hiddleston’s (unified) semantics. (shrink)

The redemption thesis assumes that how events in a person’s life are related to one another is important in evaluating the person’s welfare throughout life. In particular, according to this thesis of welfare, the fact that a person’s previous hardships contribute to bringing out the same person’s later successes, and the person would regard the hardships as having been worthwhile in light of the successes makes the person’s life better for the person herself. Recently, Ian D. Dunkle provided four objections (...) to the redemption thesis: the intuition concern, the different redemptions argument, the downplaying hardships argument, and the reconciled irreconcilables argument. This paper examines these four objections. In particular, this paper dismisses all the objections showing that the redemption thesis bases on an appealing idea, does not consider the degree of hardship significant in itself, has plausible reasons to evaluate hardships not as serious as people think, and can successfully reconcile its synchronic and diachronic evaluations. (shrink)

Some goals have special significance to agents. For instance, an agent could find her life worth living because she is pursuing her current goal, and the agent could also think that her previous life has no value because she did not pursue the current goal. If an agent’s current goal has special importance to the agent, then in terms of prudence the agent’s decision to obtain her current goal could be permissible even in the case where achieving her previous goal (...) brings out larger advantages. A widely endorsed thesis of prudence (i.e. the temporal neutrality thesis) does not successfully explain this phenomenon of goal achievement. Furthermore, the present-aim thesis and the harmony thesis also fail in explaining why an agent has prudential reason to prioritize her current goal. This paper introduces a new thesis of prudence, according to which an agent’s caring is significant in deciding whether the agent’s actions are prudentially permissible. In particular, after introducing this thesis named the care thesis, I argue that the care thesis can explain why an agent has reason to prioritize her current goal if the agent finds her life worth living due to her current goal. It is permissible that an agent obtains her current goal rather than previous goal because achieving her current goal benefits the agent’s cared one (i.e. the self who pursues her current goal). (shrink)

Recent literature has seen a surging interest in the modal principle involved in the Gettier-style thought experiments. According to the necessitation thesis, the modal principle underlying the Gettier-style thought experiments takes the form of a principle of necessitation. It is widely agreed that the necessitation thesis is seriously threatened by the problem of deviant realizations. Based on the Gricean pragmatic theory of communication, I defend the necessitation thesis against the problem of deviant realizations. The present account bears some significant similarities (...) to Pierre Saint-Germier’s account. After comparing and contrasting these two accounts, I argue that the differences between them actually speak in favor of the present account over Saint-Germier’s one. (shrink)

The stakes-shifting cases suggest that pragmatic factors such as stakes play an important role in determining our intuitive judgments of whether or not S knows that p. This seems to be in conflict with intellectualism, according to which pragmatic factors in general should not be taken into account, when considering whether or not S knows that p. This paper develops a theory of judgments of knowledge status that reconciles intellectualism with our intuitive judgments regarding the stakes-shifting cases. I argue that (...) pragmatic factors affect only our epistemic perspectives, i.e., the ways in which we evaluate S’s epistemic position. Therefore, pragmatic factors only have an indirect impact on our judgments of knowledge status. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion. I first examine three prominent “counterexamples”: false assertion, selfless assertion, and assertion based on mere justified true belief. I argue that they all fail to square well with our ordinary intuitions. However, the contemporary debate over the norm of assertion depends heavily on the method of counterexamples, whose crux is to prompt our intuitions regarding the appropriateness (or inappropriateness) of a certain kind of assertions. This method (...) has its limits as sometimes the debate simply boils down to a clash of intuitions. I think we can do better. In the second part of the paper, I construct a positive argument for the knowledge norm, showing that the knowledge norm can be derived from the general account of the conversational role of assertion. I argue that in order for assertion to play the role it plays in conversation, the knowledge norm must hold. (shrink)

This paper explores the essence of the World and the essence of Life/Consciousness. Then derives from they the highest principles of value judgment and a series of ethics, providing a theoretical basis for guiding our future actions. The essence of the World consists of three aspects: 1. Existence, 2. Not nothingness, 3.Difference/Change. The essence of Life/Consciousness includes four aspects: 1.Has the distinction of "self" and "non-self".2. Has the change of the "new self" and the "old self".3. Pursues to maintain "self".4. (...) Pursue turning "non-self" into "self". Life and consciousness are completely identical. The pursuit of "Difference/Change" is the principle of the World. Beauty and art originate from the essence of the World and Life/Consciousness. The highest principle of value judgment for Life/Consciousness actions is that they should contribute to the growth of "Difference/Change". Ethics are inherent in Life /Consciousness. Low-level Life/Consciousness species have inherent rights. In the end, I argue that all of Life/Consciousness is a whole, which is also the consciousness or will of the World. Through the cognition of Life/Consciousness, the World achieves self-cognition and finally self-expansion. (shrink)

To obtain effective fusion results of multi source evidences with different importance, an evidence fusion method with importance discounting factors based on neutrosopic probability analysis in DSmT framework is proposed. First, the reasonable evidence sources are selected out based on the statistical analysis of the pignistic probability functions of single focal elements. Secondly, the neutrosophic probability analysis is conducted based on the similarities of the pignistic probability functions from the prior evidence knowledge of the reasonable evidence sources. Thirdly, the importance (...) discounting factors of the reasonable evidence sources are obtained based on the neutrosophic probability analysis and the reliability discounting factors of the real-time evidences are calculated based on probabilistic-based distances. Fourthly, the real-time evidences are discounted by the importance discounting factors and then the evidences with the mass assignments of neutrosophic empty sets are discounted by the reliability discounting factors. Finally, DSmT+PCR5 of importance discounted evidences is applied. Experimental examples show that the decision results based on the proposed fusion method are different from the results based on the existed fusion methods. Simulation experiments of recognition fusion are performed and the superiority of proposed method is testified well by the simulation results. (shrink)

In this article, it has been aimed to examine Nietzsche’s main critique towards different understandings of morals in his era. With this criticism, it is aimed to integrally understand the opinions -which are articulated directly or metaphorically- towards morals which have been encountered. In here, while keeping in mind the difference between the concepts of immoralism and amoralism, Nietzsche’s views are interpreted. Being parallel to that aim mentioned above, it has been investigated if there is a thinking in Nietzsche which (...) can be seen as a kind of understanding of morals (maybe as the understanding of morals without morals) or not. And finally, it has been thought that if Nietzsche’s views on morals have any value for the 21st century and upcoming 22nd century human or not, whether there’s something left to learn for this human from his critiques or not. (shrink)

Yong Huang presents criticisms of Neo-Aristotelian meta-ethical naturalism and argues Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucian approach is superior in defending moral realism. After presenting Huang’s criticisms of the Aristotelian metaethical naturalist picture, such as that of Rosalind Hursthouse, I argue that Huang’s own views succumb to the same criticisms. His metaethics does not avoid an allegedly problematic ‘gap,’ whether ontological or conceptual, between possessing a human nature and exemplifying moral goodness. This ontological gap exists in virtue of the fact that it (...) is possible for there to be bad people, and the conceptual gap exists in virtue of the fact that people are not ‘good’ (in that sense of being a good agent) merely because they are human. Aristotelians and Confucians both should reject that such gaps are problematic. I conclude by proposing that Huang is better understood as criticizing the Aristotelian move from scientific-empirical facts about human nature to the objective prescriptivity of moral norms. But so too I argue that Confucians should not follow Huang here either. There is good scientific evidence that would be supportive of a Confucian analysis of social virtues and provide one way of responding to those worries about the scientific-empirical accessibility of facts about the good life. (shrink)

Amos Yong claims that persons with disabilities like Down Syndrome will retain their disability at the resurrection. In section I, I will make some preliminary remarks in order to properly frame the discussion. In section II, I will lay out Yong ’s account of the resurrection and offer some difficulties along the way. Section III will examine what appears to be the main source of justification for Yong ’s claim. It is what I shall call Stanley Hauerwas’ (...) dictum which states that to ‘eliminate the disability means to eliminate the subject.’ In this section, I shall draw out three sets of bizarre entailments and difficulties that arise from Hauerwas’ dictum. Section IV will offer some concluding remarks and suggestions for further development on the doctrine of the resurrection from a disability perspective. (shrink)

I reply to recent criticisms by Uygar Abaci and Peter Yong, among others, of my reading of Kant's pre-Critical of God's existence, and of its fate in the Critical period. Along the way I discuss some implications of this debate for our understanding of Kant's modal metaphysics and modal epistemology generally.

The main focus of the book is to examine every possible facet of the world trading system from a development perspective to advance economic development. Thus, the book title "Reclaiming Development".

Tarixi biliklər məcmusu olan- idrak və onun istiqamətləri, insan hissləri, qavrayış, təsəvvür və onların müasir ictimai həyatdakı əksinin tədqiqi, həm də “müsəlman idrakı” anlayışı İslam fəlsəfəsində xüsusi mövqeyə malikdir. Müxtəlif alimlər ət-Tirmizi, Əbu Əbdullah əl-Haris, Əbu Əbdullah əl-Qurtubi, ibn Həcər əl-Əsqalani və başqalarının bu mövzuda xüsusi yanaşması olmuşdur. Bu məsələ ilə əlaqədar olan “mötəzililər”, “ismailililər”, “mistisistlər” (sufilər), “işraqilər”, həmçinin Şərq peripatetizminin ardıcılları varlıq, bilik təlimləri, “nəfs və qəlbin ölməzliyi” və idrakın əsas elementi olan təcrübə haqqında qiymətli fikir xəzinələri qoymuşlar. Bu (...) da müasir tədrisdə vacib yer tutur. Məqalədə “İdrak fəlsəfəsi” anlayışına nəzər salınmış, onun yaranması, əhəmiyyəti, canlı və cansız təbiətdəki əksi, istiqamətləri və fərqliliyi ilə əlaqədar fikirlər şərh edilmiş, müasir islamşünaslıqda bu anlayışın tədrisində istinad ediləcək məqamlara diqqət yetirilmişdir. Bu məqsədlə araşdırmada “İdrak- beyin xüsusiyyətidir”, “Cansız təbiətdə idrakın əksi”, “Canlı təbiətdə idrakın təzahürü”, “Dərk necə yaranıb?”, “İdrakın mahiyyəti nədir?”, “İdrakın istiqamətləri”, “İdrak dəyişkənliyi” və digər suallara Şərq-Qərq fəlsəfi görüşlərinə əsasən nəzər salınaraq qeyd edilən problemin həllinə cəhd edilmişdir. Zənginliyi və müxtəlifliyi ilə seçilən İslam fəlsəfəsində dini idrak ilə birgə həm də dünyəvi və real düşüncə mövcud olmuşdur. Bu axın yeni dövrün tələbi ilə müəyyən dəyişikliyə uğramış və nəinki Şərq, həm də dünyaya öz təsirini göstərmişdir. (shrink)

Focusing on how recent protests centered on global economic and environmental injustices can contribute to furthering deliberative politics and realizing deliberative democracy, Francis Dupuis- D � ri examines the important and historical tension between force and persuasion. However, casting protest as legitimate in the framework of deliberative politics and as serving deliberative democracy obscures its own value in endeavors to achieve social, economic, and environmental justice. Being sympathetic to Dupuis- D � ri � s work, I wish to make several, (...) interrelated conceptual and practical clarifications in order to bring back to the fore the fundamental importance of protest, in terms of contributions not to deliberative politics and deliberative democracy but to public discourse. (shrink)

Azərbaycan elm tarixini tədqiq edərkən dövrün tələbindən çıxış edilərək ərəb və fars dillərində yazılmış çoxlu əsərlərə rast gəlirik. Bu əsərlərdən biri də dahi alim Nəsirəddin Tusinin fars dilində məntiqə dair yazdığı Əsasül-iqtibas əsəridir. Əsər ilk dəfə 2022-ci ildə nəşr edilərək oxucu və tədqiqatçıların ixtiyarına verilmişdir. Əsasül-iqtibas əsəri XIII əsrin ortalarında yazılmışdır. Əsərin yazılmasından təqribən səkkiz əsrə yaxın vaxt keçmişdir. Bu müddət ərzində həmin əsərdə istifadə edilən bir sıra termin və sözlər artıq müasir fars dilində istifadə edilmir. Əsərin məntiqə aid olması (...) və həm də bir sıra sözlərin günümüzdə istifadə edilməməsi onun tərcüməsini çətinləşdirən amillər kimi qeyd etmək olar. Bundan əlavə burada istifadə edilən bəzi terminlərin gündəlik danışığımzda fərqli mənada istifadə edildiyindən həmin sözlərin və terminlərin izah edilməsi zərurəti yaranmışdır. Habelə orta əsr müəlliflərinin əsərlərinin tədqiqi zamanı eyni bir sözün müxtəlif müəlliflər tərəfindən fərqli mənalarda işlədildiyinin də şahidi oluruq ki, bu da həmin termin və anlayışların Azərbaycan dilinə tərcüməsi zamanı izahının verilməsinə ehtiyac yaradır. Hal-hazırda müraciət etdiyiniz bu kitab Nəsirəddin Tusinin ən mühüm və genişhəcmli əsərlərindən biri olan “Əsasül-iqtibas”-ın tərcüməsi zamanı əsərin orijinalında işlədilmiş ərəb-fars sözlərinin izahlı tərcüməsi yönündə tərtib edilmişdir. Bu lüğətlərin tərcüməsi və izahı ilə tanış olmaqla Nəsirəddin Tusinin ərəb-fars dillərində yazılmış digər əsərlərinin tərcüməsi zamanı da yararlanmaq olar. Müəyyən bir ixtisas və peşəni və ya həmin peşə və ixtisasa aid olan terminləri başa düşmək üçün həmin istiqamət üzrə tərtib edilən terminolji lüğətlərə ehtiyac duyulur. Bu istiqamətdə zaman-zaman müxtəlif ixtisaslar üzrə terminoloji lüğətlərin nəşr edildiyini müşahidə edirik. Azərbaycan dilində məntiqi terminlərin izahından ibarət xüsusi termonoloji lüğətlərin də tərtib edilməsi zərurəti vardır. Çünki məntiq terminlərinin izahınına adətən rus dilində yazılmış ədəbiyyatda, bir neçə terminin izahı verilmiş məntiq kitablarında və ya fəlsəfi terminlərdən ibarət ensiklopediya və lüğətlərdə rast gəlmək mümkündür. Bir tərəfdən, yaranmış boşluğu doldurmaq, digər tərəfdən isə məntiq ixtisası üzrə təhsil alan tələbə və mütəxəssislərə kömək etmək üçün bu lüğəti tərtib etmək qərarına gəldik. 222 sözün izah və tərcüməsindən ibarət olan bu kitabı həmin istiqamətdə olan boşluğu doldurmaq üçün kiçik və eyni zamanda mühüm bir addım hesab etmək olar. Burada sözlərin tərcüməsi ilə yanaşı bir sıra terminlərin izahı da verilmişdir. Əsasən Əsasül-iqtibas adlı məntiqi əsəri tərcümə edərkən qarşıya çıxan çətin və mürəkkəb sözlərin izahının verilməsinə üstünlük verilmişdir. Tərcümə zamanı müxtəlif illərdə nəşr edilən Əsasül-iqtibas əsərlərinə də müraciət edilmişdir. Bu əsərlərin bəzisində Əsasül-iqtibas əsərində istifadə edilən bəzi terminlərin izahı da verilmişdir. Bu izahlar bəzən tərcümə zamanı ifadənin daha səlis və daha dəqiq başa düşülməsinə imkan vermişdir. Bu lüğət kitabı tərtib edilərkən həmin əsərlərdə mövcud olan terminlər və onların izahından da istifadə edilmişdir. Bəzən məntiqi terminlərlə yanaşı kəlam, fəlsəfə və s. elmlərdə istifadə edilən terminləri də qeyd etmişik. Çünki bu terminlər bizə məntiqdə işlədilən bəzi ifadələrin daha asan başa düşülməsinə imkan verəcəkdir. “Əsasül-iqtibasa dair terminlər” lüğəti adlı bu kitabı bu sahədə atılmış ilk addımlardan biri olduğu üçün gələcəkdə daha sanballı və həcmcə daha geniş terminoloji lüğətlərin hazırlanması nəzərdə tutulur. (shrink)

“Buddizm” dünyada ən geniş yayılmış dinlərdən biri olaraq, eramızdan öncə VI əsrdə yaşamış Buddanın ərsəyə gətirdiyi dinin adıdır. Dünyada Buddanın inanclarını qəbul edənlərə buddist deyilir. Qeyd etmək lazımdır ki, Buddizmdə Budda tanrı yerinə qoyulur. Əslində isə Budda özünün insan olduğunu söyləmiş və ilahlıq iddiasında olmamışdır. Lakin ölümündən sonra ona tabe olanlar onu tanrılaşdırmış, adına məbədlər qurub ona sitayiş etmişlər. Buddizm meydana gəldiyi hindistanda, öz təsirini çoxdan itirmiş, induizm ilə əvəz olunmuşdur və hazırda hindistanda buddistlər əhalinin bir faizindən az hissəsini təşkil (...) edir. Buddizm Nepalda, Birmada, Tailandda, Seylonda, Kambocada, Laosda, Vyetnamda, Çində, Yaponiyada yayılmışdır, həmçinin Buryat, Kalmık və Tuva xalqları içərisində geniş yayılmışdır. (shrink)

For millennia, knowledge has eluded a precise definition. The industrialization of knowledge (IoK) and the associated proliferation of the so-called knowledge communities in the last few decades caused this state of affairs to deteriorate, namely by creating a trio composed of data, knowledge, and information (DIK) that is not unlike the aporia of the trinity in philosophy. This calls for a general theory of knowledge (ToK) that can work as a foundation for a science of knowledge (SoK) and additionally distinguishes (...) knowledge from both data and information. In this paper, I attempt to sketch this generality via the establishing of both knowledge structures and knowledge systems that can then be adopted/adapted by the diverse communities for the respective knowledge technologies and practices. This is achieved by means of a formal–indeed, mathematical–approach to epistemological matters a.k.a. formal epistemology. The corresponding application focus is on knowledge systems implementable as computer programs. (shrink)

Plüralizm latınca "plüralis" sözündən olub "çoxluq" deməkdir. Plüralizm ictimai-siyasi həyatda daim yarışda və rəqabət mübarizəsində olan, bir-birindən asılı və bununla yanaşı, muxtar olan sosial, siyasi qrupların, partiyaların, təşkilatların, ideyaların və baxışların çoxluğu mənasını verir. Plüralizmin siyasi, mədəni-mənəvi iqtisadi, sosial və s. növləri mövcuddur. Təbiətinə görə plüralizm cəmiyyətdə normal sosial-siyasi münasibətlərin dirçəlmə meyillərinin inkişafını stimullaşdırır, proseslər nəzarətə məruz qalmadan sərbəst, müstəqil şəkildə inkişaf edir. Plüralizm nəticəsində sosial-siyasi baxışların, əlaqələrin sayı artır ki, bu əlaqələrdən, istiqamətlərdən hər biri öz müxtariyyatına doğru inkişaf etməyə (...) başlayır. (shrink)

Bu kitapta, Ebû İshâk es-Saffâr’ın (öl. 534/1139) kelâmî görüşleri, Telḫîṣü’l-edille li-ḳavâʿidi’t-tevḥîd adlı eserinde Allah’ın isimlerinin anlamlarını açıklarken yaptığı yorumlar çerçevesinde ele alınmaktadır. Ebû İshâk es-Saffâr, 6./12. yüzyıl Hanefî-Mâtürîdî âlimlerinden biridir. Kelâma dair Telḫîṣü’l-edille eserinde esmâ-i hüsnâ konusuna ayrıntılı olarak yer vermektedir. İki cilt hâlinde yayımlanan bu eserin yaklaşık üçte birlik bir kısmını esmâ-i hüsnâ konusu oluşturmaktadır. Bu kısım incelendiğinde, Saffâr’ın Allah’ın varlığı, birliği ve sıfatları ile ilgili konular başta olmak üzere pek çok konuyu 175 esmâ-i hüsnâya dayanarak izah ettiği görülmektedir. (...) O, esmâ-i hüsnâ bölümünde yer vermediği bazı isimlere ise müstakil başlıklar altında değinmektedir. Örneğin el-Mütekkelim ismi kelâm sıfatını bağlamında ve halku’l-Kur’ân ile icâz’ul-Kur’ân gibi konularla ilişkili bir şekilde ele almaktadır. Bu isimler de listeye dahil edildiğinde sayı 178’e ulaşmaktadır. Bu durumda eserin yarısını esmâ-i hüsnâ konusu teşkil etmektedir. -/- Saffâr, esmâ-i hüsnâ bölümünde alfabetik bir sıra içerisinde ele aldığı ilâhî isimleri öncelikle lugavî (semantik) yönden izah etmektedir. Sonrasında ise değerlendirdiği ilahî ismi, bir kelâm konusu ile bağlantı kurarak kelâmî perspektifle açıklamaktadır Esmâ-i hüsnâ temelinde ele alınan konuların hilâfet meselesi hariç diğer kelâm bahislerini kapsadığı görülmektedir. Saffâr öncesi Hanefî-Mâtürîdî kelâm literatürü içinde esmâ-i hüsnânın bu kadar kapsamlı ele alındığı başka bir eser bilinmemektedir. -/- Bu kitap; üç ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. “Metodolojik Çerçeve” başlıklı giriş bölümünde çalışmanın konusu, önemi, amacı, yöntemi ve kaynakları hakkında bilgi verilmiştir. Birinci bölümde Saffâr’ın yaşadığı sosyokültürel çevre olan Mâverâünnehir bölgesi ile Buhara ve Merv şehirlerinin siyasî, sosyal ve dinî durumu ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. İkinci bölümde esmâ-i hüsna konusunun anlaşılmasına temel oluşturan isim, tesmiye, müsemmâ, sıfat ve vasf gibi kavramlar ile esmâ-i hüsnânın sayısı ve ihsâsı gibi kelâmî tartışmalara değinilmiştir. Sonrasında Saffâr öncesi dönemde kaleme alınan esmâ-i hüsnâ litaratürü hakkında bilgi verilmiştir. Bölüm sonuna Saffâr’ın rivayet ettiği 178 ilahî isme dair ayrıntılı bir tablo eklenmiştir. Üçüncü bölümde öncelikle, Saffâr’ın esmâ-i hüsnâyı izah ederken dikkate aldığı kelâmî ilkeler tespit edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Sonrasında ise Saffâr’ın Telḫîṣü’l-edille’de ilâhî isimleri açıklarken ortaya koyduğu kelâmî görüş ve değerlendirmeler belirlenerek sistematik bir şekilde kategorize edilmiştir. Bu kapsamda ele alınan her konunun sonuna ilgili ilâhî isimleri ve bağlantılı olduğu tartışmaları içeren tablolar eklenmiştir. Sonuç bölümünde ise Saffâr’ın esmâ-i hüsnâ anlayışına dayanan kelâm yöntemine dair ulaştığımız sonuçlara yer verilmiştir. Bu kitapta onun, esmâ-i hüsnânın %75’inde kelâmî yorumlarda bulunduğu ve bilgi-varlık bahsinden âhiret hayatına kadar bütün kelâm konularını esmâ-i hüsnâ ile bağlantılı yorumladığı tespit edilmiştir. Ulaşılan bu sonuçlar, Saffâr’ın kelâm anlayışının ilâhî isimlerin yorumuna dayandığını ortaya koymaktadır. [his book discusses the theological views of Abū Isḥāq al-Ṣaffār d. 534/1139), within the framework of his comments on the meanings of Allah’s names, provided in his work titled Talkhīṣ al-adilla. Abū Isḥāq al-Ṣaffār is one of the Ḥanafite-Māturīdite scholars in the 6th/12th century. In his work titled Talkhīṣ al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd on kalām, he spared extensive space for al-asmāʾ al-husnā. Approximately one third of this work, published in two volumes, is devoted to al-asmāʾ al-husnā. An examination of the related section reveals that al-Ṣaffār explains many issues, particularly those related to the existence, unity and attributes of Allah, based on 175 al-asmāʾ al-husnā. He mentions some of the names that he does not include in the al-asmāʾ al-husnā section under separate headings. For example, the name al-Mutakallim is addressed within the context of the attribute of kalām and in relation to subjects, such as the khalq al-Qurʾān and i‘jaz al-Qurʾān. Upon the addition of these names to the list, the number names reaches 178. This means that half of the work deals with the subject of al-asmāʾ al-husnā. -/- al-Ṣaffār lists the divine names in alphabetical order and explains them semantically in the chapter of al-asmāʾ al-husnā. Then he goes on to clarify each divine name through a theological lens with a specific reference to the subject of kalām. In the pre-Saffar Ḥanafite-Māturīdite theological literature, there is no other work that addresses al-asmāʾ al-husnā in such an extensive way. -/- This book consists of three main sections. The first section titled “Methodological Framework”, elaborates on the focus, significance, purpose and method of the study, along with the sources used. The first part describes the political, social and religious status of Transoxiana (Mā-warāʾ al-Nahr) region and the cities of Bukhara and Marw, the sociocultural environment in which Saffar lived. The second chapter addresses various concepts, which promote the understanding of al-asmāʾ al-husnā, such as name, tasmiya, musammā, attribute and qualification in addition to the theological debates such as the number and iḥṣāʾ of al-asmāʾ al-husnā. Then, it provides information about the al-asmāʾ al-husnā literature produced in the pre- Ṣaffār period. The end of each chapter comes with a detailed table with the 178 divine names mentioned by al-Ṣaffār. In the third chapter, the author initially discusses the theological principles that al-Ṣaffār considered while explaining the essence of al-asmāʾ al-husnā. This section also determines and systematically categorizes the theological views and evaluations put forward by al-Ṣaffār while explaining the divine names in Talkhīṣ al-adilla. The tables with the divine names and the related discussions can be seen at the end of the discussion for each subject. The last section presents the conclusions reached, regarding the kalām method based on al-Ṣaffār’s understanding of the essence of al-asmāʾ al-husnā. The present study revealed that he made theological interpretations in 75% of the al-asmāʾ al-husnā and interpreted all theological issues ranging from the subjects of knowledge and existence to the Afterlife in connection with the al-asmāʾ al-husnā. These results indicate that al-Ṣaffār's understanding of kalām is based on the interpretation of the divine names.]. (shrink)

Responsible innovation (RI), also termed Responsible Research and Innovation, has emerged due to increasing concern over how to integrate ethical and societal values into research and innovation policy and governance (Von Schomberg 2013), in response to questioning of the societal role of science as well as populist resurgence in some countries (Long and Blok 2017a). Within a RI approach, innovators must consider three dimensions of responsibility, including the dimensions of (1) ‘avoiding harm’ to people and the planet, (2) ‘doing good’ (...) through the offering of innovations that foster sustainable development, and (3) the development of facilitative global governance schemes (Voegtlin and Scherer 2017). (shrink)

Previous Responsible Innovation (RI) research has provided valuable insights on the value conflicts inherent to societally desirable innovation. By observing the responses of firms to these conflicts, Value-sensitive Absorptive Capacity (VAC) captures the organizational capabilities to become sensitive to these value conflicts and thus, innovate more responsibly. In this article, we construct a survey instrument to assess VAC, based on previous work by CSR and RI scholars. The construct and concurrent validity of the instrument were tested in an empirical study, (...) including 109 employees of 30 food manufacturing firms. The results from the survey were then compared with the conceptual VAC dimensions. With this comparison, we do not only contribute to the substantiation of the VAC construct, but we also show how inductive and deductive approaches can be combined to build theory regarding RI in a transdisciplinary manner. (shrink)

In order to strengthen RI in the private sector, it is imperative to understand how companies organise this process, where it takes place, and what considerations and motivations are central in the innovation process. In this chapter, the questions of whether and where normative considerations play a role in the innovation process, and whether dimensions of RI are present in the innovation process, are addressed. In order answer these research questions, a theoretical framework is developed based on Jones’s theory of (...) ethical decision making and Cooper’s stagegate model of innovation management. In order to answer the research questions, a specific case of innovations that contribute to public health is explored, namely, that of food companies that participate in a Front-of-Pack logo for healthier food. As the use of healthy food logos does not necessarily have a positive impact on sales and profits, it is expected that in the decision-making process, as part of their innovation process, companies make several trade-offs between economic, technical and moral factors. As the social-ethical values at stake in corporate innovation processes have remained to a large extent unexplored in research on innovation management, the aim of this chapter is to identify the motivations and barriers for companies embracing and continuing a FoP logo for healthier food, and to assess whether ethical considerations play a role in this innovation process. From the findings in this research, it will become clear that although the studied companies participated in a programme for healthy food and thus are responsive to the needs of society, and although the companies feel responsible for public health, ethical considerations do not play a central role in the operational innovation process. Instead, technical and economic considerations seem to prevail in the operational innovation process. Furthermore, none of the procedural dimensions of RI seems to be present at this level in the innovation trajectory. It is argued that this may be an indication that the ethical decision-making process for RI is not located at the level of the operational innovation process itself, but is something that might be located on a higher strategic level in the company. It is at this level that the moral decision is taken to adopt the FoP logo and to engage in the RI process. The findings cast a new light on the discourse on RI in general, and in the private sector in particular. (shrink)

The current challenges of implementing responsible innovation can in part be traced back to the assumptions behind the ways of thinking that ground the different pre-existing theories and approaches that are shared under the RI-umbrella. Achieving the ideals of RI, therefore not only requires a shift on an operational and systemic level but also at the paradigm-level. In order to develop a deeper understanding of this paradigm shift, this paper analyses the paradigm-level assumptions that are being brought forward by the (...) different conceptualizations of RI. To this purpose it deploys a pragmatic stance on paradigms that allows discerning ontological and axiological elements shared by the RI community and an accompanying critical hermeneutic research approach that enables the profiling of paradigmatic beliefs and assumptions of accounts of RI. The research surfaces the distance of four salient RI accounts from the currently dominant techno-economic innovation paradigm RI seeks to shift. With this, our contribution helps to raise the self-awareness of the RI community about their presuppositions and the paradigm level barriers and enablers to reaching the RI ideal. This insight is needed for a successful transition to responsible research and innovation practices. (shrink)

One of the main contentions of the framework for Responsible Innovation (RI) is that social and ethical aspects have to be addressed by deliberative engagement with stakeholders and the wider public throughout the innovation process. The aim of this article is to reflect on the question to what extent is deliberative engagement suitable for conducting RI in business. We discuss several tensions that arise when this framework is applied in the business context. Further, we analyse the place of deliberative engagement (...) in several theories of business ethics. We conclude that there remains a tension between the ideal of RI and the way in which the competitive market operates. Hence, RI scholars should reflect more critically on changes that are required in the market in order to make RI possible, modify the ideal of deliberative engagement for RI in business, or attempt to strike a balance between these two responses. (shrink)

In this article, we develop a concept of stakeholder dialogue in responsible innovation (RI) processes. The problem with most concepts of communication is that they rely on ideals of openness, alignment and harmony, even while these ideals are rarely realized in practice. Based on the work of Burke, Habermas, Deetz and Levinas, we develop a concept of stakeholder dialogue that is able to deal with fundamentally different interests and value frames of actors involved in RI processes. We distinguish four main (...) characteristics of stakeholder dialogue. Dialogical responsiveness (1) enhances self-criticism, (2) is characterized by the constitution and the destruction of the self or identity of the actors involved, (3) consists only in the actual enactment of the dialogue and (4) is primarily responsive to the grand challenges of our time. Based on our findings, we provide a novel conceptualization of the central notion of responsiveness in the RI literature. (shrink)

Analytic theologians have proposed numerous “solutions” to the Logical Problem of the Trinity (LPT), mostly versions of Social Trinitarianism (ST) and Relative Identity Trinitarianism (RI). Both types of solution are controversial, but many hold out hope that further “Trinitarian theorizing” may yield some as yet unimagined, and somehow importantly different, solution to the LPT. I first give a precise definition of the LPT and of what would count as a solution to it. I then show how, though there are infinitely (...) many possible solutions, all solutions can be grouped together into a finite, exhaustive taxonomy, based precisely on those features which make them either controversial, heretical, or inconsistent. The taxonomy reveals why ST and RI have been the major proposed solutions, and also proves that there can be no importantly different, new solutions to the LPT. (shrink)

Contrary to the tendency to harmony, consensus and alignment among stakeholders in most of the literature on participation and partnership in corporate social responsibility and responsible innovation practices, in this chapter we ask which concept of participation and partnership is able to account for stakeholder engagement while acknowledging and appreciating their fundamentally different judgements, value frames and viewpoints. To this end, we reflect on a non-reductive and ethical approach to stakeholder engagement, collaboration and partnership, inspired by the philosophy of Emmanuel (...) Levinas. We contrast a cognitive approach with an ethical approach to stakeholder engagement, collaboration and partnership, and explore four characteristics of this ethical approach. Based on the ethical approach to stakeholder engagement, collaboration and partnership, we also provide a three-stage framework for partnership formation in CSR and RI practices. (shrink)

Although both EU policy makers and researchers acknowledge that public or stakeholder engagement is important for responsible innovation (RI), empirical evidence in this field is still scarce. In this article, we explore to what extent companies with a disposition to innovate in a more responsible way are moving towards the ideal of mutual responsiveness among stakeholders, as it is presented in the RI literature. Based on interviews with companies and non-economic stakeholders in the Dutch Food industry, it can be concluded (...) that innovative food companies are still far from implementing the ideal of mutual responsiveness in a significant way. The tension between the call for the active involvement of stakeholders in the literature and actual stakeholder engagement practices is explained by identifying a number of critical issues regarding stakeholder engagement, which are specific to actors involved in RI in the private sector. Finally, management practices designed to deal with these critical issues regarding stakeholder engagement are identified. (shrink)

Praised as a panacea for resolving all societal issues, and self-evidently presupposed as technological innovation, the concept of innovation has become the emblem of our age. This is especially reflected in the context of the European Union, where it is considered to play a central role in both strengthening the economy and confronting the current environmental crisis. The pressing question is how technological innovation can be steered into the right direction. To this end, recent frameworks of Responsible Innovation focus on (...) how to enable outcomes of innovation processes to become societally desirable and ethically acceptable. However, questions with regard to the technological nature of these innovation processes are rarely raised. For this reason, this paper raises the following research question: To what extent is RI possible in the current age, where the concept of innovation is predominantly presupposed as technological innovation? On the one hand, we depart from a post-phenomenological perspective to evaluate the possibility of RI in relation to the particular technological innovations discussed in the RI literature. On the other hand, we emphasize the central role innovation plays in the current age, and suggest that the presupposed concept of innovation projects a techno-economic paradigm. In doing so, we ultimately argue that in the attempt to steer innovation, frameworks of RI are in fact steered by the techno-economic paradigm inherent in the presupposed concept of innovation. Finally, we account for what implications this has for the societal purpose of RI. (shrink)

Praised as a panacea for resolving all societal issues, and self-evidently presupposed as technological innovation, the concept of innovation has become the emblem of our age. This is especially reflected in the context of the European Union, where it is considered to play a central role in both strengthening the economy and confronting the current environmental crisis. The pressing question is how technological innovation can be steered into the right direction. To this end, recent frameworks of Responsible Innovation (RI) focus (...) on how to enable outcomes of innovation processes to become societally desirable and ethically acceptable. However, questions with regard to the technological nature of these innovation processes are rarely raised. For this reason, this paper raises the following research question: To what extent is RI possible in the current age, where the concept of innovation is predominantly presupposed as technological innovation? On the one hand, we depart from a post-phenomenological perspective to evaluate the possibility of RI in relation to the particular technological innovations discussed in the RI literature. On the other hand, we emphasize the central role innovation plays in the current age, and suggest that the presupposed concept of innovation projects a techno-economic paradigm. In doing so, we ultimately argue that in the attempt to steer innovation, frameworks of RI are in fact steered by the techno-economic paradigm inherent in the presupposed concept of innovation. Finally, we account for what implications this has for the societal purpose of RI. (shrink)

Whilе thе rоbust аnd pоsitivе аssоciаtiоn bеtwееn еducаtiоn аnd pоliticаl еngаgеmеnt hаs bееn widеly dоcumеntеd, thе dirеct cаusаl link is still а subjеct оf dеbаtе. This study cоntributеs tо thе оngоing dеbаtе by еxаmining whеthеr thеrе еxists а cаusаl еffеct оf еducаtiоn оn pоliticаl еngаgеmеnt. Explоiting thе plаusibly еxоgеnоus vаriаtiоn in еducаtiоn inducеd by thе cоmpulsоry schооling rеfоrms аcrоss 39 cоuntriеs, wе find thаt еducаtiоn cultivаtеs pоliticаl intеrеst, prоmоtеs thе аcquisitiоn оf pоliticаl knоwlеdgе, аnd fоstеrs suppоrtivе аttitudеs tоwаrds pоliticаl frееdоms. (...) Nеvеrthеlеss, thе bеttеr еducаtеd аrе nо mоrе likеly tо vоtе in еlеctiоns nоr аdоpt аny spеcific pоsitiоn in thе lеft-right pоliticаl spеctrum. (shrink)

It is hard to disagree with the idea of responsible innovation (henceforth, RI), as it enables policy-makers, scientists, technology developers, and the public to better understand and respond to the social, ethical, and policy challenges raised by new and emerging technologies. RI has gained prominence in policy agenda in Europe and the United States over the last few years. And, along with its rising importance in policy-making, there is also a burgeoning research literature on the topic. Given the historical context (...) of which RI emerges, it should not be surprising that the current discourse on RI is predominantly based on liberal democratic values. Yet, the bias towards liberal democratic values will inevitably limit the discussion of RI, especially in the cases where liberal democratic values are not taken for granted. As such, there is an urgent need to return to the normative foundation of RI, and to explore the notion of ‘responsible innovation’ from nonliberal democratic perspectives. Against this background, this paper seeks to demonstrate the problematic consequences of RI solely grounded on or justified by liberal democratic values. This paper will cast the argument in the form of a dilemma to be labelled as The Decent Nonliberal Peoples’ Dilemma and use it to illustrate the problems of the Western bias. (shrink)