Skepticism about the epistemic value of intuition in theoretical and philosophical inquiry has recently been bolstered by empirical research suggesting that people’s concrete-case intuitions are vulnerable to irrational biases (e.g., the order effect). What is more, skeptics argue that we have no way to ‘‘calibrate” our intuitions against these biases and no way of anticipating intuitional instability. This paper challenges the skeptical position, introducing data from two studies that suggest not only that people’s concrete-case intuitions are often stable, but also (...) that people have introspective awareness of this stability, providing a promising means by which to assess the epistemic value of our intuitions. (shrink)

No more intriguing and provoked subject is in science as the study of human giftedness. The great attention to this subject is understandable: a poem well written, an extraordinary painting, an overture well played, a brilliant scientific idea, or sports’ maneuver have always been attractive. Although studying of giftedness in visual arts and in music is very productive, the greatest body of recent research is in studies of intellectual giftedness.

In this article, there is a suggestion that the application of certain key concepts or procedures of Husserlian phenomenology can be helpful in the practice of therapy. It is well known that how a therapist is present to a client and his or her story is critical for the success of therapy. What is less clear, however, is how to address this "way of being" in therapy and what kinds of interventions are helpful to clients. In addressing some of these (...) difficult issues, the Husserlian concepts found to be helpful are Husserl's chief directive to go "back to the matters themselves," the distinction among real and irreal objects, presence to the order of phenomena, the phenomenal realm, the intentional-fulfilling-identifying nature of conscious acts, the phenomenological-psychological reduction, and the discovery and description of eidetic structures of experience. These fundamental philosophical distinctions are taken up within a psychological perspective and elaborated and used within a phenomenological psychological perspective. (shrink)

The study of the feeling of knowing may have implications for some of the metatheoretical issues concerning consciousness and control. Assuming a distinction between information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments, it is argued that the sheer phenomenological experience of knowing (''noetic feeling'') occupies a unique role in mediating between implicit-automatic processes, on the one hand, and explicit-controlled processes, on the other. Rather than reflecting direct access to memory traces, noetic feelings are based on inferential heuristics that operate implicitly and unintentionally. Once (...) such heuristics give rise to a conscious feeling that feeling can then affect controlled action. Examination of the cues that affect noetic feelings suggest that not only do these feelings inform controlled action, but they are also informed by feedback from the outcome of that action. (shrink)