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  1. Time Travel and Time Machines.Douglas Kutach - 2013 - In Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Blackwell.
    Thinking about time travel is an entertaining way to explore how to understand time and its location in the broad conceptual landscape that includes causation, fate, action, possibility, experience, and reality. It is uncontroversial that time travel towards the future exists, and time travel to the past is generally recognized as permitted by Einstein’s general theory of relativity, though no one knows yet whether nature truly allows it. Coherent time travel stories have added flair to traditional debates over the metaphysical (...)
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  • Time Travel Without Causal Loops.Bradley Monton - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):54-67.
    It has sometimes been suggested that backwards time travel always incurs causal loops. I show that this is mistaken, by describing worlds where backwards time travel occurs and yet no causal loops occur. Arguments that backwards time travel can occur without causal loops have been given before in the literature, but I show that those arguments are unconvincing.
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  • Presentism, Continuous Time-Travel and the Phenomenology of Passage.Sam Baron & David Braddon-Mitchell - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    We argue that a certain variety of presentist time travel ends up significantly undermining the motivational foundations which lead some, but not all, presentists to their view. We suggest that if presentism is motivated by phenomenology, and part of that phenomenology is that it’s an experiential datum that we experience temporal passage, then the basis for believing presentism is less secure than we might have thought.
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  • Presentism, Atemporality, and Time’s Way.Brian Leftow - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (2):173-194.
    After defining presentism, I consider four arguments that presentism and divine atemporality are incompatible. I identify an assumption common to the four, ask what reason there is to consider it true, and argue against it.
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  • What Time-Travel Teaches Us About Future-Bias.Kristie Miller - 2021 - Philosophies 6 (38):38.
    Future-biased individuals systematically prefer positively valenced events to be in the future (positive future-bias) and negatively valenced events to be in the past (negative future-bias). The most extreme form of future-bias is absolute future-bias, whereby we completely discount the value of past events when forming our preferences. Various authors have thought that we are absolutely future-biased (Sullivan (2018:58); Parfit (1984:173) and that future-bias (absolute or otherwise) is at least rationally permissible (Prior (1959), Hare (2007; 2008), Kauppinen (2018), Heathwood (2008)). The (...)
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  • In Defense of the Compossibility of Presentism and Time Travel.Thomas Hall - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (2):141-159.
    In this paper I defend the compossibility of presentism and time travel from two objections. One objection is that the presentist’s model of time leaves nowhere to travel to; the second objection attempts to equate presentist time travel with suicide. After targeting some misplaced scrutiny of the first objection, I show that presentists have the resources to account for the facts that make for time travel on the traditional Lewisian view. In light of this ability, I argue that both of (...)
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  • Presentism and Black Holes.Geurt Sengers - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (1):1-15.
    In a recent publication in the European Journal for Philosophy of Science, Romero and Pérez claim to reveal new trouble for the already difficult life of presentism in relativistic spacetimes. Their argument purports to demonstrate the impossibility of postulating a viable present in the presence of black holes, in particular the Schwarzschild geometries. I argue that their argument is flawed, and that the Schwarzschild geometries they consider offer no novel threats to presentism. However, if we consider more general black holes, (...)
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  • Presentists Should Not Believe in Time TravelPresentists Should Not Believe in Time Travel.Takeshi Sakon - 2021 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 53 (2):191-213.
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  • Time Machines.John Earman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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