Analyzing two key figures in Elif Shafak’s novel The Island of Missing Trees—a schoolgirl’s scream and a narrating fig tree—this essay analyzes the intersection between susceptibility and resilience, particularly as these terms are developed in psychology, trauma studies, and ecology. I argue that the novel’s resonant scream critiques the discourse of psychological resilience on multiple counts: its inadequacy as a response to complex trauma, its focus on autonomous individuals, its assumption that responsibility for resilience rests on victims rather than perpetrators (...) of harm, its construction of a “resistance imperative” and its disavowal of the inequalities in access to resilience-building resources. By contrast, the novel’s fig tree, I contend, exemplifies an ecological model of resilience rooted in a recognition of the interdependence of the multiple and diverse organisms that comprise an ecosystem, and of susceptibility as an advantageous suite of capacities that are crucial to resilience. These contrasting conceptions of resilience lead me to advocate for a politics of susceptibility, an eco-psychosocial politics based on the recognition that individuals cannot become resilient on their own, through their own volition, intention, or “self-efficacy”, and that focuses instead on building systemic and sustainable forms of resilience inclusive of the diverse subjects that comprise a community, society or ecosystem; that, rather than fetishizing independence, liberty and rights, fortifies interdependence and reinforces mutual responsibilities; and that rather than exploiting susceptibility as a weakness, nurtures it as the soul of resilience itself. (shrink)

This paper explores the intersection between affect, emotion, social imaginaries, and institutions through the lens of epistemic power in the academy. It argues that attending to this intersection is critical for a fuller understanding of how affective and emotional dynamics can assist to entrench, but also disrupt, asymmetries of epistemic privilege that cut across lines of race, sex, and other markers of social difference. As part of this discussion the paper reflects on the possibility of intervening in dominant social imaginaries (...) that become sedimented in the routine operations of the modern university, and which produce affective ecologies that sustain epistemic exclusions within academic institutions. (shrink)

Ideas of love within religion are usually driven by one of two mythologies – either a personal God who commands love or a mystical God of ineffable love – but both are inadequate for motivating love of neighbour. The first tends towards legalism and the second offers no cognitive guidance. The situation is further complicated by there being different understandings of love of neighbour in the various Abrahamic religions, as exemplified in the approaches of two philosophers, Søren Kierkegaard and Emmanuel (...) Levinas. A better approach is therefore to explore actual practices of love in everyday life, and to discover how love might be performed openly and creatively. One such practice is recognition of vulnerability, and this too is often driven by a mythology, in this case one marked by fear, and by a violence either imposed or avoided. One paradigmatic example is the vulnerability felt by speakers, especially women, in front of an audience. A turning from wilful ignorance of vulnerability and a turning to reliance on collective work, modelled on an awareness of mutual vulnerability and openness to the unknown, will help to change our philosophical and social imaginary. The dark myth of vulnerability can be transformed into finding opportunities in vulnerability for openness to affection and so to an enhancement of life. It is only from the perspective of this new imaginary, and from everyday practices of it, that the double love-command – love of God and love of neighbour – will function as any kind of common ground between religions. (shrink)

The last writings of Pamela Sue Anderson dwell in some depth on the facts of “mutual vulnerability” and “precarious life,” whether at a practical level or in philosophical argument. This topic can be considered in relation to the founding values of “philosophy” in the tradition we inherit from Plato. Although military imagery (immunity to attack etc.) is foregrounded in the Platonic conception of “dialectic” – that is, conversation or dialogue in a specialized sense, capable of leading to the stable possession (...) of truth – we should also remember the more ordinary (imperfect, incomplete) prototype of conversation from which this idealized version emerges: conversation as exemplified by the sacrificial figure of Socrates, who claims not to know anything. The present paper suggests that there are these two sides to the classic dialectical encounter: aporia itself, along with the ambition to escape from aporia – to be no longer at a loss. But it also considers why, in that case, writers such as Anderson (or like Judith Butler) should still find so much potential in the theme of “precarity.” This question returns us to the institutional critique of philosophy: to a mismatch between (1) the moment of vulnerability inherent in the discipline a priori, and (2) the lived experience of vulnerability about which some practitioners of the subject – namely women and other disadvantaged groups – know so much more than others. (shrink)

A positive reconceptualization of vulnerability involves a number of levels of inquiry; arguably, a fundamental or, at least, central level is the phenomenology of vulnerability with which I am concerned in my paper. By drawing on existential phenomenology and by engaging with Pamela Sue Anderson’s positive account of vulnerability, I develop a phenomenological conception of vulnerability as “openness” and pursue it in new directions which connect it to the metaphysics and epistemology of vulnerability. This approach brings to the fore the (...) possibility of resilience in the face of serious adversities which affect our lives, and draws some ethical implications in relation to this. I engage with recent work in the area of the phenomenology of illness to elaborate certain parts of the investigation. (shrink)