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  1. Common Knowledge and Argumentation Schemes .Fabrizio Macagno & Douglas Walton - 2005 - Studies in Communication Sciences 5 (2):1-22.
    We argue that common knowledge, of the kind used in reasoning in law and computing is best analyzed using a dialogue model of argumentation (Walton & Krabbe 1995). In this model, implicit premises resting on common knowledge are analyzed as endoxa or widely accepted opinions and generalizations (Tardini 2005). We argue that, in this sense, common knowledge is not really knowledge of the kind represent by belief and/or knowledge of the epistemic kind studied in current epistemology. This paper takes a (...)
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  • Common Knowledge, Common Attitudes and Social Reasoning.Richmond H. Thomason - 2021 - Bulletin of the Section of Logic 50 (2):229-247.
    For as long as there have been theories about common knowledge, they have been exposed to a certain amount of skepticism. Recent more sophisticated arguments question whether agents can acquire common attitudes and whether they are needed in social reasoning. I argue that this skepticism arises from assumptions about practical reasoning that, considered in themselves, are at worst implausible and at best controversial. A proper approach to the acquisition of attitudes and their deployment in decision making leaves room for common (...)
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  • Common knowledge revisited.Ronald Fagin, Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses & Moshe Y. Vardi - 1999 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 96 (1-3):89-105.
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  • Being realistic about common knowledge: a Lewisian approach.Cedric Paternotte - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):249-276.
    Defined and formalized several decades ago, widely used in philosophy and game theory, the concept of common knowledge is still considered as problematic, although not always for the right reasons. I suggest that the epistemic status of a group of human agents in a state of common knowledge has not been thoroughly analyzed. In particular, every existing account of common knowledge, whether formal or not, is either too strong to fit cognitively limited individuals, or too weak to adequately describe their (...)
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