At the very end of Plato's Philebus Socrates and Protarchus place the goods of a human life in a hierarchy (66a-67b). Previous interpretations of this passage have concentrated upon its relevance to the good human life, including the allowance of (true and pure) pleasures. This view picks up Plato's metaphor of a mixture of reason and pleasure, but the ranking of the goods is emphatically a vertical stratification and not a mixture in which all elements are equally fundamental. In this (...) article I argue that each and all of the higher ranked goods are necessary conditions for the goods of the level immediately below. The ranking represents an attempt to identify as far as possible what is responsible for the characteristics of the good in human life, and therefore to narrow down the definition of the good itself. (shrink)

What does Plato mean when he declares at Soph. 250b8 that Theaetetus is positing Being in his soul (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τιθείς) as a third something encompassing Change and Rest? Is he merely clarifying that the act of positing is a mental act? Or is he making a further point? This paper argues that the locution ‘in the soul’ plays a significant role in the passage in alerting to a contrast between the way Being and its relation to Change and (...) Rest are intelligible to Theaetetus and the way Being really is and relates to those two other kinds. This interpretation is set against another interpretation, defended by Leigh, according to which the phrase should be understood as drawing a contrast between what is done by the agency of the soul and what is done by the agency of the body. The paper then explores the consequences of the proposed interpretation for our understanding of the broader context of the passage. In particular, it argues that the claim that Being is a third something encompassing Change and Rest is more problematic than critics have usually assumed. To account for Theaetetus’ depiction, it develops the notion of ‘conceived parthood’, which are part-whole relations posited by the mind for the needs of a philosophical enquiry. (shrink)

Plato’s invention of the metaphor of carving the world by the joints gives him a privileged place in the history of natural kind theory in philosophy and science; he is often understood to present a paradigmatic but antiquated view of natural kinds as possessing eternal, immutable, necessary essences. Yet, I highlight that, as a point of distinction from contemporary views about natural kinds, Plato subscribes to an intelligent-design, teleological framework, in which the natural world is the product of craft and, (...) as a result, is structured such that it is good for it to be that way. In Plato’s Philebus, the character Socrates introduces a method of inquiry whose articulation of natural kinds enables it to confer expert knowledge, such as literacy. My paper contributes to an understanding of Plato’s view of natural kinds by interpreting this method in light of Plato’s teleological conception of nature. I argue that a human inquirer who uses the method identifies kinds with relational essences within a system causally related to the production of some unique craft-object, such as writing. As a result, I recast Plato’s place in the history of philosophy, including Plato’s view of the relation between the kinds according to the natural and social sciences. Whereas some are inclined to separate natural from social kinds, Plato holds the unique view that all naturalness is a social feature of kinds reflecting the role of intelligent agency. (shrink)

Plato’sPhilebusfamously combines a deliberation on the virtuous life as a balancing act between prudence and pleasure with a theory of the composition of mixtures from limit and limitedness. The latter aspect of the dialogue is used by the Neoplatonic philosopher Proclus as a basis for his own metaphysical analysis of the ultimate first principle, the One, and the manner in which it produces all things which exist. Multiple scholarly analyses have been provided of Proclus’ use of the Phileban theory of (...) limit and the unlimited for his description of the first principle’s creation process. However, this paper shows that Proclus reads thePhilebusnot merely for its discussion of limit and unlimited, but also for its description of the good life. After all, the Neoplatonic One is also the Good from Plato’sRepublic. InPhil. 20d1–11, Socrates suggest that the good is perfect, sufficient, and desirable. Proclus’Commentary on the RepublicandPlatonic Theologyreveal that these three aspects of the good provide Proclus with a framework to describe the Neoplatonic first principlequaGood. In Proclus’ view, the three Phileban concepts constitute the base elements of the good which reappear in all of its manifestations, and thus link the good in us to the transcendent and unqualified Good: the desirable element represents the good’s singularity and its position as the centre around which all beings circle; the sufficient element represents the non-reciprocal bestowal of existence and generative power by any form of the good upon its participants; lastly, the perfect element reverts all creatures to the good in which they participate, even when not all genera of beings in the Neoplatonic universe are equally capable of such participation. Furthermore, Proclus uses the description of the good life as not merely intellectual from thePhilebusto fortify his arguments in disagreements with other Neoplatonic commentators regarding the transcendence of the Good over the intelligible principles, and conversely employs the Neoplatonic definition of the first principle to affirm the ethics of the Platonic dialogue. Thus, although Proclus’ primary goal in reading thePhilebusis to obtain knowledge of the ultimate first principle, Socrates’ analysis of the virtuous life in the dialogue is just as important for his purposes as the theory of mixtures. (shrink)

J’examine dans cet article le double aspect sous lequel la loi se trouve discutée par l’Étranger dans le Politique : si elle fait tout d’abord l’objet d’une critique sévère au nom d’une science idéale, elle est ensuite réhabilitée à titre de substitut à l’idéal défaillant. Cette réhabilitation est complexe : elle passe par un étrange récit de politique-fiction qui fait écho sans le dire à Thucydide et qui permet à l’Étranger de lier dans un même procès écriture juridique et écriture (...) spéculative ; elle se développe ensuite moyennant une série d’arguments qui insistent sur le nécessaire respect de la loi indépendamment de son contenu et de sa pertinence, mais qui indiquent aussi implicitement la nécessité de lui attribuer une origine mythique dans une connaissance divine devenue inaccessible. Le Politique signe l’acte de naissance de la fiction théologico-politique.I explore in this paper the dual aspect of the Eleatic Visitor’s discussion of law in the Statesman. Although it is at first severely criticized on behalf of an ideal science, it is then rehabilitated as a substitute for the failing ideal. But this rehabilitation is a complex one : it is made via a very peculiar account of political fiction echoing implicitly Thucydides and allowing the Eleatic Visitor to put on the same trial legal and speculative writing. Then it develops by using several arguments, insisting on the necessary respect due to the law, whatever content and relevance it may have, but yet implicitly pointing out the need to confer a mythic origin to law within the context of divine knowledge now impervious to men. Thus Plato’s Statesman pioneers theological political fiction. (shrink)

This paper extracts and articulates the account of normativity in Plato’s Philebus. Central to this account is the concept of measure, which plays both an ontological and a normative role. With regard to the former, measure is what makes particular things to be the specific kind of thing they are; with regard to the latter, measure supplies the appropriate standard for determining whether or not those things are good or bad instances of their kind. As a result of measure playing (...) these two roles, normative evaluation is grounded in the ontological structure of the thing being evaluated. (shrink)