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Grounding the normative: a problem for structured non-naturalism

Philosophical Studies 177 (1):173-196 (2020)

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Why We Should Not Worry about the Triviality of Normative Supervenience.Vilma Venesmaa & Teemu Toppinen - 2023 - Ethics 133 (3):355-380.details A common worry regarding normative supervenience theses is that they are easily trivialized unless we somehow restrict the set of descriptive base properties on which the normative properties supervene. The idea is that if all descriptive properties are included in the base, any two individuals that share all their base properties must be the same individual in the same world, from which it follows that they have the same normative properties. We argue that this trivial explanation for unrestricted normative supervenience (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Normative principles and the nature of mind-dependence.Justin Morton - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1153-1176.details One of the most fundamental debates in metaethics is whether the normative facts are mind-dependent. Yet some philosophers are skeptical that mind-dependence is a category that's significant in the way metaethicists have assumed it is. In this paper, I consider a puzzle that showcases this skepticism, explaining how it undermines the most natural reading of the mind-dependence claim. I then go on to show that no modification of this reading within a certain class can hope to solve the problem. I (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Grounding Thick Normative Facts.Justin Morton - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):408-431.details Many philosophers have been concerned with the nature of thick normative concepts. In this paper, I try to motivate a different project: understanding the nature of thick normative properties and facts. I propose a ground-theoretic approach to this project. I then argue that some of the simplest and most initially plausible ways of understanding thick facts fail, and that we are forced to accept some initially implausible views. I try to show how these views are not so implausible after all. Download Export citation Bookmark
A new argument for moral error theory.Christopher Cowie - 2022 - Noûs 56 (2):276-294.details Traditional arguments for moral error theory are based on identifying a problem with the metaphysics of moral properties. I provide a new argument that is based on the inconsistency of first‐order moral judgments. I illustrate this using impossibility results in population axiology. Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Nomic moral naturalness.Alexios Stamatiadis-Bréhier - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.details Moral realists often disagree about the nature of moral properties. These properties can be natural (as per naturalistic moral realism) or non-natural. But it is unclear how we should understand the notion of naturalness employed in these discussions. In this paper I propose a novel account of moral naturalness. I suggest that a property F is natural iff F falls within the scope of a natural law. In turn, a law is natural when it figures in a nomic nexus involving (...) the laws of physics. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations

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