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On the Meaning of Connectives (Apropos of a Non-Necessitarianist Challenge).Luis Estrada-González - 2011 - Logica Universalis 5 (1):115-126.details According to logical non-necessitarianism, every inference may fail in some situation. In his defense of logical monism, Graham Priest has put forward an argument against non-necessitarianism based on the meaning of connectives. According to him, as long as the meanings of connectives are fixed, some inferences have to hold in all situations. Hence, in order to accept the non-necessitarianist thesis one would have to dispose arbitrarily of those meanings. I want to show here that non-necessitarianism can stand, without disposing arbitrarily (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations
Observations on the Trivial World.Zach Weber & Hitoshi Omori - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):975-994.details A world is trivial if it makes every proposition true all at once. Such a world is impossible, an absurdity. Our world, we hope, is not an absurdity. It is important, nevertheless, for semantic and metaphysical theories that we be able to reason cogently about absurdities—if only to see that they are absurd. In this note we describe methods for ‘observing’ absurd objects like the trivial world without falling in to incoherence, using some basic techniques from modal logic. The goal (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Trivial Languages.Arvid Båve - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):1-17.details I here present and defend what I call the Triviality Theory of Truth, to be understood in analogy with Matti Eklund’s Inconsistency Theory of Truth. A specific formulation of is defended and compared with alternatives found in the literature. A number of objections against the proposed notion of meaning-constitutivity are discussed and held inconclusive. The main focus, however, is on the problem, discussed at length by Gupta and Belnap, that speakers do not accept epistemically neutral conclusions of Curry derivations. I (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
An Interpretation of Łukasiewicz’s 4-Valued Modal Logic.José M. Méndez, Gemma Robles & Francisco Salto - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (1):73-87.details A simple, bivalent semantics is defined for Łukasiewicz’s 4-valued modal logic Łm4. It is shown that according to this semantics, the essential presupposition underlying Łm4 is the following: A is a theorem iff A is true conforming to both the reductionist and possibilist theses defined as follows: rt: the value of modal formulas is equivalent to the value of their respective argument iff A is true, etc.); pt: everything is possible. This presupposition highlights and explains all oddities arising in Łm4. Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations

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