Despite extensive discussion of naïve realism in the wider philosophical literature, those influenced by the phenomenological movement who work in the philosophy of perception have hardly weighed in on the matter. It is thus interesting to discover that Edmund Husserl’s close philosophical interlocutor and friend, the early twentieth-century phenomenologist Johannes Daubert, held the naive realist view. This article presents Daubert’s views on the fundamental nature of perceptual experience and shows how they differ radically from those of Husserl’s. The author argues, (...) in conclusion, that Daubert’s views are superior to those of Husserl’s specifically in the way that they deal with the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. (shrink)

The Buddhist vision of liberation is intimately related with an experiential state that transcends intentionality, temporality and causality, owing to its non-directed, unchanging and unconditioned nature. As such, this vision reveals a novel mode of non-dual awareness, which is not divided into perceiving subject and perceived objects. In order to directly recognise this mode, several Buddhist traditions utilised diverse contemplative instructions that were meant to dissolve the intending tendencies of consciousness. This paper discusses one of these traditions – ‘The Great (...) Perfection’ – which affirms an inherent experiential state that is open, luminous and all-encompassing. For the sake of realising such a state, this tradition advocates a contemplative approach which emphasises relaxation, spaciousness and non-intending. Through its view and practices, ‘The Great Perfection’ introduces a vision of lived experience that goes beyond the structures of intentional consciousness and entails a reassessment of our basic assumptions about human awareness. (shrink)

Las consideraciones del filósofo Herbert Paul Grice en el campo de la pragmática marcaron un punto de inflexión en la historia de la filosofía. Ellas siguen siendo de enorme utilidad, y la interpretación de sus escritos está abierta a discusión. Sin embargo, el análisis de Grice en términos de las intenciones de los hablantes ha dado pie a que se interprete su programa como una postura compatible con el naturalismo de la intencionalidad. Sin embargo, esta interpretación tiene serios problemas. En (...) el presente trabajo presentaremos la posición de Grice y la interpretación naturalista de su diagnóstico, señalaremos las objeciones a esta última desde el expresivismo clásico, y defenderemos que puede hacerse una interpretación de Grice más consistente con su pensamiento y capaz de esquivar las críticas del expresivismo. (shrink)

The phenomenon of ‘Knowing’ has a crucial role in Buddhist explanations about the determination of individual realities. According to these explanations particular modes of knowing are connected to specific ways of perceiving and, even, constituting reality. As the ideal state of reality according to Buddhist doctrine is that of an unconditioned liberation, numerous traditions have examined and described the mode of knowing which characterizes such a state. Among these, we find several traditions that related such a mode with a claim (...) concerning the innateness of an unconditioned state. This paper is meant to discuss some of these traditions, mainly ‘The Great Perfection’, a Tibetan non-dual tradition that asserted a mode of primordial knowing which is present in each moment of awareness. By discussing the intuitive qualities of this mode, we aim to show how an inherent mode of non-dual awareness can be explained through a comprehensive description of the basic aspects of lived experience. (shrink)

Levinas is usually discussed as a philosopher wrestling with the nature of our experience of others, ethical obligation, and the divine. Unlike other phenomenologists, such as Husserl and Heidegger, he is not often mentioned in discussions about issues in philosophy of mind. His work in that area, especially on perception, is underappreciated. He gives an account of the nature of perceptual experience that is remarkable both in how it departs from that of others in the phenomenological tradition and for how (...) it fits in among presently available views about the nature of perceptual experience, namely, as a form of naïve realism. (shrink)

There is a longstanding debate among Husserl scholars about whether Husserl thinks perception involves mental representation. The debate, I believe, has not been settled. I deny that the existentialist-inspired charge of representationalism about perception in Husserl is precise enough to stick. Given a clearer understanding of just what mental representation amounts to, I contend that those who defend Husserl against the accusation of representationalism fare little better than Husserl's existentialist-leaning critics. I argue that he is in fact a representationalist about (...) perception insofar as it involves a noematic sense. Nevertheless, Husserl opens up the possibility for a representation-free form of perceiving in certain later discussions of the matter in which he suggests that some perceptual states lack noematic sense. What they lack in noematic sense is compensated for by other means, namely, by two sorts of affect and their functional interrelation with abilities for bodily movement. The texts that entertain this possibility, though, severely limit the scope of its actual occurrence. Husserl never commits to a generally or substantially nonrepresentational view of perception. I attempt to sketch out, however, what this nonrepresentationalism about perception that Husserl nearly landed on might look like, rearranging various more or less familiar elements already present in his theory of perception to that end. (shrink)