A counterpossible is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Counterpossibles present a puzzle for standard theories of counterfactuals, which predict that all counterpossibles are semantically vacuous. Moreover, counterpossibles play an important role in many debates within metaphysics and epistemology, including debates over grounding, causation, modality, mathematics, science, and even God. In this article, we will explore various positions on counterpossibles as well as their potential philosophical consequences.

Several theists, including Linda Zagzebski, have claimed that theism is somehow committed to nonvacuism about counterpossibles. Even though Zagzebski herself has rejected vacuism, she has offered an argument in favour of it, which Edward Wierenga has defended as providing strong support for vacuism that is independent of the orthodox semantics for counterfactuals, mainly developed by David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. In this paper I show that argument to be sound only relative to the orthodox semantics, which entails vacuism, and give (...) an example of a semantics for counterfactuals countenancing impossible worlds for which it fails. (shrink)

In this essay I address the contemporary discussion of the problem of omnipotence and God's ability to sin, or POGAS. After some preliminary distinctions I distinguish three versions of the problem. I argue that two versions pose genuine problems for the the traditional Judeo-Christian concept of God. One of these versions is shown to be equivalent to the modal problem of evil. This version of the problem relies on a standard definition of omnipotence and the claim that there are some (...) states of affairs such that necessarily it is not morally permissible for anyone to bring them about. ;In the middle portion of the essay I look at several proposed solutions to POGAS that involve the concept of omnipotence. The radical omnipotence theory holds that an omnipotent being can bring about any state of affairs including impossible ones; it is rejected because the intellectual cost is too high. Next I distinguish two other approaches to redefining omnipotence. One approach is a Thomist approach. This involves defining omnipotence as the ability to bring about all metaphysically possible states of affairs. To solve POGAS those in the Thomist tradition further restrict those states of affairs that an omnipotent being can be expected to be capable of bringing about. Secondly, I address several Anselmian understandings of omnipotence An Anselmian understanding of omnipotence is one which allows that there may be possible states of affairs which an omnipotent being cannot bring about. However, an omnipotent being must be such that it can do whatever it wills and such that nothing can control it. These Anselmian solutions reveal a further problem, the problem of necessary omnipotence, or PONO. PONO shows that, on a plausible understanding of omnibenevolence, it is impossible for any being to be necessarily omnibenevolent. Finally I argue that both POGAS and PONO can be solved by adopting an Anselmian understanding of omnipotence as well as a revised understanding of omnibenevolence which allows that morally significant alternatives may involve only morally permissible options. (shrink)

It seems that the teachings of orthodox Christian doctrine may actually suggest that Jesus' life does not provide a useful moral example for the rest of us. The traditional doctrine of the Incarnation states that Jesus was fully human and fully God. The Bible says that Jesus was "tempted in every way that we are, yet without sin." But someone who is "fully God" cannot possibly sin, since one of God's attributes is necessary moral perfection. And yet to say that (...) someone was tempted to sin seems to imply, in a commonsensical way, that it was possible for that person to sin. I call this the "Temptation Problem". ;A number of philosophers and theologians have considered this problem or problems very much like it. I consider the proposed solutions to this apparent difficulty of Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, R. L. Sturch, and Thomas V. Morris. Each of their solutions fails, I argue, although each of them presents an interesting way of dealing with the seemingly incompatible human and divine attributes of Jesus. (shrink)