Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Three Rationales for a Legal Right to Mental Integrity.Thomas Douglas & Lisa Forsberg - 2021 - In S. Ligthart, D. van Toor, T. Kooijmans, T. Douglas & G. Meynen (eds.), Neurolaw: Advances in Neuroscience, Justice and Security. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Many states recognize a legal right to bodily integrity, understood as a right against significant, nonconsensual interference with one’s body. Recently, some have called for the recognition of an analogous legal right to mental integrity: a right against significant, nonconsensual interference with one’s mind. In this chapter, we describe and distinguish three different rationales for recognizing such a right. The first appeals to case-based intuitions to establish a distinctive duty not to interfere with others’ minds; the second holds that, if (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Incarceration, Direct Brain Intervention, and the Right to Mental Integrity – a Reply to Thomas Douglas.Jared N. Craig - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (2):107-118.
    In recent years, direct brain interventions have shown increased success in manipulating neurobiological processes often associated with moral reasoning and decision-making. As current DBIs are refined, and new technologies are developed, the state will have an interest in administering DBIs to criminal offenders for rehabilitative purposes. However, it is generally assumed that the state is not justified in directly intruding in an offender’s brain without valid consent. Thomas Douglas challenges this view. The state already forces criminal offenders to go to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Media Portrayal of a Landmark Neuroscience Experiment on Free Will.Eric Racine, Valentin Nguyen, Victoria Saigle & Veljko Dubljevic - 2017 - Science and Engineering Ethics 23 (4):989-1007.
    The concept of free will has been heavily debated in philosophy and the social sciences. Its alleged importance lies in its association with phenomena fundamental to our understandings of self, such as autonomy, freedom, self-control, agency, and moral responsibility. Consequently, when neuroscience research is interpreted as challenging or even invalidating this concept, a number of heated social and ethical debates surface. We undertook a content analysis of media coverage of Libet’s et al.’s :623–642, 1983) landmark study, which is frequently interpreted (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Neurolaw and Neuroprediction: Potential Promises and Perils.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):631-642.
    Neuroscience has been proposed for use in the legal system for purposes of mind reading, assessment of responsibility, and prediction of misconduct. Each of these uses has both promises and perils, and each raises issues regarding the admissibility of neuroscientific evidence.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • A Proposal for a Scientifically-Informed and Instrumentalist Account of Free Will and Voluntary Action.Eric Racine - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Free will and mental disorder: Exploring the relationship.Gerben Meynen - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (6):429-443.
    A link between mental disorder and freedom is clearly present in the introduction of the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). It mentions “an important loss of freedom” as one of the possible defining features of mental disorder. Meanwhile, it remains unclear how “an important loss of freedom” should be understood. In order to get a clearer view on the relationship between mental disorder and (a loss of) freedom, in this article, I will explore (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Stephen Morse on the Fundamental Psycho-Legal Error.Michael S. Moore - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (1):45-89.
    Stephen Morse has long proclaimed there to be a “fundamental psycho-legal error” that is regularly made by legal and social/psychological/medical science academics alike. This is the error of thinking that causation of human choice by factors themselves outside the chooser’s control excuses that chooser from moral responsibility. In this paper, I examine Morse’s self-labelled “internalist” defense of his thesis that this is indeed an error, and finds such internalist defense incomplete; needed is the kind of externalist defense of Morse’s thesis (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Exploring the similarities and differences between medical assessments of competence and criminal responsibility.Gerben Meynen - 2009 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 12 (4):443-451.
    The medical assessments of criminal responsibility and competence to consent to treatment are performed, developed and debated in distinct domains. In this paper I try to connect these domains by exploring the similarities and differences between both assessments. In my view, in both assessments a decision-making process is evaluated in relation to the possible influence of a mental disorder on this process. I will argue that, in spite of the relevance of the differences, both practices could benefit from the recognition (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Legal responsibility adjudication and the normative authority of the mind sciences.Nicole A. Vincent - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):315-331.
    In the field of ?neurolaw?, reformists claim that recent scientific discoveries from the mind sciences have serious ramifications for how legal responsibility should be adjudicated, but conservatives deny that this is so. In contrast, I criticise both of these polar opposite positions by arguing that although scientific findings can have often-weighty normative significance, they lack the normative authority with which reformists often imbue them. After explaining why conservatives and reformists are both wrong, I then offer my own moderate suggestions about (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • A Compatibilist Theory of Legal Responsibility.Nicole A. Vincent - 2015 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (3):477-498.
    Philosophical compatibilism reconciles moral responsibility with determinism, and some neurolaw scholars think that it can also reconcile legal views about responsibility with scientific findings about the neurophysiological basis of human action. Although I too am a compatibilist, this paper argues that philosophical compatibilism cannot be transplanted “as-is” from philosophy into law. Rather, before compatibilism can be re-deployed, it must first be modified to take account of differences between legal and moral responsibility, and between a scientific and a deterministic world view, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • What If? The Farther Shores of Neuroethics: Commentary on “Neuroscience May Supersede Ethics and Law”.Henry T. Greely - 2012 - Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (3):439-446.
    Neuroscience is clearly making enormous progress toward understanding how human brains work. The implications of this progress for ethics, law, society, and culture are much less clear. Some have argued that neuroscience will lead to vast changes, superseding much of law and ethics. The likely limits to the explanatory power of neuroscience argue against that position, as do the limits to the social relevance of what neuroscience will be able to explain. At the same time neuroscience is likely to change (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Should or should not forensic psychiatrists think about free will?Gerben Meynen - 2009 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 12 (2):203-212.
    The forensic psychiatrist’s task is often considered to be tightly connected to the concept of free will. Yet, there is also a lack of clarity about the role of the concept of free will in forensic psychiatry. Recently, Morse has argued that forensic psychiatrists should not mention free will in their reports or testimonies, and, moreover, that they should not even think about free will. Starting from a discussion on Morse’s claims, I will develop my own view on how forensic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Social Explanations and the Free Will Problem.Manuel Vargas - 2014 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology: Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Bradford. pp. 403-411.
    There is strikingly little agreement across academic fields about the existence of free will, what experimental results show, and even what the term ‘free will’ means. In Lee and Harris’ “A Social Perspective on Debates About Free Will” the authors argue that group identities and their attendant social rewards are part of the problem. As they portray it, “different philosophical stances create social groups and inherent conflict, hindering interdisciplinary intellectual exploration on the question of free will because people incorporate their (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Neural Lie Detection, Criterial Change, and OrdinaryLanguage.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2010 - Neuroethics 4 (3):205-213.
    Michael Pardo and Dennis Patterson have recently put forward several provocative and stimulating criticisms that strike at the heart of much work that has been done at the crossroads of neuroscience and the law. My goal in this essay is to argue that their criticisms of the nascent but growing field of neurolaw are ultimately based on questionable assumptions concerning the nature of the ever evolving relationship between scientific discovery and ordinary language. For while the marriage between ordinary language and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Good Enough Reason: Addiction, Agency and Criminal Responsibility.Stephen J. Morse - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (5):490 - 518.
    ABSTRACT The article begins by contrasting medical and moral views of addiction and how such views influence responsibility and policy analysis. It suggests that since addiction always involves action and action can always be morally evaluated, we must independently decide whether addicts do not meet responsibility criteria rather than begging the question and deciding by the label of ?disease? or ?moral weakness?. It then turns to the criteria for criminal responsibility and shows that the criteria for criminal responsibility, like the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Adorno, Freedom and Criminal Law: The ‘Determinist Challenge’ Revitalised.Craig Reeves - 2016 - Law and Critique 27 (3):323-348.
    This article argues—against the present compatibilist orthodoxy in the philosophy of criminal law—for the contemporary relevance of a kind of critique of criminal law known as the ‘determinist challenge’, through a reconstruction of Theodor Adorno’s thought on freedom and determinism. The article begins by considering traditional forms of the determinist challenge, which expressed a widespread intuition that it is irrational or inappropriate for the criminal law to hold people responsible for actions that are causally determined by social and psychological forces (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • From being unaccountable to suffering from severe mental disorder and (possibly) back once again to being unaccountable.Christer Svennerlind - 2015 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 8 (2):45-58.
    From 1965, the Swedish penal law does not require accountability as a condition for criminal responsibility. Instead, severely mentally disordered offenders are sentenced to forensic psychiatric care. The process that led to the present legislation had its origins in a critique of the concept of accountability that was first launched 50 years earlier by the founding father of Swedish forensic psychiatry, Olof Kinberg. The concept severe mental disorder is part of the Criminal Code as well as the Compulsory Mental Act. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Minds, Brains, and Desert: On the relevance of neuroscience for retributive punishment.Alva Stråge - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburg
    It is a common idea, and an element in many legal systems, that people can deserve punishment when they commit criminal (or immoral) actions. A standard philosophical objection to this retributivist idea about punishment is that if human choices and actions are determined by previous events and the laws of nature, then we are not free in the sense required to be morally responsible for our actions, and therefore cannot deserve blame or punishment. It has recently been suggested that this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Free will and psychiatric assessments of criminal responsibility: a parallel with informed consent. [REVIEW]Gerben Meynen - 2010 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 13 (4):313-320.
    In some criminal cases a forensic psychiatrist is asked to make an assessment of the state of mind of the defendant at the time of the legally relevant act. A considerable number of people seem to hold that the basis for this assessment is that free will is required for legal responsibility, and that mental disorders can compromise free will. In fact, because of the alleged relationship between the forensic assessment and free will, researchers in forensic psychiatry also consider the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • There but for the Grace of My Orbitofrontal Cortex …. [REVIEW]Frej Klem Thomsen - 2014 - Criminal Justice Ethics 33 (3):220-235.
    The human brain, with its 100 billion neurons working in intricate collaborations to create the physical basis of the memories, perceptions, thoughts, and emotions that together make me the person...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark