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  1. Galen on the Stoic-Peripatetic Controversy about Mixtures: Qualities or Bodies?Claudia Mirrione - 2023 - Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico 44 (2):295-311.
    Galen’s elemental mixture of fire, air, water and earth (and of the corresponding primary qualities, hot, cold, dry and wet) is primarily a physical process, in which primary elements mix and give rise to all compounded physical bodies, inanimate and animate. As such, the concrete, physical process of mixture is an essential basis for a thorough understanding of Galen’s physical system. In this article I pursued a twofold aim. First, I showed Galen’s syncretic approach while expounding his theory of mixture (...)
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  • Nature and demon on dreams and prophesies in Aristotle.Héctor Zagal Arreguín - 2020 - Ideas Y Valores 69 (172):9-20.
    RESUMEN En Acerca de la adivinación, Aristóteles afirma que "la naturaleza es demoniaca". El adjetivo es difícil de traducir y tiene connotación sobrenatural tanto en griego como en español. Pero si Aristóteles no explica lo natural apelando a lo sobrenatural, ¿por qué utiliza este adjetivo? Para resolver la dificultad se propone una lectura mitigada del adjetivo demoniaco. "Maravilloso" es una buena traducción, porque sugiere que la naturaleza es sorprendente y no por ello carente de explicación natural. ABSTRACT In On Divination, (...)
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  • How Aristotle Changes Anaxagoras’s Mind.Jason W. Carter - 2019 - Apeiron 52 (1):1-28.
    I argue that a common interpretation of DA 3.4, which sees Aristotle as there rejecting Anaxagoras’s account of mind, is mistaken. Instead, I claim that, in providing his solution to the main puzzles of this chapter, Aristotle takes special care to preserve the essential features that he thinks Anaxagoras ascribes to mind, namely, its ability to know all things, its being unmixed, and its inability to be affected by mixed objects.
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  • Change, Agency and the Incomplete in Aristotle.Andreas Anagnostopoulos - 2017 - Phronesis 62 (2):170-209.
    Aristotle’s most fundamental distinction between changes and other activities is not that ofMetaphysicsΘ.6, between end-exclusive and end-inclusive activities, but one implicit inPhysics3.1’s definition of change, between the activity of something incomplete and the activity of something complete. Notably, only the latter distinction can account for Aristotle’s view, inPhysics3.3, that ‘agency’—effecting change in something, e.g. teaching—does not qualify strictly as a change. This distinction informsDe Anima2.5 and imparts unity to Aristotle’s extended treatment of change inPhysics3.1-3.
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  • Self-knowledge in Aristotle.Frank A. Lewis - 1996 - Topoi 15 (1):39-58.
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  • Causation as property acquisition.S. D. Rieber - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 109 (1):53 - 74.
    Persistence theories of causation – such as transference theory, conserved-quantity theory, and Douglas Ehring's theory – attempt to analyzecausation in terms of some persisting entityconnecting cause and effect. While mostpersistence accounts are intended as empiricaltheories, this article develops a persistenceanalysis of the concept of causation. The basic idea is that the central concept ofdirect causation can be analyzed in terms ofproperty acquisition. The analysis cohereswith our ordinary causal judgments andprovides a straightforward explanation of thedirection of causation. It also explains whybackwards (...)
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