Firms usually need to attract debt to form and grow, but increasing financial leverage also entails increased risks and costs for stakeholders, such as customers and employees. Accordingly, past research suggests that for common commercial firms (CCFs), which prioritize profits, higher leverage leads to lower sales growth and higher employment costs. However, Certified B Corporations (CBCs) distinguish themselves by having a credible prosocial mission and, therefore, might be better insulated against the adverse effects of higher leverage. Using a European multi-country (...) matched sample of 136 CBCs and 136 CCFs, we find that the negative relationship between leverage and sales growth and the positive relationship between leverage and employment costs are weaker for CBCs than CCFs. Taken together, due to their certified prosocial mission, CBCs enjoy an advantage in debt financing compared to CCFs. (shrink)

Theoretical studies suggest that, when determining the workplace safety level, CEOs face a trade-off between ex ante safety-improving expenditures and the expected losses due to ex post injury and illness occurrences. We examine whether firms with higher CEO inside debt holdings have safer workplaces. Using establishment-level employee workplace injury and illness data, we find that CEOs’ inside debt holdings are negatively associated with employee workplace injury and illness cases. This relationship is more pronounced if workers’ compensation premiums are more sensitive (...) to injury claims and for firms with more government business and less pronounced for firms with higher levels of secured debt. We provide some evidence that our main result stems from CEOs increasing safety investments. Our empirical results are shown to be robust under a batch of robustness tests and when considering potential endogeneity problems. Our findings suggest that CEOs with higher levels of inside debt holdings are more sensitive to wealth loss due to employee injury and illness, leading to a safer workplace. (shrink)

This article explores whether and how long-term investors influence non-executive employees’ incentives. While long-term investors benefit from long-term investments that create value over time, employees tend to be averse to long-term investments. We conjecture that long-term investors foster employee-related CSR to motivate employees to engage in long-term investment projects. Consistent with this prediction, we find that long-term investor ownership is a strong driver of employee-related CSR. Additional analyses indicate that this result is not driven by self-selection or reverse causality. We (...) further show that employee-related CSR leads to increased long-term investments (R&D expenses and corporate innovation). Overall, our findings highlight that employee-related CSR is an important channel through which long-term investors encourage long-term investments. (shrink)